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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
Jacob Matthew Barto 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Department of German and Scandinavian 
 
September 2017 
 
Title: The Poetics of Affirmative Fatalism: Life, Death, and Meaning-Making in Goethe, 
Nietzsche, and Hesse 
 
 The fundamental role that tragedy has played in the development of European 
philosophy and, by extension, psychology, has in part been due to its inextricability from 
an understanding of human life, facilitating its many transformations alongside major 
shifts in the political and social landscapes where it plays out. This dissertation draws a 
thread from the traditions of tragedy and German Trauerspiel through the nineteenth 
century and into the twentieth, focusing on the legacy of the tragic as it lived on in 
Nietzsche's psychological philosophy and was taken up by Hermann Hesse in his literary 
explorations of spiritual development and the fate of the German soul. Affirmative 
fatalism is the conceptual name for a tendency that I observe specifically in German 
literature from the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries, finding its clearest 
articulations in Goethe’s Faust and Nietzsche’s amor fati, and then becoming thematized 
itself in Hesse’s Glasperlenspiel. This study illustrates how ultimately in Hesse’s texts the 
sharp distinction is drawn between affirmative fatalism in its authentic sense – a love of 
and dynamic engagement with fate – and the passive fatalism of authoritarianism – a 
prostration before a prescribed fate, the obsequiousness of which is veiled in the language 
and pageantry of patriotic heroism. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 With rare exception, tragedy as a genre is lost to modernity, and its reception has 
become increasingly difficult as the colloquial use of the word (especially in an English-
speaking context) has emptied it of its former significance. Everything sad and 
lamentable is conflated in the term, but this is, as any literary pedant would have one 
know, hardly a requisite of tragedy. Yet the tragic has not left us. And not only has it 
undergone transformations across compositional forms, but the understanding of the 
tragic imprinted itself so thoroughly on the thinkers of the nineteenth century – most 
importantly, in the context of this study, on Nietzsche – that it remains a key aspect of 
western philosophies and theories of psychology. As far as European thought and 
literature are concerned, tragedy plays a fundamental role in the conception of the 
individual human subject. And as far as European thinkers preoccupied with the 
structures and problems of subjectivity are concerned, the German philosophical and 
literary tradition is indispensable. 
 The emergence and prominence of the individual in Enlightenment thought is 
inextricable from the development of capitalism in Europe. Hence does Goethe's Faust 
serve as a launching point for the exploration of affirmative fatalism in modern German 
literature. This most legendary figure, whose apostasy is not only religious but 
thoroughly political, prefigures the coming crisis of meaning and faith embodied in 
Nietzsche’s Zarathustra. The spiritual rebellion against God and all gods is mirrored in 
the individualist and capitalist rebellion against absolutism, but even these are haunted by 
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a faith – in the self and in capital to produce a sense of meaning. No longer handed down 
from a higher power, meaning for the modern subject issues from within itself. But the 
essence, nature, and function of the self become a grand series of questions for Faust and 
Zarathustra, both of whom are also consumed by a tragic pathos, thus placing the 
question of the individual self squarely within the tradition of tragic literature, 
preoccupied as it is with sacrifice. And it was Nietzsche above all who opened a 
proverbial vat of worms with his writing, inviting the next generation to languish over 
these problems while confronted with an unbelievably fast-changing and disorienting 
social and political reality. 
 Hermann Hesse was one such author of that immediate post-Nietzsche generation. 
He indisputably ranks among the most celebrated, translated, and widely read German 
authors in the world, but for decades has been more or less neglected by literary 
scholarship – and perhaps precisely because of his popularity. While universities, in their 
tireless search for revenue streams, seem incapable of resisting the Faustian temptation to 
indulge every fresh and fleeting interest in new media with minimal historical distance 
and hindsight, literary scholars, expressing a need for a contrived intellectual austerity, 
have embraced a reactionary attitude toward Hesse's nearly century-old corpus. It is a 
tragedy of its own kind, to be sure: once beloved in the United States by hippies and 
university students as an author of the radical search for one's authentic self, Hesse has 
become a name muttered or chuckled with a tinge of nostalgia by that same generation, 
grown and jaded, his work regarded as trite feel-goodery that has lost its utility as 
intellectual capital. As is the wont of tragedy, a sacrifice has been made. "Ah, yes, I read 
Hesse when I was younger," says the older man, well-dressed, stably employed, wedded, 
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entrenched in his position, but his gaze is suddenly detached from the world before him, 
looking back and inward at images now hazy and discolored, a blurred memory more 
akin to a realistic dream, arousing affect but now, here, impractical, unrelatable, 
inconceivable. It is this tragedy of subjectivity, of integration, of aesthetic-ethical 
orientation, that is taken up in this dissertation, and its operative existential comportment, 
affirmative fatalism, is the common thread that connects Goethe's Faust, Nietzsche's 
Zarathustra, and Hesse's Glasperlenspiel. This study cannot claim to save Hesse's work 
from the neglect that it has suffered at the hands of capitalist free-market necessity over 
the last fifty years, but it is a step in that direction, and, attempting to implement an 
affirmative fatalist orientation, embraces the suffered neglect as a necessary component 
of this process which seeks to revive interest in Hesse as an author whose writing on self-
discovery and individualism is indeed very sincerely engaged with the German 
intellectual tradition. 
 The first chapter, which effectively functions as an extension of this introduction, 
provides a definition of the concept of affirmative fatalism, situating it within a tradition 
of tragic literature and surveying works from the Enlightenment to early twentieth-
century modernism that contain representations or expressions of the affirmative fatalist 
worldview. The survey follows George Steiner's argument in The Death of Tragedy, 
which illustrates that the form of tragic literature underwent transformations according to 
social and political changes in Europe, and applies an understanding of fate drawn from 
the works of Friedrich Nietzsche and Walter Benjamin. Here fate is reformulated and is 
no longer a divine judgment or singular moment of doom, but rather a representation of 
reflection and evaluation that informs an existential comportment toward the inevitability 
4 
 
of death, typically imbuing this with a significance that reproduces the sacrificial gesture 
characteristic of tragedy. 
 The second chapter proceeds to elaborate on this transformation of fate through a 
reading of the last scenes of Goethe's Faust II and Nietzsche's Also sprach Zarathustra, 
placing particular emphasis on the transience and temporal situatedness of the subject 
reflecting on fate and orienting itself toward the future. The reading also juxtaposes 
Faust's confrontation with fate (his final monologue before death) and his eventual 
redemption, positing that the latter, while compositionally awkward and conciliatory, 
underscores the religiosity implicit in both Faust's proto-Nietzschean affirmation of fate 
and Nietzsche's own amor fati. Both contain an appeal to grace, insofar as the act of 
affirmation issues from the good faith that not only will the past and fate be made 
meaningful, but that this will also make the future more bearable, if not beautiful. And it 
is that other Nietzschean dictum, that "only as an aesthetic phenomenon is this existence 
still bearable," which informs the affirmative fatalism of amor fati to seek an accord 
between the interior and exterior worlds that might provide meaning and justification. 
Thus these figures and authors underscore the power of narrative texts in communicating 
the contemplation of fate and the creation of meaning for the individual subject. 
 The lingering religiosity described above is carried into the third chapter, which 
focuses first on a reading of Hermann Hesse's "letter to the German youth," Zarathustras 
Wiederkehr, in which the author revives Nietzsche's teacher of the Eternal Return in 
Germany in the wake of the First World War. The reading compares moments in the text 
that mirror scenes from Nietzsche's book, centering particularly on how Hesse's 
Zarathustra discusses fate, suffering, and God, and then moves into a reading of excerpts 
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from his essays on religion. Throughout these texts Hesse draws on the imagery of 
Nietzsche's poetic philosophy and attempts to reconcile the anti-theism therein with his 
own lingering Christianity, highlighting the appeal to grace discussed in the second 
chapter. Hesse sets out to offer a modern understanding of God that acknowledges his 
metaphoricity while also expressing an appreciation of his psychological reality, allowing 
for an articulation of faith which is neither dogmatic nor metaphysical, but rather a 
development of Nietzsche's thought and sincere reflection on the overcoming of nihilism. 
It is ultimately in the human capacity for creative thought and expression that Hesse 
seems to identify the source of divinity, and it is in narration that possibility and the 
meaning of the subject's life and death are negotiated as in the affirmative fatalism of 
Nietzsche's tragic psychology. 
 The fourth and final chapter takes up the idea of writing as an existential-
psychological thought experiment and walks through the four incarnations of Josef 
Knecht in Das Glasperlenspiel as Hesse's grand exercise in the exploration of affirmative 
fatalism. Throughout the narratives it is not only a question of the tragic sacrifice implicit 
in the formation of the subject that Hesse illustrates, but also of the question that he took 
upon himself regarding the writer as a representative of a tradition within the broader 
context of European and world history. Castalia represents not merely the educational 
institution, but the German literary tradition, and Knecht is the writer in exile. If the 
sacrificial gesture of the tragic figure functions to imbue his life with a meaning that 
might inform and inspire the future generations of the community, for which community 
and what kind of legacy does this figure perform the gesture in the face of social 
upheaval, dehumanizing racial politics, and horrifying, large-scale military conflict? 
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Affirmative fatalism itself does not have a defined political orientation, but its 
manifestations bear political and religious inflections that are carried forward in the 
sacrificial gesture. Knecht embodies the artist and intellectual whose devotion to an ideal 
refuses recuperation – and who, in striving to craft a humanist legacy, is willing to fling 
himself into the deadly unknown for the sake of future generations, that they may liberate 
themselves from thoughtless belligerence. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE CONCEPT OF AFFIRMATIVE FATALISM 
 
What is Affirmative Fatalism? 
 An expression that implicates two apparently dialectically opposed philosophical 
comportments requires some clarification. Fatalism implies a resignation, its origins lying 
in the tradition of tragedy and the hero's subjugation to the divine powers of fate. It 
describes the comportment of a fated subject toward a telos terminating in an impending 
doom, the conditions of which seem to provide no effective means of escaping its grasp. 
Affirmation, on the other hand, implies a sense of subjective autonomy, stemming from 
humanist and Enlightenment thought. It describes a more active, creative comportment 
toward a telos the termination of which is not fixed, but rather might be influenced by the 
affirming subject. Affirmative fatalism suggests a synthesis that overcomes the apparent 
contradiction, an orientation toward the telos of mortality that acknowledges fatedness – 
materially and psychologically – but endeavors through time, the constantly unfolding 
space between the present and death, to endow life with meaning and dignity in the face 
of its inevitable dissolution. The affirmative fatalist worldview recognizes the material 
limits placed on possible action while striving nevertheless to act, often in 
acknowledgement that the action will, by virtue of its defiant character, necessitate or 
become a sacrifice for the sake of posterity. Its concern is beauty as the symmetry of 
becoming through the subject's interiority and the exterior world in which it finds itself. 
Thus affirmative fatalism seeks to craft a narrative of the self that allows the interior and 
exterior to align so that thought and action may be united through conviction and the 
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human life, subject as it is to fate and death, may exhaust itself meaningfully.  
 While perhaps a conceptual novelty, affirmative fatalism has its literary roots in 
Greek tragedy, which remains its modality, despite undergoing various formal and 
stylistic transformations, continuing into the twentieth century. Indeed, one can sniff it 
out wherever a well-crafted tragic narrative is in play, but more than functioning as a 
mere survey, this study concerns itself with particular German expressions of affirmative 
fatalism. The crux of this investigation is Friedrich Nietzsche, as both heir to and father 
of oscillating revolutionary and reactionary manifestations of the affirmative fatalist 
comportment. Tracing this existential comportment through its transformations and 
appearance in varying genres, affirmative fatalism eventually coincides with and proves 
its inextricability from the modern problem of freedom. What follows is a cursory sketch 
of the movement of the tragic modality from the Enlightenment (in the form of the 
Trauerspiel) through the nineteenth century (distilled in Nietzsche's declaration of amor 
fati) and into the early twentieth century. It is finally Hermann Hesse who, in the form 
and narrative structure of Das Glasperlenspiel, thematizes affirmative fatalism itself, 
seizing on the import of moments of existential isolation – the modern form of fate – and 
exploring the ethical implications of orientations toward freedom. 
 Although its modality and ostensible origin is tragedy, affirmative fatalism 
necessarily transcends genre – this being a foil through which affirmative fatalism, as the 
expression of an existential comportment, finds expression. In similar fashion it 
transcends religion, at least in the German context, representing at times the preeminence 
of a pagan attitude that contradicts the Christian emphasis on divine providence and 
justice. George Steiner writes in The Death of Tragedy: "All men are aware of tragedy in 
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life. But tragedy as a form of drama is not universal. It has become so much a part of our 
sense of the possibilities of human conduct...that we forget what a strange and complex 
idea it is to re-enact private anguish on a public stage. This idea and the vision of man 
which it implies are Greek" (3). Contrasting it with the Judaic tradition, which insists on 
the justice of God's unknowable plans, he continues: "Tragic drama arises out of precisely 
the contrary assertion: necessity is blind and man's encounter with it shall rob him of his 
eyes, whether in Thebes or in Gaza" (5). And while Christianity attempted to sublimate 
the tragic and justify it, especially in the martyr drama, its core sentiment has persisted 
against all of these attempts, quite notably and ironically in German literature from the 
Enlightenment through into the twentieth century, that span of time in which reason was 
to exert its power against myth and free European civilization from the cryptic forces of 
fate. As science and rational philosophy demystified nature with increasing clarity, there 
lingered a sense that the world – natural as well as social – no matter how mechanistically 
explicable, still exerted its power with an indifference that could not be distinguished 
from cruelty; that the Enlightenment ideal of freedom, as both an impossibility as well as 
the ineluctable compulsion of modern subjectivity, maintained a fated quality that seemed 
still to constrain the human striving for meaning to gestures of sacrifice. This is the 
existential perspective on which affirmative fatalism insists and the tragically repetitious 
mode through which it persists. 
 The dialectical nature of affirmative fatalism signifies an inextricable 
entanglement in the question of freedom, as it implies a sort of determinism while 
undermining its authority, thereby revealing the necessity of limitations for the very 
conceptualization of freedom, the absolute form of which is also thereby revealed to be 
10 
 
an illusion. The thematization of affirmative fatalism in German literature since the 
Enlightenment has its roots in the historical emergence of the individual, as 
problematized in Erich Fromm's Escape from Freedom where he writes: "the structure of 
modern society affects man in two ways simultaneously: he becomes more independent, 
self-reliant, and critical, and he becomes more isolated, alone, and afraid" (Fromm 104). 
Freedom becomes a question of one's orientation toward the inevitability of death in an 
increasingly complex social world, thus leading to the various political inflections of 
affirmative fatalism. Fromm asserts that two courses of action open up to the individual 
in the assessment of freedom, which is to some extent illusory, insofar as it is limited, and 
to another the burden of each living subject, insofar it is the demand of modernity that the 
individual choose a course of action. "By one course," Fromm writes, "he can progress to 
'positive freedom'; he can relate himself spontaneously to the world in love and work, in 
the genuine expression of his emotional, sensuous, and intellectual capacities" (139). This 
is the course of action represented in Hermann Hesse's work, the ultimate object of this 
study. "The other course open to him is to fall back, to give up his freedom, and to try to 
overcome his aloneness by eliminating the gap that has arisen between his individual self 
and the world" (139). This is the course of action against which Hesse wrote, Germany's 
descent into fascism. 
 The political inflections of affirmative fatalism are informed by the conditions in 
which the subject – either real or imagined – confronts fate in a moment of recognition, 
as well as under what conditions the subject's relation to death and a contingent sense of 
freedom develop. This is also in large part Fromm's concern: by what means available the 
subject reckons with present conditions and the possible consequences of any course 
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pursued, how value is assigned and how action is thereby determined. Underlying this 
consideration, however, and also informing it is a more fundamental concern, the 
preponderance of which Keiji Nishitani, a Buddhist thinker and Nietzsche scholar of the 
Kyoto School, posed as the basis of inquiry in his book Religion and Nothingness: 
"Religion poses as a starting point the question: 'For what purpose do I exist?' We 
become aware of religion as a need, as a must for life, only at the level of life at 
which everything else loses its necessity and its utility. Why do we exist at all? Is 
not our very existence and human life ultimately meaningless? Or, if there is a 
meaning or significance to it all, where do we find it? When we come to doubt the 
meaning of our existence in this way, when we have become a question to 
ourselves, the religious quest awakens within us" (Nishitani RN 3). 
Before the subject might contemplate the limits and bounds of freedom, before an 
orientation of any kind, much less the affirmative fatalist standpoint, might be assumed, 
the very possibility for meaning poses itself as a question, the object of which is the 
essence of the religious impulse. Affirmative fatalism, as a comportment which seeks to 
assert the value and meaning of life in the face of limitations and the inevitability of 
death, rests upon a religiosity springing from this most basic question, absent as it might 
seem from discourse, but indispensable to this study, especially as it implicates both 
Nietzsche and Hesse. 
 What follows is a brief survey of representations of affirmative fatalism in 
German literature from the Enlightenment to the early twentieth century. The seeming 
leaps between genres go hand in hand with George Steiner's general thesis in The Death 
of Tragedy – that the literary space in which tragedy plays out shifted alongside social 
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and political changes in Europe from lyric drama into prose – to illustrate that the home 
of affirmative fatalism lies in moments of tragic recognition. Each particular iteration of 
affirmative fatalism, by virtue of its historical and material determinations, speaks to the 
complicated relationship between aesthetics and ethics in literary representations of 
human subjects confronting the ambiguous possibility of meaning for life and death; each 
orientation, as an affirmation of necessity and recognition of the dialectical nature of 
freedom, speaks to the conception and existential concerns of the subject and the 
continued relevance of the preponderance of the tragic through the developments of 
modernity as a broader phenomenon. 
 
A Brief Historical Survey 
 Gotthold Ephraim Lessing's Emilia Galotti serves as a late example of the 
German attempt at the martyr drama and the affirmative fatalist worldview manifest in 
the tradition of the Trauerspiel. After resisting a scheming prince's attempts to seduce her, 
the eponymous protagonist learns that her betrothed has been murdered and that the 
prince plans to come and take her by force. Her father, having resigned himself to the loss 
of his daughter to the wicked monarch, speaks in indicative statements about her future: 
"Denke nur: unter dem Vorwande einer gerichtlichen Untersuchung, – o des höllischen 
Gaukelspiels! – reißt er dich aus usern Armen, und bringt dich zur Grimaldi" (85). This is 
mere fatalism, however, and it is Emilia who speaks the language of affirmative fatalism, 
a simultaneous recognition of her helplessness and existential demand upon herself to 
choose the direction of her fate, as odious as it may be. "Reißt mich? bringt mich?" she 
asks, "– Will mich reißen; will mich bringen: will! will! – Als ob wir, wir keinen Willen 
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hätten, mein Vater" (85)! She is no fool, she knows the limits of her will and its 
realization, but the sacrifice to which she commends herself is mortal, not moral; in 
depriving herself of life, she deprives the prince of the fulfillment of his lascivious desire.  
 But it is for the sake of the moral order that the mortal sacrifice is made. Tragedy 
takes as its subject the intersection of these forces, as cryptically described by Walter 
Benjamin in his study on the Trauerspiel: "Fate leads to death. Death is not punishment 
but atonement, an expression of the subjection of guilty life to the law of natural life" 
(OGTD 131). The affirmative element of the fatalism so prevalent in the German literary 
canon is the desire to maintain honor and autonomy in the confrontation with fate. Thus 
the subject of the tragic is mor(t)ality: the intersection of visceral life, defined by death, 
and the fraught experience of its contingencies; the intersection of life as such, which is 
always already a physically interdependent phenomenon, and the web of guilt, the 
schema of interdependence that prescribes social existence and describes its 
consequences – literally and sonorously expressed through the inscription of the t, where 
the tongue strikes at the teeth and speaks the collision represented in crossed lines, 
thereby affixing a memento mori to the questions of good and evil. The tragic appears 
where the composition of a drama or narrative illustrates the power of the natural law in 
human affairs with such intensity that it takes on the qualities of divine judgment. 
Affirmative fatalism is the worldview that attempts, in the face of such apparent cruelty, 
not only to draw meaning from these collisions, but to translate it into an attitude that 
asserts with equal force the value of human experience, even where its convictions are 
self-evidently illusory. 
 But affirmative fatalism need not necessarily be couched in a morality like that of 
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Lessing's Emilia Galotti. The old order, sanctifying innocence and justified anew by 
rational philosophy, bore the seed of a reactive fascination with the moral and emotional 
frailty of the human in Romanticism. Here the mortal self is not offered as a sacrifice to 
uphold the moral order, but often in spite of it, affirming it while refusing to obey its 
dictates, to bestow even the basest human suffering with a redemptive power which in its 
impotent defiance stakes a tragic claim. But it is in spite and because of the ambivalent 
significance of the sacrifice – whether an act of rebellion or obedience – that the 
tendencies at hand may be discussed under the category of the tragic.  
"The tragic is to the demonic what the paradox is to ambiguity. In all the 
paradoxes of tragedy – in the sacrifice, which, in complying with the ancient 
statutes, creates new ones, in death, which is an act of atonement but which 
sweeps away only the self, in the tragic ending, which grants the victory to man, 
but also to god – ambiguity, the stigma of the daimons, is in decline. ... It is rather 
that in tragedy pagan man realizes that he is better than his gods, but this 
realization strikes him dumb, and it remains unarticulated. ... The paradox of the 
birth of genius in moral speechlessness, moral infantility, constitutes the sublime 
element in tragedy" (Benjamin 109-10).  
For Benjamin the tragic gains its significance through its implementation of paradox, 
thereby challenging and reaffirming the tyranny of paradox, thus formally imitating the 
world or myth that it simultaneously questions and reinforces in its content. Franco 
Moretti similarly characterizes tragedy in his essay The Great Eclipse, echoing Nietzsche 
when he writes, "Yet new ages are not brought into being merely through the 
development of new ideas: the dissolution or overthrowing of old ideas plays an equal 
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part in their emergence" (42). Affirmative fatalism likewise has its home in paradox, 
expressed in ancient tragedy as well as modern narrative: to challenge the way of the 
world, one must pay a toll in the currency of that which one seeks to emancipate from the 
demonic or cosmic order, be it property, sanity, or life. It is not an appeal to justice, but to 
the power of the spectacle of sacrifice, even if there are no literal witnesses. The literary 
form itself provides that possibility. 
 Heinrich von Kleist, known for his particular brand of macabre Romantic irony, 
crafted his story Der Findling around a web of uncanny intrigue, throughout which a 
young man, Nicolo, overcome by lust and treacherous resentment, ruins the lives of his 
adoptive family, ultimately driving his father, Piachi, to defy the legal order that 
guaranteed his property to the wicked foundling. In his inimitable style Kleist weaves a 
tale of increasing frustration through often long, winding sentences replete with relative 
and dependent clauses, such that the details of the unfolding action are hidden in 
labyrinthine formulations, defusing vital, explosive acts in the larger haze of social life. 
Building the tension around a series of private and social scandals that unfold in this way, 
uncanny moments are likewise defused, until the finale, Piachi's confrontation with the 
law and his fate, where his encounters with death and the consequences of his actions, as 
well as the questionable legitimacy of the prevailing order, inspire in him a rebellion 
against the conciliatory gesture of absolution. 
"In dem Kirchenstaat herrscht ein Gesetz, nach welchem kein Verbrecher zum 
Tode geführt werden kann, bevor er die Absolution empfangen. Piachi, als ihm 
der Stab gebrochen war, verweigerte sich hartknäckig der Absolution. Nachdem 
man vergebens alles, was die Religion an die Hand gab, versucht hatte, ihm die 
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Strafwürdigkeit seiner Handlung fühlbar zu machen, hoffte man, ihn durch den 
Anblick des Todes, der seiner wartete, in das Gefühl der Reue hineinzuschrecken, 
und führte ihn nach dem Galgen hinaus. Hier stand ein Priester und schilderte 
ihm, mit der Lunge der letzten Posaune, alle Schrecknisse der Hölle, in die seine 
Seele hinabzufahren im Begriff war; dort ein andrer, den Leib dess Herrn, das 
heilige Entsühnungsmittel in der Hand, und pries ihm die Wohnungnen des 
ewigen Friedens. – 'Willst du der Wohltat der Erlösung teilhaftig werden?' fragten 
ihn beide. 'Willst du das Abendmahl empfangen?' – Nein, antwortete Piachi. – 
'Warum nicht?' – Ich will nicht selig sein. Ich will in den untersten Grund der 
Hölle hinabfahren. Ich will den Nicolo, der nicht im Himmel sein wird, 
wiederfinden, und meine Rache, die ich hier nur unvollständig befriedigen 
konnte, wieder aufnehmen" (64)! 
In his defiance of the church as well as the law, which are here notably asserted together 
in the designation "Kirchenstaat," Piachi draws the explosive power of the various 
transgressions together with the eerie, spectral atmosphere crafted by the narrator and, in 
his final declaration, summons the wrath of hell to earth in himself. The reality of that 
hell is inconsequential; it is enough to haunt Nicolo with the threat of doubled torment in 
death. Only the curse, lingering into posterity, for the sake of which Piachi sacrifices 
himself, can give meaning to his death in the face of the injustice that he has suffered. His 
damnation, by invoking the prevailing order's most terrible threat, contains the possibility 
to erode faith in that order by virtue of the conviction of his impotent defiance. 
 Whether Christian martyrs or infernal avengers, the figures of the literature thus 
far surveyed share in common a general lack of classical nobility. It is the shift that 
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George Steiner observes in The Death of Tragedy as a hallmark of the modern 
transformation of the tragic: the movement from lyrical drama concerned with high 
personages to prose drama and narrative that speak of the struggles of the middle and 
lower classes (194-5). Kleist is likewise a central figure for this pivot, in that, while some 
of his dramas still present mythical heroes in verse, his more poignant works present the 
force of tragic fate in the more mundane, bourgeois world and language of prose. Steiner 
credits this Romantic with giving expression to "that characteristically modern insight 
into the plurality of individual consciousness" (220), as his vivid, shocking language 
charges the prosaic with a mystery that in verse was attributed to the distant, untouchable 
gods; in his figures the terror of fate does not merely fall from the sky, but rather 
exercises its power through the impenetrable fog of social relations and psychology. 
 These stylistic and topical changes run alongside a change undergone in the 
spiritual life of Europe, and specifically the German states. The fateful encounters that 
constitute the central struggles in the emerging tragic narratives of and after the 
Enlightenment signify the diffusion of powers formerly reserved for the gods into the 
fabric of social existence, which is to say: into human beings. The democratization of 
Europe decentralized power from monarchs as philosophy undermined the spiritual 
authority of the churches, and the struggles of the individual human being took moral and 
aesthetic precedence over the exaggerated tragedies of mythical gods and kings. In the 
Trauerspiel, in melodrama, in stories and novellas, the examination of the tragic figure's 
fate became less concerned with any divine judgment – be it just or arbitrary – and more 
concerned with psychological complexity, the ambiguity of guilt, and blind chance, the 
indifference of nature. The sense of the tragic and an accompanying affirmative fatalism 
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proved by this shift to be matters of interpretation, but also thereby gained a renewed 
power for the consideration of human – and historical – affairs. 
 For many this was nowhere more observable than in the French Revolution, 
which furnished Georg Büchner with dramatic material most suitable for a vivid 
expression of affirmative fatalism. In the so-called "fatalism letter" of 1834 Büchner 
reflected on how the revolution and its aftermath illustrated with frightful clarity the 
visceral horrors that still threatened to manifest even in emancipatory humanist 
movements. 
"Ich studierte die Geschichte der Revolution. Ich fühlte mich wie zernichtet unter 
dem gräßlichen Fatalismus der Geschichte. Ich finde in der Menschennatur eine 
entsetzliche Gleichheit, in den menschlichen Verhältnissen eine unabwendbare 
Gewalt, Allen und Keinem verliehen. Der Einzelne nur Schaum auf der Welle, die 
Größe ein bloßer Zufall, die Herrschaft des Genies ein Puppenspiel, ein 
lächerliches Ringen gegen ein ehernes Gesetz, es zu erkennen das Höchste, es zu 
beherrschen unmöglich" (GW 219). 
For Büchner there is a violence (Gewalt) perpetrated even in human nature that 
ultimately reduces every individual to "foam on the wave." The force (Gewalt) of social 
existence, traditions and revolutions alike, transforms the actions of singular subjects into 
broad objective phenomena, infused with the same inscrutable power exercised by nature 
and the gods: "an iron law, the recognition of which is the highest, the mastery of which 
is impossible." The same pathos courses through his play inspired by the French 
Revolution, Dantons Tod, where the terror resulting from the revolution exerts its 
destructive power over the very men who led the charge. Facing his execution, Danton 
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utters his last words in simultaneous defiance and acceptance of his fate, striving even in 
his final moments to mock and invite his death, and says to the executioner as he and his 
revolutionary compatriots approach the guillotine: "Willst du grausamer sein als der Tod? 
Kannst du verhindern, dass unsere Köpfe sich auf dem Boden des Korbes küssen" (94)? 
As if this postmortem humiliation could cut more deeply than the guillotine. But the 
sardonic last words also contain a warning: whatever dark comedy or horror plays out on 
the scaffold, a more ancient myth repeats itself which should be taken to heart. "Die 
Revolution is wie Saturn," Danton says in the first act, foretelling his own demise, "sie 
frisst ihre eigenen Kinder" (29). 
 It is Büchner who for George Steiner represents the dissolution of the tragic into 
prosaic life, especially in the fragmented and torturous Woyzeck. For Steiner it is the 
literally unspeakable terror which the confrontation with fate evokes in the tragic subject 
that gives tragedy its name; with Büchner's Woyzeck and the eponymous character's 
inarticulacy the modern transformation of the tragic is complete. 
"Woyzeck...is driven by his torment toward an articulateness which is not native 
to him. He tries to break out of silence and is continually drawn back because the 
words at his command are inadequate to the pressure and savagery of his feeling. 
The result is a kind of terrible simplicity. Each word is used as if it had just been 
given to human speech. It is new and full of uncontrollable meaning. That is the 
way children use words, holding them at arm's length because they have a natural 
apprehension of their power to build or destroy" (Steiner 279-80). 
Where the heroes of more classical tragedy made their sacrifices as gods and nobles, 
elevated above the communities bearing witness to their grand gestures, Woyzeck 
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presents the ineffable horror of the lowest person's suffering, not dignified, but grotesque 
and pitiful. Woyzeck's fate is hardly monumental or transformative in the classical sense. 
Instead, it lends itself to a pointed critique of social stratification as a signal of an 
emergent social awareness and historical consciousness. The heroes of old are a distant 
memory, unimaginable in the soldier's cruel and lowly circumstances, and in the form of 
pure drama, stripped of ancient tragedy's ritualistic character, Woyzeck merely enacts his 
hideous misery for the world to behold. There are no gods to pass judgment here; their 
power has been diffused into the doctor, the captain, the lover, the mocking or indifferent 
masses who likewise condemn Woyzeck to inarticulate madness. He cannot be discussed 
in terms of affirmative fatalism per se, but important here is the particular movement of 
power from the cosmos into banality. Infused with such mortal power, the social sphere 
becomes both the locus and focus of new tragic forms. 
 The tragic figure's gesture toward a future that can learn from the sacrifice 
becomes itself ironized under the cold gaze of realism, where it serves as an example of 
commonplace and calculated cowardice in the face of the prevailing order. In Effi Briest, 
a domestic novel about a marriage and its discontents, Theodor Fontane illustrates a 
thoroughly cynical affirmative fatalism in Geert von Instetten. Discovering his wife Effi's 
love letters from an affair over six years past, Instetten resolves in conversation with his 
friend Wüllersdorf that he must challenge her former lover, Major Crampas, to a pistol 
duel. Instetten delivers his decision, which is not conceived as a decision, in a long 
monologue to his friend: 
"Man is nicht bloß ein einzelner Mensch, man gehört einem Ganzen an, und auf 
das Ganze haben wir beständig Rücksicht zu nehmen, wir sind durchaus abhängig 
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von ihm. ...  Man braucht nicht glücklich zu sein, am allerwenigsten hat man 
einen Anspruch darauf, und den, der einem das Glück genommen hat, den braucht 
man nicht notwendig aus der Welt zu schaffen. Man kann ihn, wenn man 
weltabgewandt weiterexistieren will, auch laufen lassen. Aber im Zusammenleben 
mit den Menschen hat sich ein Etwas ausgebildet, das nun mal da ist und nach 
dessen Paragraphen wir uns gewöhnt haben, alles zu beurteilen, die andern und 
uns selbst. Und dagegen zu verstoßen, geht nicht; die Gesellschaft verachtet uns, 
und zuletzt tun wir es selbst und können es nicht aushalten und jagen uns die 
Kugel durch den Kopf. Verszeihen Sie, dass ich Ihnen solche Vorlesung halte, die 
schließlich doch nur sagt, was sich jeder selber hundertmal gesagt hat. Aber 
freilich, wer kann was Neues sagen! Also noch einmal, nichts von Hass oder 
dergleichen, und um eines Glückes willen, das mir genommen wurde, mag ich 
nicht Blut an den Händen haben; aber jenes, wenn Sie wollen, uns tyrannisierende 
Gesellschafts-Etwas, das fragt nicht nach Charme und nicht nach Liebe und nicht 
nach Verjährung. Ich habe keine Wahl. Ich muss" (264-5). 
The web of guilt is drawn vividly here in Instetten's assessment of his situation. He is not 
entitled to happiness, and while he is not explicitly compelled by social forces to 
challenge Crampas, he cannot imagine continuing to live in society with the specter of 
Effi's infidelity hanging over him. Eventually, he muses, the shame would drive him to 
suicide. Under the scrutinizing gaze of others no slight can go unavenged; instead, that he 
may live, he must risk his life in the duel. "But truly, who can say anything new!" 
Instetten's exclamation speaks the words of a believer: the power of myth reveals itself 
within the social order, inscribed anew through Instetten's declaration that he has no 
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choice in the matter. It is filled with the echoes of Büchner's letter – the "iron law" that 
one must recognize, but which is impossible to overcome, the sense that the human being 
is "foam on the wave," that "greatness is merely a coincidence." Fontane illustrates in 
Instetten's calm, calculated consultation with Wüllersdorf the muted but undeniable force 
of social obligations and subsequent anxieties. The decision to duel Crampas represents 
once more the affirmative fatalism of one who, bowing to the power of fate, attempts, 
even if only for the sake of pride, to infuse compelled action with a sense of meaning.  
 The movement of cosmic fatal power into the mundane sphere of everyday 
personal life is drawn up vividly in the fourth book of Nietzsche's Gay Science in 
aphorism 341. In the paragraph preceding the introduction of Zarathustra, Nietzsche 
writes: 
"The heaviest weight. – What if some day or night a demon were to steal into your 
loneliest loneliness and say to you: 'This life as you now live it and have lived it 
you will have to live once again and innumerable times again; and there will be 
nothing new in it, but every pain and every joy and every thought and sigh and 
everything unspeakably small or great in your life must return to you, all in the 
same succession and sequence – even this spider and this moonlight between the 
trees, and even this moment and I myself. The eternal hourglass of existence is 
turned over again and again, and you with it, speck of dust!' Would you not throw 
yourself down and gnash your teeth and curse the demon who spoke thus? Or 
have you once experienced a tremendous moment when you would have 
answered him: 'You are a god, and never have I heard anything more divine.' If 
this thought gained power over you, as you are it would transform and possibly 
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crush you; the question in each and every thing, 'Do you want this again and 
innumerable times again?' would lie on your actions as the heaviest weight! Or 
how well disposed would you have to become to yourself and to life to long for 
nothing more fervently than for this ultimate eternal confirmation and seal" (GS 
§341)? 
This thought experiment heralds a new reckoning with the spirit of tragedy for a rapidly 
modernizing Germany, as well as for countless thinkers thereafter. The moment of tragic 
recognition, the confrontation with fate that inspires unspeakable fear, asserts itself as a 
creeping demon, a haunting thought that might occur at any time. Here the fateful 
moment is reimagined as an existential-psychological phenomenon, an intrasubjective 
confrontation between the past and present, the latter being a self-aware amalgamation of 
experiences issuing from the former. As a being who is ever only becoming through time, 
the self grasps itself as the endlessly developing and impossible consummation of its past 
thrust forward toward the future. With the end of point of its trajectory being only death – 
and with death and the hereafter looming as unpredictable, unanswerable questions – fate 
is transformed from a predetermined doom or divine judgment into the stuff of self-
consciousness itself. To overcome the fear inspired by this proposition, one must embrace 
that this process of assessing and accepting the past as not only part of oneself, but as the 
very material from which the self crafts itself. Does the proposition that the thought 
experiment contains not threaten to turn life itself into a repeatable drama? "This life as 
you now live it and have lived it you will have to live once again and innumerable times 
again." Taking stock of one's decisions and actions in such a way, could one affirm this 
life with all of its woe and joy alike, as if it were a tragedy that would repeat in an endless 
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cycle? The question distills the essence of the tragic and situates it in the monotony of 
everyday life, reformulating the mythical proposition in personal and psychological 
terms. Even if this life is indeed finite, as the past reasserts itself in memory, the 
confrontation with fate as a force in social and intersubjective activity provokes a 
reaction and orientation. 
 The orientation that Nietzsche ostensibly promotes – or at least confesses as his 
ardent desire – is affirmatively fatalistic. The thought experiment cited above echoes the 
opening aphorism of the fourth book, which lays out in no uncertain terms the formula 
for this comportment: 
"For the new year. – I'm still alive; I still think: I must still be alive because I still 
have to think. Sum, ergo cogito: cogito, ergo sum. Today everyone allows himself 
to express his dearest wish and thoughts: so I, too, want to say what I wish from 
myself today and what thought first crossed my heart – what thought shall be the 
reason, warrant, and sweetness of the rest of my life! I want to learn more and 
more how to see what is necessary in things as what is beautiful in them – thus 
will I be one of those who make things beautiful. Amor fati: let that be my love 
from now! I do not want to wage war against ugliness. I do not want to accuse; I 
do not even want to accuse the accusers. Let looking away be my only negation! 
And, all in all and on the whole: some day I want only to be a Yes-sayer" (GS 
§276)! 
The proposition is not new, nor was it at the time of its composition. It speaks to a 
particular tragic bent in German literature, the import of which was not lost on Nietzsche 
in his broad critique of philosophy in the wake of the conceptual death of God. 
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Underlying this tradition of affirmative fatalism is a lingering and profound faith which is 
not necessarily Christian, but which is no doubt inflected by centuries of Christianity. 
Key to Nietzsche's thought is the dissolution of those inflections – the insistence upon 
divine justice – and the development of a kind of philosophical faith in the creative power 
of one's interpretive faculties. George Steiner's characterization of tragedy harkens back 
to such a view: "The Greek tragic poets assert that the forces which shape or destroy our 
lives lie outside the governance of reason or justice. Worse than that: there are around us 
daemonic energies which prey upon the soul and turn it to madness or which poison our 
will so that we inflict irreparable outrage upon ourselves and those we love" Steiner 6-7). 
The expression of this senseless suffering in tragedy and its subsequent incarnations 
presents the possibility for the tragic figure – and by extension the spectator or reader – to 
craft an interpretation that affirms fate, if not cosmically, then as personally and 
aesthetically justified. 
 This position, it must be noted, is not political in itself, but the scope of history 
provides the insight that there are naturally and inevitably political ramifications entailed 
in whatever decisions are made, whether these are perceived as voluntary or imposed. 
The affirmatively fatalistic position, however, is also wont to tend toward spiritual 
exhaustion in matters of politics and ethics. No author was perhaps more overcome by 
this feeling than Franz Kafka, whose work is steeped in a hopelessness that cannot but 
help in spite of the specter of doom to strive for understanding and redemption. A similar 
sense of the simultaneous necessity and futility of human action permeates the 
atmospheres of his strange world, and in a parable called "The Emperor" he gives 
expression to his affirmative fatalism that eerily echoes Büchner: 
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"A man doubted that the emperor was descended from the gods; he asserted that 
the emperor was our rightful sovereign, he did not doubt the emperor's divine 
mission (that was evident to him), it was only the divine descent that he doubted. 
This, naturally, did not cause much of a stir; when the surf flings a drop of water 
on to the land, that does not interfere with the eternal rolling of the sea, on the 
contrary, it is caused by it" (183). 
The oceanic imagery employed by both Büchner and Kafka effectively minimizes the 
individual in an atomic sense as the smallest constitutive element of a larger body, 
seemingly powerless to exert any influence over its movement while also implicitly 
responsible for the movement by virtue of its mere existence. This sentiment Kafka also 
transmutes into a more concrete example, so to speak, with "The Great Wall of China," 
where ineffable fate takes on the form of the massive project – not simply the wall itself, 
but the organization of social practices and institutions that make its continuous 
construction possible. As the narrator reveals with increasing clarity the emptiness of the 
rhetoric and popular explanations for the necessity or purpose of the wall, as well the 
general awareness of this fact among his fellow citizens, he maintains to some extent the 
indispensability of the fictions. Of the seemingly passive attitude that happily complies 
with the prevailing social and political institutions of a distant capital whence orders 
come from a probably already dead emperor, the narrator concludes: "All the more 
remarkable is that this very weakness should seem to be one of the greatest unifying 
influences among our people; indeed, if one may dare to use the expression, the very 
ground on which we live. To set about establishing a fundamental defect here would 
mean undermining not only our consciences, but, what is far worse, our feet" (80). 
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 Kafka's parables speak to the developments of modernity in no uncertain terms: 
political engagement feels like an exercise in futility, the machinations of the state are 
cloaked in mystery, and the perpetual consumption machine of capitalism asserts itself as 
a self-evident social necessity. In similar fashion, Hermann Hesse sought to reveal in his 
early writings the reification of time as one of the mechanisms by which the social and 
economic order oppresses human subjects and suspends the possibility for spiritual 
growth by endowing time with an objective character that renders it impotent for the 
contemplation of fate. In his essay Die Kunst des Müßiggangs (1904) he compares the the 
art of storytelling in Europe to eastern traditions, noting their relationships to time: 
"Bei uns, im armen Abendland, haben wir die Zeit in kleine und kleinste Teile 
zerrissen, deren jeder noch den Wert einer Münze hat; dort aber fließt sie noch 
immer unzerstückt in stetig flutender Woge, dem Durst einer Welt genügend, 
unerschöpflich, wie das Salz des Meeres und das Licht der Gestirne. Es liegt mir 
fern, dem die Persönlichkeiten fressenden Betrieb unserer Industrie und unserer 
Wissenschaft irgend einen Rat geben zu wollen. Wenn Industrie und Wissenschaft 
keine Persönlichkeit mehr brauchen, so sollen sie auch keine haben" (9). 
The reified, fractured, compartmentalized time of western capitalism is antithetical to 
genuine human experience – here "personality" – and the psychological state required to 
digest a narrative carefully. Instead, Hesse sees Europeans as consumers of literature and 
stories, using gastronomical metaphors in a fashion similar to Nietzsche, who wrote in 
the third essay of his Genealogy of Morals that "one skill is needed – lost today, 
unfortunately –for the practice of reading as an art: the skill to ruminate, which cows 
possess but modern man lacks" (157). Hesse is not, in the long run, interested in nuanced 
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political criticism, but is rather engaged with considerations of the relationship between 
narrative and subjectivity. A certain indebtedness to Nietzsche is of critical import here, 
for it is out of his tragic philosophy that a number of Hesse's more psychological texts 
provide an articulation of affirmative fatalism as a diegetic means of a character's coming 
to terms with the world. 
 Some twenty years later in an essay called Die Sehnsucht unserer Zeit nach einer 
Weltanschauung (1926) Hesse described the state of the "civilized world" as having lost 
the foundations of culture, "die Religion und die Sitte" (24). It is not a lamentation of the 
loss of a "true" culture, but of culture in general, a concern for the onset of nihilism as the 
abandonment of old spiritual traditions that provided a meaningful basis for social life 
and ethics. "Als Ersatz für die verlorene Sitte hat der moderne Durchschnittsmensch die 
Mode," Hesse claims, which provides templates for social interactions but does not 
provide meaning for all of this activity, such that the dictates of fashion – as custom – 
drive the human like a factory machine. 
"Der Mensch hat nicht bloß das Bedürfnis, in Brauch und Sitte, in Kleidung und 
Unterhaltung, Sport und Konversation durch eine gültige, vorbildliche Form, 
durch irgendein Ideal – sei es auch bloß das Eintagsideal einer Mode – regiert und 
geführt zu werden. Er hat in den tieferen Schichten seines Wesens auch das 
Bedürfnis, seinem ganzen Tun und Treiben, seinem Dasein, seinem Leben und 
Sterbenmüssen einen Sinn gesetzt zu sehen" (Hesse MG 25). 
This religious impulse that Hesse describes is "so alt und wichtig wie das Bedürfnis nach 
Essen, dach Liebe, nach Obdach," and endows the activity of daily life with a meaning 
that the individual subject can incorporate into a sense of self and purpose (25). "Denn 
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auch der ungeistige, oberflächliche, dem Denken abgeneigte Mensch noch hat jenes 
uralte Bedürfnis, einen Sinn seines Lebens zu kennen, und wenn er keinen mehr findet, 
verfällt die Sitte, und das Privatleben steht unter dem Zeichen wildgesteigerter 
Selbstsucht und gesteigerter Todesangst" (25-6). Social life, unanchored from a 
personally meaningful cultural narrative, becomes a question of death, stoking fear and 
an intensified, myopic selfishness. 
 But this crisis also signified an oppotunity: 
"Aber unser Leben ist ein nie unterbrochenes Gewebe von Auf und Ab, 
Niedergang und Neubildung, Verfall und Auferstehung, und so stehen all den 
düsteren und kläglichen Zeichen eines Zerfalles unserer Kultur andere, hellere 
Zeichen gegenüber, die auf ein neues Erwachen des metaphysischen Bedürfnisses, 
auf die Bildung einer neuen Geistigkeit, auf ein leidenschaftliches Bemühen um 
eine neue Sinngebung für unser Leben deuten" (26). 
Hesse saw in his contemporary society the possibility for "a new awakening of the 
metaphysical need," which he in his optimism tried to see from a reflective religious 
standpoint, but which also found its expression in the extreme and violent politics of his 
day, namely in National Socialism. While Hesse's appeal for spiritual renewal echoed 
those Romantic tones that, as Thomas Mann saw it1, sought to resurrect an idealized past, 
                                                        
1It is the tendency toward Innerlichkeit that Thomas Mann in Deutschland und die Deutschen (1945) cites 
as one of the historically fundamental qualities of the Germans, capable of expressing itself dialectically in 
a tendency toward "Zartheit, der Tiefsinn des Herzens, unweltliche Versponnenheit, Naturfrömmigkeit, 
reinster Ernst des Gedankens und des Gewissens," as well as in a tendency toward violent reaction against 
the perceived threat of change, as in Mann's description of Martin Luther: "Aber der gewaltige innerliche 
Grobian von Wittenberg war kein Pazifist; er war voll deutscher Bejahung tragischen Schicksals und 
erklärte sich bereit, das Blut, das da fließen würde, 'auf seinen Hals zu nehmen'" (275). Precisely this 
wording reveals the potentially dangerous but broadly expressed pathos in question: Luther, although 
expressing his Innerlichkeit in religious contemplation and the relationship of the individual with God, was 
"full of German affirmation of tragic fate" when the political order came under threat, ready to let the 
spilled blood of peasants and soldiers run "up to his neck." This paradoxical orientation, spiritually 
revolutionary but politically reactionary, exerted a lasting influence over the religious and political 
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it stood in contrast to nationalist projects of racial purity and domination. Even so, it was 
ever driven by an affirmative fatalism, a view that the world, inherited by the living, 
asserted its tendencies with such force that the individual often became like the drop of 
water flung onto the sand by the rolling tide in Kafka's illustration: powerless to effect 
change in the prevailing order, but ever driven to attempt it; a willing sacrifice for a better 
world to come, yet a constitutive element of the world as it is. 
 
What Lies Ahead 
 The centrality of the moment to the tragic modality through which affirmative 
fatalism presents itself in literature introduces a question of time that intersects with a 
question of the religious or "metaphysical" drive that underlies its differing 
manifestations, and it is in this respect that Hermann Hesse's work is the ultimate object 
of this study. The transformation of fate, from a cosmic or divine judgment into an 
existential-psychological concept, coupled with the reification of time, a primary method 
of the objectification of the human being in modernity, furnished Hesse with the 
opportunity to take up the writing of narrative as a meditative practice in itself that 
provides a space for the reflection lacking in an increasingly mechanized and 
dehumanized world. Specifically and eventually it is the form and content of Hesse's final 
                                                        
philosophies that contributed to the development of German nationalism. This lonely Innerlichkeit made 
the Germans "das Volk der romantischen Gegenrevolution gegen den philosophischen Intellektualismus 
und Rationalismus der Aufklärung – eines Aufstandes der Musik gegen die Literatur, der Mystik gegen die 
Klarheit" (276). But without romanticizing Romanticism, that movement reveals its connection to the 
violent legacy of the German Empire, one of the dangerous consequences of Innerlichkeit: "[Die Romantik] 
ist die Tiefe, welche sich zugleich als Kraft, als Fülle empfindet, ein Pessimismus der Ehrlichkeit, der es 
mit dem Seienden, Wirklichen, Geschichtlichen gegen Kritik und Meliorismus, kurz mit der Macht gegen 
den Geist hält und äußerst gering denkt von aller rhetorischen Tugendhaftigkeit und idealistischen 
Weltbeschönigung" (276). The formation of the German Empire, Mann insists, "durch Krieg enstanden," 
was tainted from the outside by a violent politic born from the Romantic obsession with the past which, in a 
dangerous turn, charged the concept of national unity with the desire to reconstruct a fallen empire that 
never really existed (277). 
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novel, Das Glasperlenspiel, that most explicitly renders this process of contemplative 
reflection transparent in the act of writing itself. First rolling out Josef Knecht's 
biography in slow, painstakingly inward detail, and then assailing the reader with a series 
of poetic writings attributed that very inward figure, each of which centers on a character 
carefully modeled after Knecht, time is wound around itself. And with each iteration of 
Knecht's life, (as Knecht again, then Famulus, and finally Dasa), quiet contemplation 
seems to occupy ever more space, until at last in the Indischer Lebenslauf the bulk of the 
narrative is revealed to be a mere daydream. But even this, when considered within the 
structure of the dominant narrative, is one of many contemplations that inform the "real" 
Knecht's own confrontations with fate. Confrontations – plural – because in Hesse's text 
they assume both their modern form, as existential encounters with the self, and their 
ancient form, as a singular moment of tragic recognition in the face of death.  
 Moments indeed play the crucial role in this study. Whether explicitly discussed in 
the texts at hand or thematized through narration, the moment functions as the locus of 
reflection and the space in which the tragedy of subjectivity, as imagined by Nietzsche, 
plays itself out. That giant of German literature and curiously named tragedy, Goethe's 
Faust, provides in the protagonist's final Augenblick a sketch of this reformulation and an 
insight into how a lingering religious impulse – the shadow of God as an appeal to grace 
– still operates in Nietzsche's thought, though in a markedly different form than in 
Christianity. Faust's confrontation with the fateful moment, configured lyrically as a 
rebirth before and in death, combines the ancient and modern senses of fate in 
anticipation of Nietzsche's amor fati, but is undermined by Goethe's authorial insistence 
on literal redemption. With the salvation of Faust Goethe commits the faux pas of which 
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Steiner accuses all too many dramatists: the introduction of divine justice threatens to 
negate the force of the fateful moment. But that moment, juxtaposed with moments from 
Nietzsche's Zarathustra and Gay Science, reveals a religiosity at work in affirmative 
fatalism that would later become the link between Nietzsche's philosophy and Hermann 
Hesse's "mystical Christianity." 
 The moment, as the locus of reflection and the existential confrontation with fate, 
gains a renewed religious significance for Hesse. In an address to the German youth titled 
Zarathustras Wiederkehr he resurrects, so to speak, Nietzsche's teacher and places him in 
a Germany tattered by the first world war and a failed revolution. Here he appeals to their 
individual humanity, urging them not to over-identify with the Vaterland, but to find in 
themselves their own fate. Echoing passages from Also sprach Zarathustra, Hesse 
presents a curious attempt at reconciling Nietzsche's thought with his own nebulous 
Christian sensibilities, which are also conspicuously inflected by Hesse's interest in 
Hinduism and Buddhism. Taken alongside a handful of his essays on religion, that text 
reveals not only Hesse's affirmative fatalist bent, but how this comportment emerges from 
the tragic insight occasioned by a moment of intimate reflection that is for him 
tantamount to a religious experience. The essence of Hesse's "mystical Christianity" lies 
in the contemplation of that fundamental religious question posed by Nishitani, but 
reveals itself to be, to some extent, inarticulable in descriptive language. Instead, it is the 
playful and formal space opened up by narrative that allows Hesse to explore and 
indirectly explain his affirmative fatalism in circumscriptive fashion. 
 This circumscription of his religious sensibilities is nowhere more palpable than 
in Das Glasperlenspiel, where the act of narrative writing reveals itself as Hesse's 
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preferred mode of meditation on revelatory moments and affirmative fatalism. The 
numerous poetic devices employed to these ends allow the story of Josef Knecht to 
unfold in such a way that invites repeated and reflective readings, opening up its critique 
of authoritarianism and the educational institution to the consideration of their relation to 
the more fundamental existential concerns facing the Germany of his day. The modern 
problem of freedom, which Fromm posited in Escape from Freedom only one year prior 
to the publication of Hesse's last novel, is of a kind with the deliberations that arise from 
this intersection. This study seeks to find in Hesse's writing a serious engagement with 
affirmative fatalism as a tendency in the German imagination as well as an existential 
orientation which, when turned upon itself, leads concretely away from ideologies of 
domination and toward an embrace of positive freedom. 
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CHAPTER III 
NIETZSCHE’S TRAGIC RELIGIOSITY 
 
Introduction 
 In his book The Nietzsche Legacy in Germany, Steven Aschheim identifies the 
historically broad appeal of Nietzsche's works across disparate political and ideological 
camps as "a potent protean force precisely because it was diffuse and not organized" (14). 
Considering the history of nineteenth-century German literature, this configuration could 
not be more accurate, especially as regards Also sprach Zarathustra, that book "für alle 
und keinen," in which the titular teacher wishes to bestow his listeners with the wisdom 
needed to realize the Übermensch. This trope taken too seriously became infamously 
conflated under National Socialism with the mythic ideal of the Aryan master race, but 
beside and behind it lurked another aspect of Nietzsche's legacy perhaps more protean 
than any other precisely because of its immanence to centuries of German literature: 
affirmative fatalism. 
 Through its many iterations, transformations, and interpretations, this tragic 
worldview as a characteristic of German thought and literature has reasserted itself even 
where broader philosophical gestures sought to emancipate the spirit from the forces of 
fate and the gods. The study at hand concerns itself primarily with Goethe and Nietzsche, 
two of the most iconic German writers of the nineteenth century, whose representative 
tragic figures, Faust and Zarathustra, respectively, became likewise iconic for the German 
articulation of affirmative fatalism in the early 20th century. Nietzsche's work was 
especially edifying for writers, thinkers, politicians, and radicals from the 1890s through 
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to the 1940s, one of the core notions of his philosophy being amor fati, love of fate, 
which placed this typically mythical concept at the center of his otherwise anti-religious, 
life-affirming project. Drawing on Benjamin's Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels – 
one such articulation of the tragic and a response to Nietzsche's Geburt der Tragödie, 
among other theories of the tragic – an interpretation of amor fati, read through the 
fateful moments at the end of Goethe's Faust, reveals the lingering religious impulse 
underlying Nietzsche's dictum. Both Goethe and Nietzsche present an image of the tragic 
that stakes its power and import on the generative possibilities of the narratives 
themselves, their appeal to reinterpretation, which is itself an appeal to grace, insofar as 
the confrontation with fate produces an awareness of death that inspires a hope for a 
better world to come through posterity. Thus the sacrificial death of the tragic figure 
signifies a call for the continued articulation of such fateful moments in the good faith 
that this might bestow the chance nature and suffering of life with meaning. All of this is 
saturated with a religious sentiment which is hardly indistinguishable from mythical 
thinking. 
 It is the mythical element in Aschheim's comment that connects Nietzsche's work 
to Goethe: the invocation of Proteus, the shape-shifting god of the sea, calls to mind an 
episode from Faust concerning the homunculus, an artificially contrived human soul 
without a body. Nietzsche's sketch of the human as an incomplete being, "ein Seil, 
geknüpft zwischen Tier und Übermensch," recalls this "artig Männlein" in a phial, who 
aids Mephistopheles in retrieving Faust's consciousness from a magically induced coma 
while also seeking a physical form to inhabit. In the second act of Faust II, at the end of 
the klassische Walpurgisnacht, the homunculus, accompanied by the Greek sage Thales, 
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consults Proteus in hopes that he might help the little soul in a glass find the form best 
suited for it. Proteus considers his quest and after some discussion declares: 
"Dem Leben frommt die Welle besser; 
Dich trägt ins ewige Gewässer 
Proteus-Delphin. Er verwandelt sich 
   Schon ist's getan! 
Da soll es dir zum schönsten glücken; 
Ich nehme dich auf meinen Rücken, 
Vermähle dich dem Ozean" (251-2).2 
The infinite sea, a formless, changing mass, holds the promise of transformation while 
also serving as an intermediary body for the homunculus. The shapeless substance of the 
ocean appears as a primordial corporeality, but it also speaks to an ideal, transcendent 
existence: "wed to the ocean," the homunculus becomes a being of seemingly infinite 
possibility, able to adapt its mind to varying forms and to continue endlessly to expand 
and inform its experience of existence. 
 The protean quality of Nietzsche's work does not lie solely in its ideological 
adaptability, as suggested by Aschheim, but is also integral to its inner logic. One would 
do well to remember as well that Proteus is a soothsayer and a trickster who only gives 
up his knowledge to those who, like Menelaus in the Odyssey, can successfully wrestle 
                                                        
2"A better life the waves declare thee, 
And now to endless seas shall bear thee 
Proteus-Dolphin. 
 (He transforms himself.) 
  'Tis done! Behold! 
Unto thy fairest fortune waken: 
Upon my back shalt thou be taken, 
And wedded to the Ocean old." Trans. Bayard Taylor. 
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the truth out of him while he changes forms. As a thinker fundamentally concerned with 
contradictions, Nietzsche's thought evolved almost violently, turning back on itself 
repeatedly, embodying in its movements Zarathustra's own description of the human 
psyche: "Was ist dieser Mensch? Ein Knäuel wilder Schlangen, welche selten beieinander 
Ruhe haben, – da gehen sie fort und suchen Beute in der Welt" (33). Snapping from time 
to time at nearby prey, the various conflicting drives and desires tangled together in the 
human mind are wild and seldom at peace with one another – an admission that perhaps 
only the most honest philosopher would make. But such honesty is also ever steeped in 
irony. For all of his emphasis on the realization of a higher humanity in the trope of the 
Übermensch, Zarathustra mocks and inverts the promise of grace at the end of Goethe's 
Faust, indicting himself (and his author) for their fables: "Alles Unvergängliche – das ist 
nur ein Gleichnis! Und die Dichter lügen zu viel" (70).3 
 The promise of grace as release from suffering is the promise of unity with God, 
the spiritual parallel to the promise of the ocean for the homunculus, whose corporeal 
union with the sea serves as an inversion of Faust's ascension to heaven. The 
juxtaposition of the two paths to fulfillment aptly sets the backdrop for Nietzsche's first 
book, Die Geburt der Tragödie aus dem Geist der Musik, and the exploration of the 
Dionysian drive to dissolution vis-a-vis the Apollonian drive to individuation. Already 
both Faust and the homunculus illustrated the tension between these drives, as well as the 
impossibility of their pure fulfillment. Instead their respective fates lie in abyssal 
Zwischenräume, where the longing for either embodiment or transcendence is bound to a 
profound experience of its opposite. And thus does Zarathustra, teacher of the Eternal 
                                                        
3 "All things intransitory – those are but an illusion! And the poets lie too much!" (My translation.) 
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Return and the Übermensch, declare that the human being is "ein Seil, geknüpft zwischen 
Tier und Übermensch – ein Seil über einem Abgrunde" (13). The proverbial sea of 
possibility in which the human being swims is as liberating as it is limiting, thrust 
forward as one is toward death. 
 In this abyssal space where Nietzsche's work resounds, a concept of the tragic 
functions as a most formative ontological element. In this a certain protean quality is 
especially discernible, particularly insofar as the original subject of tragedy was always 
considered a different incarnation of Dionysus: 
"Es ist eine unanfechtbare Ueberlieferung, dass die griechische Tragödie in ihrer 
ältesten Gestalt nur die Leiden des Dionysus zum Gegenstand hatte und dass der 
längere Zeit hindurch einzig vorhandene Bühnenheld eben Dionysus war. Aber 
mit der gleichen Sicherheit darf behauptet werden, dass niemals bis auf Euripides 
Dionysus aufgehört hat, der tragische Held zu sein, sondern dass alle die 
berühmten Figuren der griechischen Bühne Prometheus, Oedipus u. s. w. nur 
Masken jenes ursprünglichen Helden Dionysus sind" (Nietzsche GT §10). 
The tragic concerns itself not so much with particularities as with more general 
tendencies and movements, much as the homunculus, aided by Proteus, finds his search 
for a body fulfilled not in the discovery of a particular form, but in the multitude of 
possible forms. An analogy to this illustration presents itself in the form and style of 
Nietzsche's own writing, as well as those aspects of German literature and thought with 
which he takes issue. In her article on "Nietzsche as Tragic Poet," Mary Ann Frese Witt 
notes, "If tragedy is seen primarily as an aesthetic rendering of the sacrificial suffering of 
a god, then its essence is more lyrical, more rhapsodic, than what we conventionally call 
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dramatic: more pathos than praxis, more lyrical than mimetic" (13). The tragic is not 
merely a dramatic category, but an expression of suffering and its sublimation through 
poetic imagery that arouses the swelling, contradictory sensations of pleasure and pain, 
blissful oblivion and visceral terror. 
 The promise of grace thus appears as an affront to the tragic conception of life, a 
false promise offered by lying poets that fails to grasp the dialectical relationship of joy 
and suffering. And in contrast to the pure lyricism of tragedy as propounded by 
Nietzsche, Goethe's Faust offers a resolution to the eternal contradiction posed by 
Dionysus and Apollo in the logic of Gretchen's final intercession. But represented as an 
absolute religious grace, this promise conveniently avoids the absurdity of the eternal 
contradiction, perhaps with the intent to elide nihilism, but ultimately, in Nietzsche's 
view, dishonest. For whether physical or spiritual, neither total dissolution nor total 
individuation appear possible in his depictions of human experience. The self is an 
unstable collection of desires that find expression in the I, and these are driven by that 
mystery of mysteries, the Will to Power, which feeds the roots of life while also being 
capable of undermining them. In this way all phenomena find perspectival justification as 
well as condemnation, such that the personal dictum amor fati becomes the rallying cry 
for an existential standpoint which, interpreting and creating meaning from experience, 
might overcome the nihilism implicit in otherwise endless contradictions. 
 But even amor fati seems to operate on the promise of grace: the assurance that, 
despite the apparent meaninglessness of one's suffering, an affirmative confrontation with 
one's actions and their consequences and everything in between will yield a narrative that 
can edify and empower. It is in a sense the profane form of grace, insofar as grace offers 
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comfort while still operating on the assumption that the sinner, as a sinner, never quite 
deserves redemption, and, while perhaps half expecting it, also lives in fear of damnation. 
Nietzsche's thought issues from a preoccupation with the value of knowledge, a rejection 
of divinity, and demands that the act of grace come from within the subject, providing a 
similar sense of ambiguity as regards the efficacy of amor fati. Thus a certain kind of 
faith emerges which has little to do with God, but everything to do with the creation of 
meaning for the human being, the fundamental consideration of religion in the wake of 
God's death. 
 
Nihilism and Necessary Fictions 
On moral enlightenment. – One must talk the Germans out of their Mephistopheles, and 
their Faust, too. They are two moral prejudices against the value of knowledge. 
–Nietzsche, Die fröhliche Wissenschaft, §178 
 
 In the last sections of Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels, Walter Benjamin 
discusses the significance of Satan for the development of German drama and the 
prominence of allegory as the mode of representation. 
"With the revival of paganism in the Renaissance, and Christianity in the Counter-
Reformation, allegory, the form of their conflict, also had to be renewed. The 
importance of this for the Trauerspiel is that, in the figure of Satan, the middle 
ages had bound the material and the demonic inextricably together. Above all, the 
concentration of the numerous pagan powers into one, theologically rigorously 
defined, Antichrist meant that this supreme manifestation of darkness was 
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imposed upon matter more unambiguously than in a number of demons. And not 
only did the middle ages come thus to impose strict limits on the scientific study 
of nature; even mathematicians were rendered suspect by the devilish essence of 
matter" (226-7). 
That the devil and the speculator of the elements occupy the central roles in Goethe's 
masterwork speaks to a fundamental paradox with which German thought had come to 
contend. The condemnation of the physical realm as sin-soaked matter opposed to the 
absolute, spiritual goodness of God tainted human endeavors from the outset: "Es irrt der 
Mensch, solang' er strebt" (Goethe 18). Yet the drive to scientific discovery embodied in 
the Enlightenment had paradoxically become an admirable quality in the great figures of 
modernity. The conflict between these perspectives provided material for the new 
metamorphoses of tragedy as it passed from myth over into history, with Goethe 
providing his Faust as an allegorically charged dramatization of this conflict itself. 
 The attitude which recognizes the paradoxical, interdependent relationship of 
knowledge as sin and death as redemption was for Nietzsche characteristic of European 
nihilism and a sign of decadence. That despite the end of God's tyranny over truth, 
knowledge might still be suspect and a source of melancholia, that in the denial of life the 
human being might be redeemed by oblivion – such "moral prejudices against the value 
of knowledge" spelled suicide for so-called enlightened Europe. Benjamin's descriptions 
of the role of knowledge as evil in the Trauerspiel, the dramatic predecessor of Goethe's 
Faust, detail the offenses of that lingering Christianity which Nietzsche found so 
repellant for philosophy. 
"Knowledge, not action, is the most characteristic mode of existence of evil. ... Its 
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dominant mood is that of mourning, which is at once the mother of the allegories 
and their content. And from it three original satanic promises are born. ... What 
tempts is the illusion of freedom – in the exploration of what is forbidden; the 
illusion of independence – in the secession from the community of the pious; the 
illusion of infinity – in the empty abyss of evil. For it is characteristic of all virtue 
to have an end before it: namely its model, in God; just as all infamy opens up an 
infinite progression into the depths" (230). 
This articulation simultaneously serves as a prescription and description of Faust. From 
Benjamin's standpoint, Goethe's tragedy might function as a culmination of that 
melancholia that characterized German drama as well as the sign of its dissolution before 
the widening gaze of Enlightenment. For as God lay dead and the phenomenal world 
became ever more intriguing and penetrable to science, knowledge would demand its 
redemption. 
 But it is Faust and not his knowledge that is redeemed; indeed, Faust is redeemed 
in spite of his devilish search for knowledge. That his redemption lies merely in death, 
that his damnation comes at the moment when he adores and clings to life, that his 
striving for knowledge is a symptom of his spiritual impurity, that this impurity is 
inherent in his physical existence – these moral judgments all stake themselves on the 
promise of bliss in death and an implicit denial of life. For Faust (and Goethe) still 
walked in that world where the infinite possibility opened up by knowledge was an 
eternal, insufferable abyss, and faith in the absolute wisdom of God offered an escape 
rope from the confusion of the depths. Should that rope vanish, however, and should the 
abyss swallow us whole – would not the whole of our existence demand a new 
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interpretation, a new orientation? 
 This new orientation is effectively the redemption of knowledge that Nietzsche's 
antipathy toward the end of Faust represents. The promise of Christianity – heavenly 
bliss in death – had lost its viability by way of knowledge, removing the escape rope 
from the abyss and thus radically changing the face of knowledge. Not an abyss – that is 
the world – but a light to illuminate and draw meaning out of the abyss – that should be 
knowledge's proverbial face. This is the sentiment of Nietzsche's madman in Die 
fröhliche Wissenschaft who carries a lantern in daylight. "Where is God?" he cries, "I'll 
tell you! We have killed him – you and I! We are all his murderers. But how did we do 
this? How were we able to drink up the sea? Who gave us the sponge to wipe away the 
entire horizon? What were we doing when we unchained the earth from its sun?" (119-
20). The Enlightenment did not hesitate to unchain the earth from its sun, so to speak, but 
it was not prepared for the monstrous task that this would necessitate. "Where are we 
moving to? Away from all suns? Are we not continually falling? And backwards, 
sidewards, forwards, in all directions? Aren't we straying as though through an infinite 
nothing? Isn't empty space breathing at us?" (120). The answer to these is a resounding 
"jaein": without the foundation supplied by God, we are straying, falling, wandering 
aimlessly, except that the ground is still beneath us, the sun rises and sets as ever, and 
death remains a great mystery. But that the reassurances of the phenomenal world be 
rooted in our own human experience – here the shadow of God looms, the fear of 
knowledge and transience overshadows the liberating possibilities of this new horizon.  
 The indeterminacy of this position represents the ambivalent danger inherent in 
nihilism. Thrilling, promising, daunting, suffocating, the loss of a metaphysical and moral 
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ground upon which even European epistemology had established itself is as liberating as 
it is debilitating. It is not unlike the sea presented to the homunculus of Goethe's Faust: a 
contained infinity, an opening to new possibilities, the sheer number of which are 
intimidating. The image of the sea appears repeatedly in Die fröhliche Wissenschaft as the 
representation of the new task facing humanity: 
"In the horizon of the infinite. – We have forsaken the land and gone to sea! We 
have destroyed the bridge behind us – more so, we have demolished the land 
behind us! Now, little ship, look out! Beside you is the ocean; it is true, it does not 
always roar, and at times it lies there like silk and gold and dreams of goodness. 
But there will be hours when you realize that it is infinite and that there is nothing 
more awesome than infinity. Oh, the poor bird that has felt free and now strikes 
against the walls of this cage! Woe, when homesickness for the land overcomes 
you, as if there had been more freedom there – and there is no more 'land'!" (119) 
We cannot return to the demolished land, the foundation provided by Christian 
metaphysics and morality. That old nihilism, built on a life-denying and self-defeating 
logic, has been wiped away, and a new nihilism lies before and beneath us: not a 
foundation, but a vast sea stretching on toward infinity in which only the little boat, the 
shaky, fragile self, provides any sense of stability. 
 But what of this self, this ball of snakes, this word that ascribes to the manifold 
desires and drives competing for dominance the semblance of unity? Its unifying power 
is illusory at best, but through its primary mode of operation – the I, das Ich – it shapes 
the whole of grammar and linguistic expression, the means by which the very questions 
at hand are posed. Posturing in the first person, it provides the central point from which 
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the world, conceived here as an ocean of seemingly infinite possibility, may be thought. It 
is also telling that both the German and English expressions for this process – verstehen, 
understand, begreifen, grasp – illustrate it simultaneously as a subjugation to and 
possession of the idea. The world– as the subject perceives it from without and builds it 
from within, as the source and object of a subjectivity which is the only mode of its 
expression, especially in speaking the word "world" – is but a thought of the human 
being, who is likewise a thought of the world's. 
 Such a contradiction illustrates the operative logic underlying Nietzsche's 
considerations and reveals the necessity of certain fictions for the possibility of thought. 
Railing against the "despisers of the body," Zarathustra declares "sense," "spirit," and the 
"I" to be mere tools of a "greater reason," the source and expression of which is sheer 
corporeality. 
"'Ich' sagst du und bist stolz auf dieses Wort. Aber das Größere ist, woran du nicht 
glauben willst – dein Leib und seine große Vernunft: die sagt nicht Ich, aber tut 
Ich. 
Was der Sinn fühlt, was der Geist erkennt, das hat niemals in sich sein Ende. Aber 
Sinn und Geist möchten dich überreden, sie seien aller Dinge Ende: so eitel sind 
sie. 
Werk- und Spielzeuge sind Sinn und Geist: hinter ihnen liegt noch das Selbst. Das 
Selbst sucht auch mit den Augen der Sinne, es horcht auch mit den Ohren des 
Geistes. 
Immer horcht das Selbst und sucht: es vergleicht, bezwingt, erobert, zerstört. Es 
herrscht und ist auch des Ichs Beherrscher. 
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Hinter deinen Gedanken und Gefühlen, mein Bruder, steht ein mächtiger Gebieter, 
ein unbekannter Weiser – der heißt Selbst. In deinem Leibe wohnt er, dein Leib ist 
er." (28-9) 
The manifold drives and desires that make up the human being are deeply rooted in 
bodily existence; the body is one with the self, which performs the I and expresses 
through it the knowledge garnered through the senses and the mind. Yet the reduction of 
all of these concepts to mere tools of the self also reveals the self as another 
objectification of those tools. The body qua self is the necessary prerequisite for the 
development of language, but language is the prerequisite for the idea of the body. Again 
paradox rears its head. 
 If such impassable contradictions form the foundation for Nietzsche's thought, 
then the only tool against them is to accept the necessity of certain fictions implied 
therein. And although these formulations cast doubt on the possibility of knowledge, this 
remains in the last analysis all that the human being has to cling to, at least from its 
isolated position as an existential subject. But knowledge should not be understood only 
in the sense of positivistic or physical science (Wissenschaft); rather, knowledge (Wissen) 
lends itself to elucidations of life beyond mechanistic descriptions, namely in the sense of 
that gay science (fröhliche Wissenschaft) called poetry. When the physical sciences, 
which killed but could not replace God, become too nihilistic to bear, we have recourse to 
aesthetic expression, which is able, if not to explain the meaning of our suffering, at least 
to make it interesting and manageable. 
"Our ultimate gratitude to art. – Had we not approved of the arts and invented 
this type of cult of the untrue, the insight into general untruth and mendacity that 
47 
 
is now given to us by science – this insight into delusion and error as a condition 
of cognitive and sensate existence – would be utterly unbearable. Honesty would 
lead to nausea and suicide. But now our honesty has a counterforce that helps us 
avoid such consequences: art, as the good will to appearance. ... As an aesthetic 
phenomenon existence is still bearable to us, and art furnishes us with the eye and 
hand and above all the good conscience to be able to make such a phenomenon of 
ourselves. At times we need to have a rest from ourselves by looking at and down 
at ourselves and, from an artistic distance, laughing at ourselves or crying at 
ourselves; we have to discover the hero no less than the fool in our passion for 
knowledge; we must now and then be pleased about our folly in order to be able 
to stay pleased about our wisdom." (GS 104) 
Science is liable to give way to hopelessness; its mechanistic explanations serve to 
answer questions of "How?" but it cannot respond to the "Why?" lost with the death of 
God. Especially where this concerns human psychology and biology, one is wont to find 
in the reduction of life and experience to meaningless mechanical processes a crushingly 
nihilistic worldview. Art, however, concerns itself not with mechanisms, but with 
appearance, aesthetics, and sensuous interpretation: the subjective, the untrue – insofar as 
it provides no demonstrable, replicable results from sterile experimentation – but the 
most human truth – insofar as every lived moment is an experiment, the results of which 
are the lingering thoughts and feelings that constitute the interior life of the subject. 
 Thus meaning emerges not from explanation, but from expression. Its essence is 
the dialectic of pleasure and pain, and it reveals itself where one or the other is able by 
virtue of abundance to justify its existence in the face of the other. This kind of 
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knowledge – the gay science, the knowledge contained in and afforded by art – rescues 
the subject from the abyss while often approximating it. If utter nihilism dwells in 
sustained contemplation of meaninglessness, even this suffering is afforded to 
subjectivity by means of knowledge which allows for the good will to untruth: to beauty, 
to appreciation of the whole terrible mess of consciousness. 
 "Alles Vergängliche / Ist nur ein Gleichnis,"4 declares the choir of angels at the 
close of Goethe's Faust, after Gretchen implores Mary, Mater Gloriosa, to save the titular 
sorceror from the jaws of hell, citing the fallen nature of all humanity and the impossible 
expectation of perfection. Faust is drawn upward by Gretchen's spirit as the choir sings of 
the triumph of the world beyond and condemns the world of appearances to mere 
illusion. Despite Zarathustra's apparently outright rejection of these lines – "Alles 
Unvergängliche – das ist nur ein Gleichnis! Und die Dichter lügen zu viel!" – this is a 
protean moment for the wild philologist. At first glance it is a condemnation of Faust's 
salvation as a conciliatory gesture and an indictment of poets who would make claims 
beyond the reach of their ken. Simultaneously it is merely an explosive reiteration of the 
sentiment expressed in the aforementioned aphorism regarding "our ultimate gratitude to 
art." Like the shape-shifting god who will not give up his wisdom until exhausted by 
combat, Nietzsche writes in half-riddles, making declarations that implicate him in the 
class of poets who "lie too much" while extolling this as their greatest virtue. The 
rejection of the phenomenal world as expressed in the final lines of Faust may well 
offend Nietzsche's sensibilities, but the grace extended to the titular sinner is just that 
extended to every subject by the fictions that make the world bearable: knowledge, 
                                                        
4"All things transitory / Are but an illusion." My translation. 
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subjectivity, and beauty. 
 Naturally, poets lie – their gift is that for untruth, the will to beauty – and their 
task is to give meaning to our suffering, but beware those who would make impossible 
promises, who would overstep the bounds of their role. Knowledge as speculation leads 
into the abyss of tragic insight. The boon afforded by art is a promise that reflects that of 
grace, but rests upon a different foundation: it does not efface the value of knowledge by 
negating its substantiality, but rather highlights the transient and ecstatic joy offered by 
both wisdom and folly alike. "The discovery that all empirical reality is illusory is called 
a tragic discovery; no man, it seems, would be able to withstand its destructive power. ... 
We are rescued by the essential theatricality of art" (de Man 93). By means of artistic 
expression this awful knowledge gains meaning within the theater of human existence.  
 And yet this insistence on the primacy of aesthetics is not without its opponents. 
In response to Nietzsche's statement in Die Geburt der Tragödie that "nur als ästhetisches 
Phänomen ist das Dasein und die Welt ewig gerechtfertigt," Benjamin contends: "Where 
art so firmly occupies the center of existence as to make man one of its manifestations 
instead of recognizing him above all as its basis, to see man's existence as the eternal 
subject of its own creations instead of recognizing him as its own creator, then all sane 
reflection is at an end" (OGTD 103). Yet it is also the very notion of sanity that becomes 
suspect in the consideration of tragedy. For is it not the essence of tragedy that one is 
struck so deeply in a moment of recognition – as de Man puts it, "the discovery that all 
empirical knowledge is illusory" – that any stable sense of self and world implodes? 
 For the tragedian as well as the philosopher (and the novelist, for that matter), this 
moment signifies an encounter with fate, seeming to render all knowledge impotent and 
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meaningless in the face of the tragic discovery. But as seen in Goethe's Faust and through 
to Nietzsche's work, even this force is a fiction as necessary and indispensable to the self-
preservation of the subject as its conception of its own subjectivity. Indeed, it is part and 
parcel of the formation of this conception. If we can understand how Nietzsche's irony 
might inflect his condemnation of Faust and Mephistopheles as "moral prejudices against 
the value of knowledge," then they may also be its savior. For while Faust is apparently 
saved by God's grace, the moment (Augenblick) in which he confronts fate smacks of 
Nietzsche's amor fati, a saving grace delivered not from on high, but from within 
subjectivity itself. 
 
Der Augenblick: On Time and the Modern Concept of Fate 
 The question of Faust's fate remains throughout Goethe's work something of an 
ambiguous mystery. Even in the initial conversation between God and Mephistopheles, it 
is unclear whether the devil's game could actually result in Faust's damnation, as God 
admits that, "Es irrt der Mensch, solang' er strebt," but maintains confidence in his faith 
(Goethe 18). When Faust expresses his rage at Mephistopheles for withholding news of 
Gretchen's infanticide and condemnation, the demon mocks his weakness and reminds 
him of the infernal nature of their pact. "Warum machst du Gemeinschaft mit uns, wenn 
du sie nicht durchführen kannst? Willst fliegen und bist vorm Schwindel nicht sicher? 
Drangen wir uns dir auf, oder du dich uns?" (138).5 Faust is incensed, but Mephistopheles 
reminds him of his dire responsibility – for Gretchen's fate as well as his own. The latter 
does not perturb him. As far as he is concerned, no moment could ever offer him the 
                                                        
5"Why didst thou enter fellowship with us, if thou canst not carry it out? Wilt fly, and art not secure against 
dizziness? Did we thrust ourselves upon you, or thou thyself upon us?" Trans. Bayard Taylor. 
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satisfaction required for him to lose his soul. And yet, while time seems then inwardly 
suspended for him, Gretchen's fate strikes him with horror. The privilege that he enjoys – 
his relative freedom from consequence – does not extend to other mortals with whom he 
becomes entangled. This concerns him, but only, as we learn, momentarily. Ultimately 
neither his own damnation nor the suffering that he causes come to bear much upon his 
conscience. 
 There is another dimension to this problem. Not only is Faust's impending 
damnation unclear, but determining the form that fate takes also presents an ambiguity. Is 
fate to be understood only as the moment in which death strikes, or can it be seen and 
interpreted prior to death? Benjamin asserts in Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels that 
"fate is the entelechy of events within the field of guilt. ... Fate leads to death. Death is 
not judgment, but atonement, an expression of the subjection of guilty life to the law of 
natural life" (129-31). If it is also the hallmark of the Trauerspiel, as Benjamin theorizes 
throughout the book, that its tragic figures are not merely judged or struck down but in 
fact redeemed by grace, often through an apotheosis, then this theory of fate developed 
out of these dramas might apply equally well to Faust. By this definition, fate is the force 
that propels events, that highlights intersections and coincidences, that "unleashes 
causality" as one of its weapons, but which is above all something to be seen only in 
flashes and interpreted as death approaches. It is the very phenomenon that it describes: 
the recognition of events as they unfold and the possibility of meaning in the face of blind 
necessity. 
 It is not until finally confronted and struck blind by the spirit of care (Sorge) that 
Faust once again considers his mortality and the meaning which he might ascribe to it. 
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Now an old man, Faust has established a vast dominion, extending his reach with levees 
and reclaiming land from the sea. Having accomplished so much and provided so much 
new space for his subjects, he contemplates in a final monologue the trajectory of his life, 
suddenly offering an interpretation and experiencing for the first and last time the sense 
of fulfillment that would damn him. 
 The description that Faust offers of his realm, painted with swelling pathos and 
sentimentality, compares it not so subtly to Eden, presenting it as a paradisiacal bastion 
surrounded by a dangerous and decadent world. Indeed, it will function as the locus of 
Faust's death and redemption, and thus serves as an image of what Benjamin refers to as 
"the light of grace" seen "mirrored in the swamp of Adam's guilt" (129).  
"Ein Sumpf zieht am Gebirge hin, 
Verpestet alles schon Errungene; 
Den faulen Pfuhl auch abzuziehn, 
Das Letzte wär' das Höchsterrungene. 
Eröffn' ich Räume vielen Millionen, 
Nicht sicher zwar, doch tätig-frei zu wohnen. 
Grün das Gefilde, fruchtbar; Mensch und Herde 
Sogleich behaglich auf der neusten Erde, 
Gleich angesiedelt an des Hügels Kraft, 
Den aufgewälzt kühn-emsige Völkerschaft. 
Im Innern hier ein paradiesisch Land, 
Da rase draußen Flut bis auf zum Rand, 
und wie sie nascht, gewaltsam einzuschließen, 
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Gemeindrang eilt, die Lücke zu verschließen" (Goethe 348).6 
What differentiates it, however, from a God-given paradise is the requirement that it 
continually be fought for, repaired and reinforced against threats from outside. As a 
representation of human achievement, the realm promises safety and nourishment as 
rewards for combined efforts and cooperation. Here millions are “tätig-frei” to live – not 
free from activity, but free to act, acting and free, and the continuation of this state is 
contingent upon their shared and constant work against the foul swamp that tries to seep 
into and spoil their haven. This hyphenated relationship between the citizens' activity and 
freedom is similarly echoed in "kühn-emsig": bold in their business, diligent in their 
daring, their survival depends upon continuous labor without express promise; every 
attempt to secure their position is a gamble, but is paradoxically tied to effort. 
Redemption is reconfigured as a negotiation, a back-and-forth movement between duty 
and freedom, daring and industriousness. 
 In these moments before being granted entrance to literal paradise, Faust's 
monologue itself functions like these hyphens. Caught between the glorification of his 
human striving and the uncertainty of success, a proto-Nietzschean standpoint is born in 
which striving and success become equivalent, simultaneous phenomena; like desire, its 
                                                        
6"Below the hills a marshy plain 
Infects what I so long have been retrieving; 
This stagnant pool likewise to drain 
Were now my latest and my best achieving. 
To many millions let me furnish soil, 
Though not secure, yet free to active toil; 
Green, fertile fields, where men and herds go forth 
At once, with comfort, on the newest Earth, 
And swiftly settled on the hill's firm base, 
Created by the bold, industrious race. 
A land like Paradise here, round about: 
Up to the brink the tide may roar without, 
And though it gnaw, to burst forth the limit, 
By common impulse all unite to hem it." Trans. Bayard Taylor. 
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satisfaction delayed indefinitely, longing and striving contain their fulfillment in their 
fervor. This Faust expresses in his last mortal utterances: 
"Ja, diesem Sinne bin ich ganz ergeben, 
Das ist der Weisheit letzter Schluß: 
Nur der verdient sich Freiheit wie das Leben, 
Der täglich sie erobern muß. 
Und so verbringt, umrungen von Gefahr, 
Hier Kindheit, Mann und Greis sein tüchtig Jahr. 
Solch ein Gewimmel möcht' ich sehn, 
Auf freiem Grund mit freiem Volke stehn. 
Zum Augenblicke dürft' ich sagen: 
Verweile doch, du bist so schön! 
Es kann die Spur von meinen Erdetagen 
Nicht in Äonen untergehn. – 
Im Vorgefühl von solchem hohen Glück 
Genieß' ich jetzt den höchsten Augenblick." (348)7 
The moment (Augenblick) that spells doom for Faust is the one to which he would like to 
                                                        
7"Yes! to this thought I hold with firm persistence; 
The last result of wisdom stamps it true: 
He only earns his freedom and existence, 
Who daily conquers them anew. 
Thus here, by dangers girt, shall glide away 
Of childhood, manhood, age, the vigorous day: 
And such a throng I fain would see, – 
Stand on free soil among a people free! 
Then dared I hail the Moment fleeing: 
"Ah, still delay – thou art so fair!" 
The traces cannot, of mine earthly being, 
In aeons perish, – they are there! – 
In proud fore-feeling of such lofty bliss, 
I now enjoy the highest Moment, – this!" Trans. Bayard Taylor. 
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cling; it is an instance of gratification in which he wants to dwell, a desire (Lust) for and 
joy (Lust) in eternity that ultimately functions as a transition from life into death. Yet this 
moment differs from those before it only in Faust's own recognition of its transient 
nature. That life and freedom must be daily earned by those who conquer them: this is the 
constant activity that constitutes the human experience, the hyphen separating birth and 
death, the endless, eternal moment through which life flows. Faust's most beloved 
moment is thus merely that in which he recognizes simultaneously that the moment is 
endless and that it is constantly ending. He longs to rest in the restless progression of 
time, to be eternally present in the hyphen connecting the future to the past. 
 Faust's embrace of the moment per se – his affirmation of activity in the inevitable 
passage of time – as the highest moment of his life prefigures an understanding of time 
not merely as a linear progression or succession of moments, but as a singular, eternal 
moment in which potentiality fulfilled passes through actuality into actuality. In so doing 
the folly of his wager with Mephistopheles becomes glaringly clear: not only is the 
possibility of clinging to a beautiful moment untenable, but the recognition of that 
moment always comes too late, once the potential has transformed in its passage through 
the gateway of the moment. 
 This paradoxical moment is the instance of death in Goethe's masterpiece, but in 
Nietzsche's Zarathustra the titular prophet seeks out the paradox of the moment in the 
midst of life, as the life-affirming moment par excellence. In the section titled "Vom 
Gesicht und Räthsel," after carrying the Spirit of Gravity up the mountain on his 
shoulder, Zarathustra illustrates linguistically the temporal-existential phenomenon of the 
moment. 
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"'Siehe diesen Torweg! Zwerg!' sprach ich weiter: 'der hat zwei Gesichter. Zwei 
Wege kommen hier zusammen: die ging noch niemand zu Ende. 
Diese lange Gasse zurück: die währt eine Ewigkeit. Und jene lange Gasse hinaus 
– das ist eine andre Ewigkeit. 
Sie widersprechen sich, diese Wege: sie stoßen sich gerade vor den Kopf – und 
hier, an diesem Torwege, ist es, wo sie zusammenkommen. Der Name des 
Torwegs steht oben geschrieben: "Augenblick." 
Aber wer einen von ihnen weiter ginge –und immer weiter und immer ferner: 
glaubst du, Zwerg, daß diese Wege sich ewig widersprechen?'" (Nietzsche 128) 
The gateway called Moment presents him with two paths extending eternally in opposite 
directions – the future and the past. The two paths, as two faces of the gateway, contradict 
one another, but the moment is also of a two-faced, deceptive character: it appears in 
every instance as something unique and fleeting, yet it persists eternally as the singular 
locus of temporal experience. As the hyphen between future and past, the moment is both 
the point of their divergence and the point of their intersection. But the paths are neither 
parallel nor perpendicular; rather, they pursue the selfsame trajectory and only assume 
different identities as they pass through the gateway of the moment. 
 The ambivalence of the word Gesicht lends its own complexity to the question of 
the moment. Rendered rather literally as "something that is seen," it signifies both the 
"vision" that appears to Zarathustra as well as the "face" of the gateway. One might thus 
behold the moment, with its own reference to sight (Augenblick), as the face of the past or 
the future, gazing back or leering ahead. That which is seen can also see, repeating the 
ambivalence of understanding, in which the subject, in grasping its object, is also 
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subjugated by it. The moment is then not merely the blink of a subjective eye, but the 
apprehension of that subjectivity by the eye of time itself. Time folds back upon itself, 
not merely in terms of its linearity vis-a-vis its circularity, but insofar as its presence is 
purely present, neither linear nor circular, but incessantly revolving in an infinite, tightly 
wound spiral, like a thread endlessly looped through the eye of a needle. 
 But memory persists, and insofar as the living subject might recall moments from 
the past, the linear shape of time is preserved, most especially in the linguistic forms 
given to memory in narrative expression. Michael Stern takes up this issue of the shape of 
time in Nietzsche's thought, especially as regards his view of tragedy, and determines that 
Nietzsche "posited two species of time" (51). One is "a linear historical time" that is 
dominated by the past, "marked by ressentiment," while the other is "the circular time of 
the eternal return," which is "not a metaphysical time," but instead "a psychological time 
marked by differentiated repetition and Selbstüberwindung" (51-2). That "these two 
species of time coexist and are in constant opposition" (52) speaks to the ambivalence of 
the Augenblick, which signifies literally the act of the apprehending eye, but figuratively 
the spatial-temporal moment that it apprehends. It is at once an active "gaze of the eye," 
spinning its wheels in the present, and the passive "view" taken in by the eye, an image 
recalled from the past. Within Nietzsche's conception of tragedy as a condition of human 
experience, "the collision of inherited narratives...and the construction of a narrative 
self," (43) Stern then deduces: 
"Linear time is the time of passive 'nihilism' or 'decadence.' Circular time is 
valorized as the time of health. And as the time of Selbstüberwindung, it is the 
time when elements of the past are addressed in the moment in order to create the 
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metaphor of self. It is this copresencing of temporal regimes in collision that 
activates the Nietzschean idea of tragedy as the collision between competing 
narratives" (52). 
The moment – not only psychologically or philosophically, but poetically – contains the 
potential to render a doubled image, the passive "view" and active "sight," of the 
subjective confrontation with time and, by proxy, subjectivity itself. 
 Faust's fate is conceived as this moment in which the moment itself is seen by the 
subject and thereby subjects the subject to its own gaze. It is the fervor, the rapture, the 
sense of simultaneous mastery over and subjugation to the force of time that finally 
allows him to declare, "Zum Augenblicke dürft' ich sagen: / Verweile doch, du bist so 
schön!" For here the whole of history and all the potential for the future swell within his 
"view"; the narratives of his life and deeds – as sinful deviation and great works – 
confronted with the possibilities of the future – as the tasks of generations and the legacy 
of his own existence – are distilled in the image of his dominion. The edenic landscape, 
yet tainted by the Fall, suspended between the carefree aesthetic of the idyll and the 
crushing reality of the historical world, threatening in biblical fashion to seep in and flood 
it, is a veritable modern paradise, which only momentarily and by way of arduous labor 
might maintain the semblance of its perfection. "Verweile doch, du bist so schön!" This 
exclamation contains the tragic insight that his absolute fulfillment is only subjectively 
possible, insofar as it is also impossible: in the ardent desire to arrest the moment, Faust 
surrenders himself to its transient and annihilating power. 
 While by no means a Trauerspiel in any pure sense, Goethe's Faust still shares 
with that tradition a role in the transformation of aesthetic and philosophical 
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configurations of fate for modernity. It is one of the grand ironies of modernity that 
tragedy was resurrected to illustrate and give meaning to events, staked as it was on the 
terrible and inscrutable machinations of mythic fate. But the specter of fate looms so 
perfectly over every pronouncement of doom; like the necessary fiction of the subject, 
there must, even in the absence of God, be some vague order to events, some logic, 
however loose, however convoluted. In his assessment of Nietzsche's tragic philosophy, 
Stern takes up the paradox of fate in a world determined to be random and meaningless. 
He contends that "tragedy for the mature Nietzsche is the collision between inherited 
narratives...and the construction of a narrative self," that "Nietzschean tragedy, in the end, 
is the story of the ironic subject of modernity" (Stern 43). That is to say: tragedy consists 
of the terror entailed by the realization that subjectivity – and therefore all knowledge – is 
a contrivance, a fiction. "Subjectivity is intimately tied to poiesis or making, and 
subjectivity is a retrospective activity poeticized into experience" (46). And fate strikes in 
the moment that this becomes clear to the tragic subject: when the artifice of subjectivity 
reveals itself as the creator and creation of an eternal contradiction, but is ever forced to 
make a decision that will offend one of its valences. 
 That such an understanding of fate be shared between Goethe and Nietzsche is 
neither mere coincidence nor a question of influence; rather, it is a direct consequence of 
Enlightenment thought and its dialectical character. With the death of God the concept of 
fate faced a necessary but gradual reorientation. Fundamental as it was to drama, its 
metaphysical composition could no longer stake its foundation upon divinity or 
providence. Instead, before being accurately identified as such, it blazed a path for the 
coming social sciences, drawing attention not to simple linear causality, but to the whole 
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tangled web of interpersonal relations whose image emerged ever more clearly as the 
content of drama shifted from myth to history. This transformation was fundamental to 
Benjamin's study of Trauerspiel insofar as the dramas of the Baroque which called 
themselves tragedies in fact wrestled with a very different fate than the ancient plays 
from which they drew their inspiration. 
 For Benjamin in his study of German drama, fate is "itself the true order of the 
eternal recurrence," and it "is not a purely natural occurrence – any more than it is purely 
historical" (129). Not purely natural, because social interactions and their consequences 
are intimately involved in its composition, and not purely historical, because creaturely 
mortality is at stake. As historical phenomenon, fate involves the "copresencing of 
temporal regimes in collision" that Stern describes, where the image of the past flashes 
and confronts the march of time, demanding reconciliation and narrative justification. As 
natural phenomenon, it is the force of nature's violence and indifference, a reminder of 
mortal frailty as terrifying as it is simply annihilating. Spelled out by Benjamin in this 
way, fate's transition from mythic power into the realm of history is clear, but not 
complete; it maintains a divine quality. "It is the elemental force of nature in historical 
events, which are not themselves entirely nature, because the light of grace is still 
reflected from the state of creation. But it is mirrored in the swamp of Adam's guilt" 
(129). The "light of grace," the reminder of a state of innocence, the promise of unity 
with God, is reflected in the swamp, not only in the form of death (which is the nihilism 
that Nietzsche contradicts), but in the contemplation of that fate. 
 This phenomenal ambiguity, the lingering mythic power of fate in the face of what 
appears to be a chance coalescence of interrelated courses of activity, highlights that its 
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modern conception is one of interpretation. It obtains meaning only in concentration, 
where virtues and events are distilled into poetic language and charged with a resonant 
pathos so that, where the countless threads of schemes and intentions intersect, 
unfortunate coincidences or sudden consequences strike with the force of a supernatural 
power. 
"The core of the notion of fate is, rather the conviction that guilt (which in this 
context always means creaturely guilt – in Christian terms, original sin – not 
moral transgression on the part of the agent), however fleeting its appearance, 
unleashes causality as the instrument of the irresistibly unfolding fatalities. Fate is 
the entelechy of events within the field of guilt. The isolation of the field in which 
the latter exerts its power is what distinguishes fate; for here everything 
intentional or accidental is so intensified that the complexities – of honour, for 
instance – betray, by their paradoxical vehemence, that the action of this play has 
been inspired by fate" (129-130). 
The incidental appearance of fate within the "field of guilt" – the realm of relationships 
and responsibility where conflict and consequences unfold – is at once proof and denial 
of its power. As the culmination of so many interrelated plots, it feigns the appearance of 
random and historical events, but as it unleashes the forces of nature – most notably death 
– so viciously, it still retains a mystical and divine quality. And it is the residue of this 
divine judgment persisting in the existential conception of fate that keeps it alive and 
endows it with an uncanny significance. It is because the drama reaches a terrible climax, 
in spite of all dead gods, and the unforeseen consequences of all of the intriguers' and 
heroes' deeds coalesce into a decisive event, that the drama exists in the first place. The 
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same can be said of history, which is punctuated by similar moments that, although 
juxtaposed in order to reveal their causal relations, gain an almost divine significance in 
their monumental and transformative character.8 
 As the coalescence of causalities, fate appears in flashes and makes the gravity of 
one's participation in the field of guilt palpably undeniable. Benjamin says as much, 
albeit in a typically cryptic fashion, when in an essay titled Schicksal und Charakter he 
writes, "Schicksal ist der Schuldzusammenhang des Lebendigen" (46). In Christian terms 
this is divine judgment for the unavoidable original sin of knowledge, but according to 
the budding existential concept of fate seen in Goethe and Nietzsche alike, this is a 
moment of radical recognition wherein the subject comes face to face with itself in view 
of its many relationships and spheres of shared responsibility – as well as the 
impossibility of its stable subjectivity. 
 The reconceptualization of fate as the force through which social entanglements 
and natural laws express their violent power over the subject reveals a modern strain of 
thought brought fully to bear upon Nietzsche's treatment of history, as well as (or in 
conjunction with that) his treatment of fate for the modern subject, that tightrope walker 
suspended between animal and Übermensch. In the face of nihilism (in both its Christian 
and atheistic forms), history, as the space in which the collision of narratives constitutes 
the fateful moment of tragic insight, becomes the canvas upon which the subject might 
paint an interpretation of that revelation and redeem its own subjugation to fate. And this 
                                                        
8 This is the central idea of aphorism 34 in The Gay Science: "Historia abscondita. – Every great huma 
being exerts a retroactive force: for his sake all of history is put on the scale sgain, and a thousand secrets 
of the past crawl out of their hiding places – into his sunshine. There is no telling what may yet become a 
part of history. Maybe the past is still essentially undiscovered! So many retroactive forces are still needed" 
(GS 53-4)! 
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redemption, for Nietzsche as well as in the Christian promise of grace, remains within the 
purview of love. 
 
Amor fati and Grace as "History's Antidote" 
Ich will immer mehr lernen, das Nothwendige an den Dingen als das Schöne sehen: – so 
werde ich Einer von Denen sein, welche die Dinge schön machen. Amor fati: das sei von 
nun an meine Liebe!  
–Nietzsche, Die fröhliche Wissenschaft, §276 
 
I want to learn more and more how to see what is necessary in things as what is beautiful 
in them – thus I will be one of those who make things beautiful. Amor fati: let that be my 
love from now on! 
–Nietzsche, Die fröhliche Wissenschaft, §276 
 
 The deus ex machina of Gretchen's intercession that implies Faust's salvation is of 
a kind with Faust's final monologue, but the latter is the fateful moment, the 
confrontation with time, the past, which is also a confrontation with the self, and is thus 
the point on which the work stakes its claim to tragedy. Yet the redemption offered to 
Faust shares with the moment of tragic insight the promise of suffering's sublimation. The 
former deigns from without – it echoes the Lutheran emphasis on the helplessness of the 
sinner at the mercy of God's grace – while the latter erupts from within, prefiguring in 
turn Nietzsche's declaration of amor fati. 
 The moment of fate produces an excess of knowledge, terrible insight that bares 
64 
 
the cruel, indifferent, but seemingly ordered and wickedly hostile face of time, the 
tangled web of social and natural events that have delivered the subject to this 
confrontation with its very notion of self. Faust anticipates Nietzsche's dictum in the 
embrace of his fate. The third book of Die fröhliche Wissenschaft ends with a series of 
short quips, the last of which reads: "What is the seal of having become free? – No longer 
to be ashamed before oneself" (153). Read together with the first aphorism of the fourth 
book, this sense of freedom appears to be the goal of his New Year's resolution. 
For the new year. – I'm still alive; I still think: I must still be alive because I still 
have to think. Sum, ergo cogito: cogito, ergo sum. Today everyone allows himself 
to express his dearest wish and thoughts: so I, too, want to say what I wish from 
myself today and what thought first crossed my heart – what thought shall be the 
reason, warrant, and sweetness of the rest of my life! I want to learn more and 
more how to see what is necessary in things as what is beautiful in them – thus 
will I be one of those who make things beautiful. Amor fati: let that be my love 
from now! I do not want to wage war against ugliness. I do not want to accuse; I 
do not even want to accuse the accusers. Let looking away be my only negation! 
And, all in all and on the whole: some day I want only to be a Yes-sayer! (156) 
To gaze back at the mass of material furnished by memory and guilt, to see each deed and 
event as a necessity in light of time's unyielding forward march, and to formulate a 
narrative that gives it coherence as well as aesthetic appeal – to see it all as beautiful – 
this is Nietzsche's fervent desire: to be free of shame before himself, to love his fate. And 
to see all necessity as beauty, to transform even ugliness into a beautiful aspect of his fate 
– does this not require certain leaps in thought, or a very open willingness to adjust one's 
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taste? 
 Especially in the European context, replete with all manner of spirits, the social 
animal knows that many tastes are indeed acquired. The development of taste into desire 
and pleasure entails the gradual transformation of a tolerance into a love. But this, 
Nietzsche maintains in the fourth book of Die fröhliche Wissenschaft, is a conscious 
process, itself a labor, the fruits of which are an aesthetic appreciation the likes of which 
could redeem even the ugliest fate and justify an enthusiastic affirmation. 
One must learn to love. – This happens to us in music: first one must learn to hear 
a figure and melody at all, to detect and distinguish it, to isolate and delimit it as a 
life in itself; then one needs effort and good will to stand it despite its strangeness; 
patience with its appearance and expression, and kindheartedness about its oddity. 
Finally comes a moment when we are used to it; when we expect it; when we 
sense that we'd miss it if it were missing; and now it continues relentlessly to 
compel and enchant us until we have become its humble and enraptured lovers, 
who no longer want anything better from the world than it and it again. But this 
happens to us not only in music: it is in just this way that we have learned to love 
everything we now love. We are always rewarded in the end for our good will, our 
patience, our fair-mindedness and gentleness with what is strange, as it gradually 
casts off its veil and presents itself as a new and indescribable beauty. That is its 
thanks for our hospitality. Even he who loves himself will have learned it this way 
– there is no other way. Love, too, must be learned (GS §334). 
One might consider here the music of Richard Wagner, long beloved by Nietzsche, when 
imagining not only the strange sounds to which one becomes slowly accustomed, but also 
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in its relationship to history. With the moment figured as a point of reflection where the 
paths of the past and future intersect, where various narratives overlap and collide like 
motifs, this process of learning to love describes equally well by which process one might 
come to love one's fate. The moment of insight, with its excess of knowledge, the 
overwhelming coalescence of motifs into a monstrous sound, is tragic in that it shatters 
any sense of stability and demands a critical reorientation toward lived history, itself the 
form and content of a subjectivity that stakes its identity on a coherent narrative. 
 To be free of shame before oneself, to love one's fate: this must be expressed 
through the language of desire – "I want to learn more and more..." – and thereby contain 
the admission that it is by no means a simple and instantaneous judgment, but rather a 
gradual process. Fate, after all, is not perfectly analogous to music; whereas the latter 
becomes a fixed work that can be revisited and may indeed elicit different responses upon 
each occasion, the former is bound up within the endless process of becoming, constantly 
changing and posing new challenges not only to understanding, but to taste itself. To be 
free of shame one day does not preclude the possibility of disgusting oneself the next. 
That which one loves, one must learn to love, and when that which one loves is ever-
changing, one must continually relearn to love with all of its new content, odd qualities, 
and painful contradictions. 
 One hears in Nietzsche's various exhortations of fate an echo of Faust's tragic, 
fate-affirming monologue: "Ja, diesem Sinne bin ich ganz ergeben, / Das ist der Weisheit 
letzter Schluß: / Nur der verdient sich Freiheit wie das Leben, / Der täglich sie erobern 
muß."9 Implicit in Faust's words is a recognition of his subjugation to history in the 
                                                        
9"Yes! to this thought I hold with firm persistence; 
The last result of wisdom stamps it true: 
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moment (Augenblick), beholding and beheld; having conquered freedom by graciously 
accepting his fate, he thereby wins his freedom, sparing himself shame. Neither Faust nor 
Nietzsche express a particular interest in death, and far less any care about the hereafter. 
Their primary concern when confronted with history in the moment of tragic insight is 
their own ability to bear it, their own (dis)taste for themselves in light of all that they 
have been and done. 
 In Affecting Grace, a study of theatricality and subjectivity, Kenneth Calhoon 
develops an understanding of the modern subject that, by means of feigned effortlessness 
(affected grace), bears the weight of history and the scrutinizing gaze of the public 
without betraying the fear and doubt within that issue from an inescapable sense of guilt. 
"Grace separates out from the scenario involving, in the extreme, tyrant and supplicant. 
Distinct from 'mercy,' it becomes the trait of an individual outwardly unencumbered by 
the ancient breach that left the body an impediment to the soul" (4). In his analysis this 
manifests both linguistically – in the diegetic speech and pleas of the dramatic figures – 
and aesthetically – in the dissimulated obliviousness of the living actors before their 
audience. This theatricality is a symptom and model of modern subjectivity; it reveals 
"the structural paranoia of the subject, bedevilled by the sense of being secretly 
observed," which issues from intensified introspection, as "the modern person bears the 
source of judgment within himself. The performer's crafted innocence of his audience is 
an affected grace – a means of counteracting the visual exposure that is both the state of 
man and the condition of the theater" (5). 
 Faust and Zarathustra share a common lineage with the dramatic personages and 
                                                        
He only earns his freedom and existence, 
Who daily conquers them anew." Trans. Bayard Taylor. 
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gestures at the center of Calhoon's work. Original sin gains a renewed tragic significance 
for both of them as forbidden knowledge, but not of any specific object; rather, the terror 
erupting from their tragic insight is what Benjamin pinpoints as the very subjective nature 
of evil, or, inversely, the evil nature of subjectivity. 
"The Bible introduces evil in the concept of knowledge. The serpent's promise to 
the first men was to make them 'knowing both good and evil.' But it is said of God 
after the creation: 'And God saw everything that he had made, and, behold, it was 
very good.' Knowledge of evil therefore has no object. There is no evil in the 
world. It arises in man himself, with the desire for knowledge, or rather for 
judgment" (Benjamin OGTD 233). 
That "the modern person bears the source of judgment within himself" is the mark of a 
shift in subjectivity that perceives its own perceptibility. A subjectivity which conceives 
of its world and self historically, perceiving time and perceived by that time in the 
ambivalent gateway of the Augenblick, both subject and object of the critical gaze, is one 
in which fate has shed its mythical character and become a narrative – but thereby also 
psychological – phenomenon, a locus of insight and interpretation. This modern subject, 
by virtue of its contemplative and self-critical tendencies, confronted by fate with the 
nebulous web of guilt in which it is always already implicated, longs for grace, "which 
refers to acts of clemency as well as a state of divine forgiveness" (Calhoon 5). And like 
the actor who musters up a "crafted innocence" in order to escape the scrutiny of others, 
the subject seeks to affirm – to justify aesthetically, in Nietzsche's terms – the course of 
its history, the coalescence of forces that have led to the moment of insight, and endure 
fate, if not with the semblance of effortlessness, then in the hope that it might find 
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forgiveness and sublimation of suffering from within. 
 Emblematic of Nietzsche's embrace of fate and rejection of divine grace is a poem 
in the rather literally playful Vorspiel to Die fröhliche Wissenschaft, "Bei der dritten 
Häutung," which takes up the lyrical subjectivity of the serpent cursed forever to eat dust 
upon its expulsion from Eden. Rather than lament his lot, Nietzsche's serpent revels in his 
judgment and craves the earth that should be his punishment, casting off his sin like old 
skin, and slithers toward his fate with a "crafted innocence." 
Schon krümmt und bricht sich mir die Haut, 
Schon giert mit neuem Drange, 
So viel sie Erde schon verdaut, 
Nach Erd’ in mir die Schlange. 
Schon kriech’ ich zwischen Stein und Gras 
Hungrig auf krummer Fährte, 
Zu essen Das, was stets ich ass, 
Dich, Schlangenkost, dich, Erde! (§8) 
Treating his condemnation to the earth as inevitable and necessary, the serpentine poet 
orients his desire and pleasure toward that fate. Made from dust, he hungers for the loam, 
seeking in the consumption of his own constitutive elements an absolution akin to the 
ingestion of Christ's body and blood. But it is an expressly unholy communion, aspiring 
not to spiritual purification but to the thoroughgoing exaltation of creaturely existence. If 
forbidden knowledge is the hallmark of the serpent's sinful suggestion, Nietzsche's poetic 
subject desires nothing more fervently than to stare down the abyss of fate again and 
again, "to redeem those who are the past and to recreate all 'it was' into 'thus I willed it!" 
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as Zarathustra declares, "only that would I call redemption" (TSZ 110)! 
 The resolution "to see what is necessary in things as what is beautiful in them" 
expresses in existential-psychological terms what Calhoon sees in the "crafted innocence" 
of theatricality and the untainted perfection of the classical object as aesthetic attempts to 
defend against the otherwise terrible knowledge furnished by fate, the confrontation with 
history. "Grace, of which the immaculate aspect of porcelain is one expression, is 
history's antidote" (Calhoon 16). To see history itself, however, as something immaculate, 
something necessary and therefore beautiful, renders the fateful moment itself vulnerable. 
Indeed, it reveals the afterlife of God – the "tremendous, gruesome shadow" (GS §108) 
that lingers in the wake of his death – not only in the longing of the human subject to 
interpret and seek meaning from history and suffering, but in the good faith that this 
literary or poetic task will produce the desired effects of grace. 
 This good faith is reminiscent of the "good will to untruth" for which Nietzsche 
praises artists, but we must remember his admonishment that "poets lie too much" – a 
reminder that amor fati shares with so many other necessary fictions a protean quality 
that allows for adaptation in the face of new revelations. Recall the inversion of Faust's 
heavenly ascension in the image of the homunculus who commits himself to Proteus's 
sea: in his longing for knowledge the titular doctor continually aspires, however 
devilishly, to pure spirituality, while the homunculus, the disembodied spirit, as if spared 
the original sin of naturally born man, longs to know voluptuous corporeality. In his 
formlessness he resembles the affirmative adaptability that Nietzsche wishes to champion 
with his New Year's resolution: to summon up the strength not only to bear, but to love 
the past, to bring it into himself and maintain the beautiful semblance of a stable 
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subjectivity that does not shy away from tragic insight, but seizes it as a source of 
redemptive grace. If the mass of history's material, unleashed as an excess of knowledge 
in the fateful moment, threatens to poison the subject's spirit, then amor fati, as an all-
forgiving, all-affirming love of fate, is indeed its antidote. 
 But if Faust is also a prefiguration of this attitude, then he illustrates just as well 
the ultimate subjugation of the human being to the march of time – and to tragedy. 
Against the impossible promises of lying poets ("Alles Vergängliche / Ist nur ein 
Gleichnis"), the conviction of amor fati provides suffering with meaning and a beauty 
that resist not time, but the fear of what time will bring. Faust's affirmation of fate is most 
definitive: it is the affirmation itself which overcomes the fear of damnation, but fully 
aware that it also signifies the fulfillment of his infernal contract with Mephistopheles. 
Indeed, the whole drama is distilled into a single proposition for Nietzsche: 
The heaviest weight. – What if some day or night a demon were to steal into your 
loneliest loneliness and say to you: 'This life as you now live it and have lived it 
you will have to live once again and innumerable times again; and there will be 
nothing new in it, but every pain and every joy and every thought and sigh and 
everything unspeakably small or great in your life must return to you, all in the 
same succession and sequence – even this spider ad this moonlight between the 
trees, and even this moment and I myself. The eternal hourglass of existence is 
turned over again and again, and you with it, speck of dust!' Would you not throw 
yourself down and gnash your teeth and curse the demon who spoke thus? Or 
have you once experienced a tremendous moment when you would have 
answered him: 'You are a god, and never have I heard anything more divine.' If 
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this thought gained power over you, as you are it would transform and possibly 
crush you; the question in each and every thing, 'Do you want this again and 
innumerable times again?' would lie on your actions as the heaviest weight! Or 
how well disposed would you have to become to yourself and to life to long for 
nothing more fervently than for this ultimate eternal confirmation and seal? (GS 
§341) 
With damnation reconfigured as the infinite repetition of life, could one bear to affirm 
that life as fate, to embrace it and "long for nothing more fervently" than for its endless 
repetition? This, it would seem, is the conviction of the strongest consitutions, but it also 
poses an interesting challenge to tragedians and other authors alike. Barring Faust's 
conciliatory and contrived salvation, Goethe's drama constructs itself around a wager 
which can only be lost, but can only be lost in a feeling of triumph. This irony – the 
paradox of the wager meant to stave off damnation, but which, in embracing the 
inevitability of damnation overcomes and succumbs to it – is not simply a device of the 
tragedy, but its most centrally formative element. Departing from a realm where fate 
intervenes mysteriously, it most directly places the responsibility for the drama in 
ephemeral human hands. 
 
Conclusion 
 The infinite possibilities for transformation represented by the homunculus mirror 
the "potent protean force" contained in Nietzsche's thought, most specifically in his 
modern reconfiguration of tragedy not as the drama itself, but as the repetitive process by 
which the subject attempts to reconcile the conflicting narratives that constitute its 
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selfhood. The encounter with fate – as the reckoning of one's experiences in response to 
the eternal return of memory in the moment – is an expression of affirmative fatalism that 
transposes tragedy from the realm of drama into the existential-psychological processes 
of subjectivity and its attempt to find beauty in necessity. Seeking symmetry between the 
interior and exterior world, the subject is obliterated and reconstructed in the negotiation 
of opposing or incongruous narratives about itself, hoping to find a unifying narrative that 
can allow it to bear its continued existence. Whether understood as Geschichte or 
historia, both of which imply more or less generally a story of events past, history 
presents itself to the subject as a force that threatens to destabilize its constitution through 
the inconvenient confrontation with narratives that do not align with its internal account 
of itself. The good faith that a stabilizing compromise can be reached – the appeal to 
grace represented in amor fati – is the antidote to its destructive power. 
 The previous chapter sought to give examples from texts before and after Goethe's 
Faust that similarly illustrated this process and representations of affirmative fatalism. In 
Faust's final monologue the schema is clear: in recognition of his deeds, Faust gathers 
before himself the evidence of his wickedness and nobility, embracing the finality of the 
moment in which he can affirm the content of his life in recognition of his looming fate. 
The import of this moment for the subsequent course of German literature is of the 
utmost significance. It highlights in its focus on the subject's inner turmoil, in the 
reckoning with ambivalence, the central role of narrative itself in the development of 
affirmative fatalism as an existential comportment extending beyond the fantastical realm 
of classical tragedy. Because Faust may effectively choose the hour of his damnation, as 
per his agreement with Mephistopheles, his fate is not thrust upon him as upon the demi-
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gods of old, but rather comes when he acknowledges that his love of life necessitates his 
death, at the moment in which he is ready to be obliterated by asserting his subjectivity. 
By this token Faust's death prefigures the modern form of fate as a process through which 
the subject continually reforms its sense of self in the dissolution of a former narrative in 
favor of a new one that attempts to reconcile the inner and outer conditions of its self-
understanding. 
 While the moment remains the crucial locus for this process, in modernity it is 
narrative through which these tragic moments might be elucidated and affirmative 
fatalism expressed. The general movement of the tragic modality from drama to prose 
discussed by George Steiner in The Death of Tragedy and referenced in the prior chapter 
provides the literary-historical framework for the next chapter's considerations, but the 
focus now will come to bear upon the aforementioned religious impulse and how its 
appeal to grace resonated with Hermann Hesse. As an author whose work spoke to a 
generation disabused by world war and the economic crises of global capitalism, Hesse's 
writing – especially those pieces concerned more concretely with religion and the fog of 
nihilism looming over Germany – attempted to reconcile Nietzsche's freshly popular 
thought with traditional Christian philosophy in order to restore a sense of meaning to the 
widespread suffering of the early twentieth century. Hesse, who so adored the work of 
Goethe, was also unapologetically enamored of Nietzsche, as many others of his 
generation, but felt the need, which here only whispered itself in amor fati, to ground that 
thought in the contemplation of a larger context and its ethos. 
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CHAPTER IV 
HERMANN HESSE’S MYSTICAL CHRISTIANITY 
 
Introduction 
 In various essays, articles, letters, and stories penned toward and after the end of 
the First World War, Hermann Hesse, who had already achieved considerable acclaim for 
his earlier attempts at the Bildungsroman, began writing more explicitly and publicly on 
religion. It was not only Christianity and its interpretations that drew his attention, but 
also a growing fascination with eastern religions, as well as the changing social and 
political climate in Germany. One of the most prominent influences upon Hesse and these 
contemporary discourses was Friedrich Nietzsche, whose seminal work Also sprach 
Zarathustra inspired political groups as disparate as socialists and fascists, and whose 
declaration of the death of God was met with equal enthusiasm and rancor. One finds 
throughout Hesse's work, and especially in the period after 1917, many overt references 
to Nietzsche's thought alongside more or less subtle allusions. The desire to restore a 
sense of spiritual order and meaning, which took its most horrible form in the rise of 
German National Socialism, appeared to Hesse during the Weimar Republic as a reaction 
to a deeply penetrating nihilism which he, perhaps naïvely, saw as an opportunity to 
reinvent the German spirit through one of its newest, most beloved thinkers. In an essay 
titled "Die Sehnsucht unserer Zeit nach einer Weltanschauung," published in 1926 in the 
magazine Uhu, Hesse discusses the impulses of Europeans (and especially Germans) to 
seek out new and seemingly exotic religions and philosophies to combat nihilism. In the 
final passage, Hesse points to Nietzsche as the key to overcoming this emptiness, and 
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tellingly connects it to the forbidden knowledge represented by Faust as the 
quintessentially modern figure representing the embrace of amor fati: 
"Mir persönlich, so muß ich bekennen, ist sogar die Geistigkeit der heute 
führenden Strömungen, von Steiner bis zu Keyserling, noch um einige Grade zu 
rationell, zu wenig kühn, zu wenig bereit, ins Chaos, in die Unterwelt einzutreten 
und dort bei Fausts 'Müttern' die ersehnte Geheimlehre vom neuen Menschentum 
zu erlauschen. Keiner der heutigen Führer, so klug oder so begeistert sie seien, hat 
den Umfang und die Bedeutsamkeit Nietzsches, dessen wahre Erben zu werden 
wir noch nicht verstanden haben. Die tausend einander durchkreuzenden Stimmen 
und Wege unserer Zeit aber zeigen ein wertvolles Gemeinsames: eine gespannte 
Sehnsucht, einen aus Not geborenen Willen zur Hingabe. Und die sind 
Vorbedingungen alles Großen" (MG 29).10 
Though the various movements to which Hesse alludes are "too rational" and lacking 
boldness, they do show "an eager longing, a will to devotion born from necessity." To 
embark ardently to understand this necessity anew is the beginning to a great project, 
echoing the New Year's resolution from Nietzsche's Gay Science "to see what is 
necessary in things as what is beautiful in them" (GS §276). 
 These sentiments are indicative of a longer project of Hesse's, namely to bring an 
engaging but more self-critical reading of Nietzsche into public discourse, primarily 
                                                        
10 "For my own part, I must confess, the spirituality of the leading movements of today, from Steiner to 
Keyserling, is still a few degrees too rational, too lacking in daring, too unwilling to descend into chaos, 
into the wunderworld, and there give ear to Faust's "Mothers" and learnfrom them the longed-for secret 
doctrine of a new humanity. None of today's leaders, however clever and enthusiastic they may be, has the 
scope and profundity of Nietzsche, whose true heirs we have not yet shown ourselves capable of being. The 
thousand conflicting voices and paths of our time have, however, something valuable in common: an eager 
longing, a will to devotion, born of misery. And these are the prerequisites of everything great." Trans. 
Denver Lindley. 
77 
 
through his creative writing. Two texts illustrate the earlier, most explicit attempts at this: 
the short novel of 1919, Demian, and a less well-known essay from earlier that year, 
Zarathustras Wiederkehr: Ein Wort an die deutsche Jugend von einem Deutschen, which 
will serve as the point of departure for the present discussion. In this open letter Hesse 
takes up the voice of Nietzsche's prophet and addresses the German youth in the wake of 
the First World War and the failed revolution of 1918, demanding that they reinterpret 
their fate (Schicksal) as Germans and human beings from a Nietzschean standpoint that 
not insignificantly bears certain marks of Christianity. These marks, however, resemble 
the sense of grace implicit in amor fati, a lingering faith that even Nietzsche's philosophy 
cannot shake, recognized by Hesse as that "will to devotion born from necessity." This 
religious impulse underpins the aimless spiritual search of the Weimar era as much as it 
did Nietzsche's own need to find meaning in fate and suffering, and it functions for Hesse 
to justify his strange wedding of Nietzschean thought and religious ideas into what he 
would later term his "mystical Christianity." 
 While it may seem paradoxical (yet perhaps even therefore fitting) to comingle 
Nietzsche's thought with religious considerations, Hesse drew much inspiration for his 
work from the eastern traditions to which he was exposed through his parents' missionary 
work. One finds little differentiation between the philosophical and religious in Taoism or 
Buddhism, to name two pertinent examples, where ontological and epistemological 
concerns are central to questions of divinity, faith, or redemption. Thus it is noteworthy in 
a study of Hesse's literary engagement with Nietzsche to heed the import of his Japanese 
contemporary Keiji Nishitani, whose own work on Buddhism was deeply influenced by 
Nietzsche and a period of study under Martin Heidegger in the 1930s. Although his work 
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and lectures were not published outside of Japan for many decades thereafter, his insights 
into the relationship between religion and German philosophy after Nietzsche provide a 
perspective and vocabulary productive for the examination of Hesse's work. 
 For Nishitani as well as Hesse, Nietzsche's thought complicated but also enriched 
the consideration of religious questions in the twentieth century, whether from a Christian 
or Buddhist standpoint. Indeed, eventually for Hesse there ceased to be any necessity to 
speak in terms of specific religions as his personal faith became a more philosophical 
amalgamation of different religious ideas. And although Nishitani utilizes Buddhist and 
Heideggerian vocabulary, his work deals much more broadly with the question of religion 
per se in the twentieth century, proceeding from the nihilism that provoked Nietzsche to 
probe at the nature of human subjectivity. 
"Religion poses as a starting point the question: 'For what purpose do I exist?' We 
become aware of religion as a need, as a must for life, only at the level of life at 
which everything else loses its necessity and its utility. Why do we exist at all? Is 
not our very existence and human life ultimately meaningless? Or, if there is a 
meaning or significance to it all, where do we find it? When we come to doubt the 
meaning of our existence in this way, when we have become a question to 
ourselves, the religious quest awakens within us" (Nishitani RN 3). 
The religious impulse gnaws at the subject when the possibility of its existence comes 
into question. For Nietzsche, the world could only justify itself as an aesthetic 
phenomenon, and ultimately all necessity had to become beautiful in order for fate to be 
bearable. Nishitani eventually articulates this in terms of karma and samsara – inherited 
guilt and the wheel of suffering, respectively – to explore the possibility of their beauty. 
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 In a style that would later be developed into the narrative form of Siddhartha and 
which was no doubt inspired by the speeches of the Buddha, Hesse took up the mantle of 
Zarathustra and wrote his 1919 Wort an die deutsche Jugend. In the meditative, 
undulating tones of this text, the focus on a vacillation between opposite poles laid out in 
sprawling parataxis, the formal elements reflect the fundamental contradiction at the heart 
of religious thought during the age of nihilism. Some years later, in the essay Ein 
Stückchen Theologie, he revisited these religious concerns, sketching again his dialectical 
understanding of joy and suffering as the apparent contradiction which, when reconciled 
through a gesture like amor fati, paves the way for a faith in the subject's ability, by way 
of affirmative fatalism, to create not only an individual narrative that can stave off 
nihilism, but also to contribute to the world creatively. Whether or not this gesture be 
properly tragic is a matter of unique socio-historical conditions, but the pathos of the 
tragic gesture remains, and for Hesse this lies in the production of texts that provide 
narrative representations of affirmative fatalism. That is: affirmative fatalism – as the 
apotheosis of beauty, understood dialectically in the interplay of limitation and 
possibility, as the unity of self and world in these terms – finds expression in Hesse as the 
creation of texts that attempt to illustrate the existential and religious task of affirming 
fate. 
 
Zarathustras Wiederkehr: Risky Reincarnations 
"But courage is the best slayer, courage that attacks; it slays even death, for it says: "Was 
that life? Well then! One more time!" 
–Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra 
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 It was indisputably bold for Hermann Hesse to take up the voice of Zarathustra in 
the wake of the First World War, but also potentially effective, considering the popularity 
and renown of Nieztsche's book among civilians and soldiers alike. Between the loss of 
the war and the collective trauma of failed revolutions, a moment of tragic insight availed 
itself. Drawing Zarathustra into world history, Hesse acknowledged his specifically 
German identity while also making the explicit claim that Nietzsche, as a figure who 
ultimately became an "anti-patriot" and "anti-German," was the "last great" example of 
the "German spirit." 
"Es gab einmal einen deutschen Geist, einen deutschen Mut, eine deutsche 
Mannhaftigkeit, welche sich nicht nur in Herdenlärm und Massenbegeisterung 
äußerte. Der letzte große Geist dieser Art ist Nietzsche gewesen, und er ist, 
inmitten des damaligen Gründertums und der damaligen Herdengesinnung in 
Deutschland, zum Anti-Patrioten und Anti-Deutschen geworden. An ihn will mein 
Ruf erinnern, an seinen Mut, an seine Einsamkeit" (ZW 7).11 
Against the nationalism and "herd mentality" that had come to characterize German 
culture for Nietzsche and Hesse alike, the Zarathustra resurrected here will speak to a 
courage not wrapped up in the noise and fervor of the masses, but rather will recall that 
formerly championed, solitary tragic spirit that confronts fate alone in its darkest hour. 
 The political intention and impact of this text is obvious enough and well 
documented, but, like so many of Hesse's works, its treatment by scholarship has been 
                                                        
11 "There was once a German spirit, a German courage, a German manliness, that did not merely express 
themselves in the noise of the herd or the rapture of the masses. The last great spirit of this kind was 
Nietzsche, and it was he, amidst the founding and herd mentality of Germany at that time, who became an 
anti-patriot and anti-German. I want to recall him, his courage, and his loneliness." My translation. 
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largely superficial and biographical. It is the general tendency either to deem Hesse's 
writing unworthy of close reading and literary analysis, or to try to offer broad readings 
of his entire corpus, as if each text were merely exemplary of a singular, central idea. And 
although it might be rightly argued that there is indeed such a guiding principle at the 
heart of Hesse's literary project, it is irresponsible to gloss over entire works without 
taking their finer composition more seriously. Joseph Mileck, as one example, while a 
formidable biographer of Hesse, tends on the whole to write literary history around his 
works rather than more pointed literary criticism of their form and content. In his book 
Hermann Hesse: Between the Perils of Politics and the Allure of the Orient, he once 
again builds his study around Hesse the man and his feelings, eschewing any detailed 
engagement with the living works of the poet and artist. About one paragraph is dedicated 
to Zarathustras Wiederkehr, and while the general message of the open letter is 
succinctly extracted, the analysis is more political and biographical, situating the text in 
the context of Hesse's life more than in literary history or in Nietzsche's legacy. Mileck 
writes: "Germans were admonished to put aside all their self-righteous indignation, their 
hatred and thoughts of revenge, to cease their theatrical worship of heroism, and to 
counter their adversity with love and a religious acceptance of fate" (24-5).  
 This brief summation completely overlooks the stylistic developments 
exemplified in this postwar text, as well as its importance within the history of 
antinationalist, antifascist interpretations of Nietzsche in the early twentieth century. And 
while it is obvious that Mileck prefers the broader historical study to the more nuanced 
literary critique, he is far from alone among Hesse scholars. For the twentieth century and 
the postmodern hell of our twenty-first century, ever permeated by cynical nihilism and 
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the lazy irony of a drunk's morning-after haze, the most serious investigation of Hesse's 
writing must do away with the man and ask about the concepts so flippantly tossed about 
here: heroism, love, the "religious acceptance of fate." 
 Hesse's Zarathustra appears in the streets of a German city ravaged by social 
unrest and the sounds of gunshots, all of which, taken together with the text's explicit 
reference to the Spartacists, signifies the very specific historical situation of Germany 
languishing after defeat in the First World War. The deliberate identification of 
Zarathustra with the German spirit has, of course, its political implications, but in 
connection with these also illuminates the centrality of the affirmatively tragic worldview 
for German thought in the early twentieth century. Yet what makes this text especially 
intriguing is its rhetorical delivery: fashioned into a series of speeches, it mimics the 
overall form of Zarathustra's addresses in Nietzsche's "book for all and none," but the 
speeches themselves are less pointedly sardonic or ironic, and rather more meditative and 
repetitive in the style of the speeches of the Buddha.12 
 Like Nietzsche's teacher of the Eternal Return, Hesse's Zarathustra playfully 
nettles his audience while also offering up his wisdom in cryptic metaphors and 
analogies. But infused with the rhetorical tendencies of Buddha's speeches, employing 
imagery in a rhythmic fashion at once somewhat alien but, in accordance with the 
"longing of [his] time for a worldview" that inspired so many Germans to look east, also 
enticing. This Zarathustra attempts to lull his audience into a contemplative trance 
wherein Hesse's affirmatively fatalistic interpretation of Nietzsche might resonate with 
the dreams and fears of the Germans, guiding them toward a more self-critical standpoint. 
                                                        
12See: Die Reden Gotamo Buddhos aus der mittleren Sammlung Majjhimanikayo des Pali-Kanons. Trans. 
Karl Eugen Neuman. Zurich: Artemis Verlag, 1956. 
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Regardless of the text's political impact in the hindsight of history, the reincarnation of 
Zarathustra with a decidedly eastern flair reveals an uncanny similarity between Hesse's 
interpretation of Nietzsche and Nishitani's reading in The Self-Overcoming of Nihilism, 
which would merely be a happy accident if it were not afforded by our view of 
intellectual history through a Nietzschean lens as one such beautiful necessity that forms 
the fateful position in which we find ourselves. In both of these writers – one a poet, the 
other a philosopher – the friendly confrontation of Nietzsche's thought with eastern 
philosophy produces a new examination of just how long the shadow of the dead God yet 
looms. Both recognize that the unsolved question for modern nihilism remains a 
fundamentally religious interrogation of the meaning of existence; that an answer to 
nihilism, which issued in part from the denial of religion, lies in religious thinking itself.  
 Whether as resurrection or reincarnation, the return of Zarathustra in Hesse's text 
plays both rhetorically and historically on the Gedankenexperiment of the Eternal Return. 
Rhetorically in its title and return to certain moments from Nietzsche's Zarathustra, but 
historically in the literal return of Zarathustra to Germany for a fresh confrontation with 
his fate, both as a literary figure and as a German. His rebirth also signifies that of 
Germany: not like a phoenix from the ashes, but as a worn and weary soldier from the 
trenches. And like Germany facing its political and military failure, Zarathustra returns to 
face his failure as a teacher. 
"Was war es doch, das ihr einst, in jenen trunkenen Stunden, von eurem 
Zarathustra gelernt habt? Was war es doch? War es etwa Weisheit für den 
Kaufladen, oder für die Gasse, oder für das Schlachtfeld? Gab ich euch 
Ratschläge für Könige, habe ich königlich, oder bürgerlich, oder politisch, oder 
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händlerisch zu euch gesprochen? Nein, ihr erinnert euch, ich sprach 
Zarathustrisch, ich sprach meine Sprache, ich tat mich vor euch auf wie ein 
Spiegel, damit ihr in ihm euch selbst zu sehen bekämet" (ZW 13).13 
Hesse's Zarathustra rejects any practical dimension of his teaching; he should appear 
before the Germans "like a mirror" so that they might glimpse their reflection in him. But 
he is himself the reflection. His melancholic introspection insists on that historically 
defined German quality par excellence, the mode of Trauerspiel, the aesthetic appeal of 
which Walter Benjamin treated as a mandate of its public.14 As a mirror, this Zarathustra 
reveals nothing new, but rather takes on a temporally relevant and identifiable form in 
order to fulfill the role played previously by tragic drama. In him a quintessentially 
German trait is discernible: the propensity for a profound, potentially self-destructive 
inwardness. 
 This moment in Hesse's text reenacts the beginning of the second book of 
Nietzsche's Zarathustra, "The Child with the Mirror." After wandering the land and 
giving speeches, Zarathustra has again retired to his mountain hermitage, where for years 
he seems to hibernate, until he shoots up from a dream that fills him with foreboding.  
"What frightened me so in my dream that it waked me? Did not a child approach 
me carrying a mirror? 
'Oh, Zarathustra' – spoke the child to me – 'look at yourself in the mirror!' 
But when I looking into the mirror I cried out, and my heart was shaken; for I did 
                                                        
13 "What was it then, in those drunken hours then, that you learned from your Zarathustra? What was it? 
Was it some kind of wisdom for the shop, for the alley, for the battlefield? Did I give you advice for kings, 
did I speak in a regal, bourgeois, political, or mercantile manner? No, you remember, I spoke Zarathustrian, 
I spoke my language, I placed myself before you like a mirror, that you might come to see yourselves." My 
translation. 
14 "For [Trauerspiele] are not so much plays which cause mourning, as plays through which mournfulness 
finds satisfaction: plays for the mournful" (Benjamin OGTD 119). 
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not see myself there, but a devil's grimace and scornful laughter. 
Indeed, all too well I understand the dream's sign and warning: my teaching is in 
danger, weeds want to be wheat! 
My enemies have become powerful and have distorted the image of my teaching, 
so that those dearest to me must be ashamed of the gifts I gave them" (TSZ 63). 
Similarly possessed of a fear that his teaching has been mangled and mistreated, Hesse's 
Zararthustra is compelled to return to Germany and save his teaching from those who 
might misrepresent it and abuse its influence. But it is also that protean quality of 
Nietzsche's writing in general, its parabolic nature, that affords it such interpretive 
elasticity. Should Zarathustra thus be surprised by the hideous grimace in the mirror? 
 As both mirror and reflection, Hesse's Zarathustra seeks to show the Germans 
what has become of them, but he also contains and represents their potential. For it is part 
and parcel of his dictum amor fati that the ugliness of the past be embraced as necessity 
and transformed into beauty. In this historical moment not only Zarathustra returns, but 
the past deeds and beliefs of his German public, returning eternally as is their wont in the 
psychological time of memory, re-presence themselves for thorough scrutiny. This fresh 
view of themselves, augmented by the influence of eastern religions, might allow for a 
simultaneous rebirth and redemption; seen through the lens of amor fati, the burden of 
the folly and trauma of the past may be taken up gracefully in the creation of a new 
narrative. 
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"Vom Steine stäuben Stücke": God, Fate, and the Self 
"Now my hammer rages cruelly against its prison. Shards shower from the stone: what do 
I care?" 
–Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra 
 
 "Vom Stein könnet ihr lernen, was Härte ist, und vom Vogel, was Singen ist. Von 
mir aber könnet ihr lernen, was Mensch und Schicksal ist" (ZW 14).15 Thus Hesse's 
Zarathustra closes his introduction and moves into the first of his speeches, "Vom 
Schicksal." The centrality of amor fati for Hesse's text is immediately recognizable, 
although he does not employ the Latin dictum; instead, the specifically religious bent of 
Hesse's thought is fundamentally tied to the concept of fate from the outset: "Eines ist 
dem Menschen gegeben, das ihn zum Gotte macht, das ihn erinnert, daß er Gott ist: das 
Schicksal zu erkennen" (15).16 The suggested equivalence of the human being and God 
smacks of a Nietzschean blasphemy – specifically, it recalls the section of Nietzsche's 
Zarathustra following "The Child with the Mirror": "On the Blessed Isles." Here 
Zarathustra reasserts his dedication to teaching the Übermensch and challenges the very 
notion of God, most notably in that polemical allusion to the end of Goethe's Faust with 
which the previous chapter occupied itself.  
 In Nietzsche's text Zarathustra has returned after his terrible dream to continue his 
teaching, and he declares: 
                                                        
15 "From the stone you can learn what hardness is, and from the bird, what singing is. From me, however, 
you can learn what the human is and fate." My translation. 
16 "One thing is given to the human that makes him God, that reminds him that he is God: to recognize 
fate." My translation.  
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"Once people said God when they gazed upon distant seas; now I have taught you 
to say: overman. 
God is a conjecture, but I want that your conjecturing not reach further than your 
creating will. 
Could you create a god? – Then be silent about any gods! But you could well 
create the overman. 
Not you yourselves perhaps, my brothers! But you could recreate yourselves into 
fathers and forefathers of the overman: and this shall be your best creating" (TSZ 
65)! 
The disavowal of any gods is paired with a hope for the future; the human being is still "a 
rope fastened between animal and overman" (7), but therein is contained the possibility 
for a future being that might overcome the human. But the probability of the realization 
of this superior human is not important. Rather, the charged conviction that the human 
being might strive to perfect itself is the crux of Nietzsche's argument. Rather than 
conjecture about gods over and beyond the world, Zarathustra "gaze[s] upon distant seas" 
and imagines the manifold possibilities for the human being, like the homunculus in 
Goethe's Faust who ventures into the ocean to explore its corporeal possibilities. And this 
desire has lost no traction in Hesse's time: it is the same "will to devotion born from 
necessity" that Hesse senses in his contemporaries in "the longing of [his] time for a 
worldview." 
 "Could you think a God? – But let this mean will to truth to you; that everything 
be transformed into what is humanly thinkable, humanly visible, humanly feelable! You 
should think your own senses to their conclusion" (Nietzsche TSZ 65). While Nietzsche's 
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Zarathustra rejects the thought of God with these sentiments, Hesse's Zarathustra 
collapses the notion of God into the schema for a more refined and self-possessed 
humanity. After all, with God's shadow looming, is it possible not to think a God? Does 
the monstrous idea not haunt all human striving? "Es irrt der Mensch, solang' er strebt," 
says God in the opening of Goethe's Faust (18) – and among these follies is God himself, 
woven into the very fabric of thought in the nebulous form of abstract ideas, which take 
on a superhuman existence of their own. 
 Hesse unifies this conjecture, abstraction, and imaginative thinking in his text: 
"Lernet, daß Schicksal nicht von Götzen kommt, so werdet ihr auch endlich 
lernen, daß es keine Götzen und Götter gibt! Wie im Leibe eines Weibes das Kind, 
so wächst Schicksal in eines jeden Menschen Leib, oder wenn ihr wollt, könnt ihr 
auch sagen: in seinem Geist oder in seiner Seele. Es ist dasselbe. 
Und wie das Weib eins ist mit seinem Kinde und sein Kind liebt und nichts 
Besseres in der Welt kennt als sein Kind – so solltet ihr euer Schicksal lieben 
lernen und nichts Besseres auf der Welt kennen als euer Schicksal. Es soll euer 
Gott sein, denn ihr selbst sollt eure Götter sein" (ZW 15).17 
To recognize fate allows the human being to become its own god, and the body or spirit 
or soul, which are here quickly reduced to a singular entity, is the incubator of fate. As 
something "humanly thinkable, humanly visible, humanly feelable," fate, the coalescence 
of narratives within the subject, has its home in lived experience, drawing its 
                                                        
17 "Learn that fate does not come from idols, thus will you learn that idols or gods do not exist! Like the 
child in the woman's body, so does fate grow in every human body, or if you like, you can just as well say: 
in his spirit or in his soul. It is the same. And as the woman is one with the child and loves and knows 
nothing better than her child – so shall you learn to love your fate and know nothing better in the world 
than your fate. It shall be your god, for you shall be your own gods." My translation. 
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identification with God into the development of a human being possessed of its own 
creativity. It recalls the sentiment against which Benjamin lashes out, the idea that "man's 
existence" is "the eternal subject of its own creations instead of recognizing him as its 
own creator," where "all sane reflection is at an end" (OGTD 103). But only as creator 
and creation can the human subject possibly take hold of its fate and not succumb to 
passive fatalism. And what sanity is to be expected of the author of Der Steppenwolf? The 
aesthetic justification of existence that pulses through Nietzsche's thought is a central 
concern for Hesse elsewhere, but especially here, where he demands of the Germans an 
honest confrontation with their fate and all that they have wrought. If their political and 
military endeavors proved fruitless, could their own sense of self and people not perhaps 
be somehow redeemed in a new, at least aesthetically satisfying narrative? 
 It is therefore not a question of sanity, but rather a question of meaning, and the 
self, configured as God and fate, then becomes the locus and focus of the problem. In the 
moment of its confrontation with itself, the past must be assessed and, in Nietzschean 
fashion, affirmed, some narrative or part of the self sacrificed in tragic fashion, so that a 
future might be possible, either for this active subject or thereafter. This is the decidedly 
affirmative fatalist quality of such a vein of German thought: it resists the beckon call of 
the abyss, though it longs to sing its song. Thus Hesse's Zarathustra teaches that fate 
cannot be changed, but must be recognized and embraced as part of the self. 
"Wer das Schicksal erkannt hat, der will niemals Schicksal ändern. Schicksal 
ändern wollen, das ist so recht ein Kinderbemühen, wobei man einander in die 
Haare gerät und einander totschlägt. Schicksal ändern wollen, das war das Tun 
und Bemühen eurer Kaiser und Feldherren, es war euer eigenes Bemühen. Nun 
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ihr das Schicksal nicht habt ändern können, schmeckt es bitter, und ihr meint, es 
sei Gift. Hättet ihr es nicht ändern wollen, hättet ihr es zu eurem Kind und 
Herzen, hättet ihr es ganz und gar zu euch selbst gemacht – wie süß würde es 
alsdann schmecken! Erlittenes, fremd gebliebenes Schicksal ist jeder Schmerz, ist 
jedes Gift, ist der Tod. Jede Tat aber und jedes Gute und Frohe und Zeugende auf 
Erden ist erlebtes Schicksal, ist zu Ich gewordenes Schicksal" (Hesse ZW 16).18 
The desire to change one's fate is a childish endeavor; it fails to recognize that the self is 
constituted of its successes and failures alike, that time rolls forward without pause or 
care for disappointment. Two faces (Gesichter) of fate appear here: one that attacks the 
subject from without and the other that is experienced from within. The potential 
contained in the moment of recognition hinges on an ambivalence reminiscent of 
Zarathustra's encounter with time in Nietzsche's book. The possibility of the eternal 
return, as proposed in Die fröhliche Wissenschaft in "The Heaviest Weight," makes one 
the subject of fate, replete with its own ambiguities, capable at once of passive 
subjugation to the wheel of time but also of active agency, taking up the past as beautiful 
necessity and the formative substance of subjectivity. 
 Hesse's own emphasis on becoming and the recognition of the ever-changing 
shape of fate follows from Nietzsche's Zarathustra, where the rejection of God goes hand 
in hand with his allusion to and criticism of Faust's redemption at the end of Goethe's 
tragedy. 
                                                        
18 "Whosoever has recognized fate never wants to change fate. To want to change fate, that is a childish 
endeavor, like grabbing another by the hair and beating him. To want to change fate, that was the endeavor 
of your Kaiser and commanders, it was your own endeavor. Now that you could not change fate, it tastes 
bitter, and you think it is poison. Had you not wanted to change it, had you made it your child and heart, 
made it fully and completely part of yourself – how sweet would taste now! Fate that is suffered and 
remains alien is every pain, every poison, every death. But every deed and every good and every joy and 
generative thing on earth is lived (experienced) fate, is fate that has become I (ego)." My translation. 
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"All that is everlasting – that is merely a parable! And the poets lie too much. 
But the best parables should speak about time and becoming: they should be 
praise and justification of all that is not everlasting! 
Creating – that is the great redemption from suffering, and life's becoming light. 
But in order for the creator to be, suffering is needed and much transformation. 
Indeed, much bitter dying must be in your life, you creators! Therefore you are 
advocates and justifiers of all that is not everlasting" (TSZ 66). 
Poetry and parables serve "the good will to untruth" that Nietzsche praises in Die 
fröhliche Wissenschaft (GS 104), the desire to make the world beautiful and palatable in 
spite of the meaningless pain suffered in life. In the absence of divine providence, the 
human subject must become the creator of a narrative into which the events of the past 
may be incorporated and bestowed with a meaning that justifies lived experience, if only 
aesthetically. Faust's knowledge and creative spirit, the focus of his entire existence and 
striving – the content of his life and becoming – are effectively nullified in his 
conciliatory redemption. But for Nietzsche the work of art (or literature) ought to redeem 
that knowledge and creativity. In creating a new narrative, one consecrates pain, failure, 
and loss. 
 Similarly, when Hesse's Zarathustra speaks "vom Leiden und vom Tun," he insists 
on the necessity of suffering and its embrace as part of the complete experience 
interpreted as fate. It is here that the more specifically Buddhist aspects of Hesse's 
worldview emerge. His Zarathustra outlines the nature of life as suffering, but a 
productive suffering, a series of processes into which the human subject is born and over 
which it has no control. This suffering is at one with all activity, and its inevitably 
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negative aspects should be considered from the standpoint of fate where all that has come 
to pass presents itself as beautiful, edifying necessity. 
"Tun und Leiden, welche zusammen unser Leben ausmachen, sind ein Ganzes, 
sind eines. Das Kind leidet, daß es erzeugt wird, es leidet seine Geburt, es leidet 
seine Entwöhnung, es leidet hier und leidet dort, bis es zuletzt den Tod erleidet. 
Alles Gute aber, was an ihm ist und wofür es gelobt oder geliebt wird, ist nur das 
gute Leiden, das richtige, volle, lebendige Leiden. Gut zu leiden wissen, ist mehr 
als halb gelebt. Gut zu leiden wissen, ist ganz gelebt! Geborenwerden ist Leiden, 
Wachstum ist Leiden, Same leidet Erde, Wurzel leidet Regen, Knospe leidet 
Sprengung. 
So, meine Freunde, leidet der Mensch Schicksal. Schicksal ist Erde, ist Regen, ist 
Wachstum. Schicksal tut weh" (ZW 21).19 
The rhythmic, repetitive composition of passages like this provide a taste of the style later 
employed in Siddhartha, possessed of a cadence that rolls like the wheel of time (or 
samsara), rising and falling as they illustrate the stages of life: "Same leidet Erde, Wurzel 
leidet Regen, Knospe leidet Sprengung." No wonder that this representation, which is so 
reminiscent of the Buddha's speeches, resonates with Keiji Nishitani's interpretation of 
Nietzsche's amor fati. The unfolding of fate seen from the perspective of the becoming 
subject charges all suffering and activity with the possibility of meaning; where the 
creative subject has this affirmative view of the past, which asserts itself unremittingly in 
                                                        
19 "Doing and suffering, which together make up our lives, are a whole, are one. The child suffers in that it 
is begotten, it suffers its birth, it suffers weaning, it suffers here and there until it finally suffers death. But 
everything good about it and for which it is praised or loved, that is the good suffering, the proper, full, 
living suffering. To know how to suffer well is better than half-living. To know how to suffer well is living 
completely! Birth is suffering, growth is suffering, seed suffers earth, root suffers rain, bud suffers 
blooming. 
"So, my friends, does the human suffer fate. Fate is earth, is rain, is growth. Fate hurts." My translation. 
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memory with the potential of its eternal return, it may transform the historical material 
furnished by experience into part of an active narrative process that endows blind chance 
with significance. 
"In the absence of both divine Providence and fatalism in the ordinary sense, 
occurrences assume the character of utter chance. Every action of the self in this 
context is influenced by all things and in turn influences all things. All things 
become the fate of the self, and the self becomes the fate of all things. At such a 
fundamental level the world moves at one with the self, and the self moves at one 
with the world. This idea is close to the Buddhist idea of karma, although in 
Nietzsche the standpoint of self as fate is a fundamentally creative one. ... In the 
midst of the world of becoming the self turns the world and its 'necessity' into its 
own will and affirms it; it affirms the world and its chance nature as necessity 
from out of creative will to power. Nietzsche characterizes the standpoint of amor 
fati as 'attaining height by a bird's eye view in observation' [WP 1004]. He 
explains this by saying that there 'one understands how everything actually goes 
as it should go: how every kind of "imperfection" and the suffering due to it 
belong together in the highest desirability.' To say 'yes' in this sense (Ja-sagen) is 
precisely amor fati; and this means that 'self = fate'" (Nishitani SN 50). 
The "chance nature" of the world is the infinite and unpredictable possibility for pleasure 
as well as suffering, the necessity of the past from the standpoint of the present, the 
singular temporal position to which the subject has access. But to take hold of this vision 
from "a bird's eye view," like Faust gazing out upon his dominion from the heights, 
gathering knowledge of the past into a massive image or narrative – from here every 
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singular chance event plays out on the stage of history and fulfills its role by virtue of 
simply being as it is. 
 The description resounds as well with Benjamin's characterization of fate 
discussed in the previous chapter as "the entelechy of events within the field of guilt," 
where a certain view perceives the convergence of coincidences as the charged forces of 
fate, which "unleashes causality as the instrument of the irresistibly unfolding fatalities" 
(OGTD 129). History, be it personal or communal, constitutes the "field of guilt" in 
which each subject must craft an edifying narrative out of the terrible knowledge afforded 
by fate. This knowledge sees beyond the appearance of individual causes and effects into 
the impossible and meaningless expanse of universal contingency, where causality has no 
purpose save to assert its own infinite potential. To conceive of oneself as part of this 
world is to recognize, on the one hand, one's absolute impotence in the face of nature's 
indifference and, on the other hand, that the incidental and random character of the world 
affords it justification only insofar as it accords with the subject, involuntarily born into 
and subjugated to its cruelty. 
 That the world might accord with the subject, that the past, filled perhaps with 
pain and ugliness, might become beautiful as necessity, requires a comportment toward 
time and events in which these collapse into subjectivity itself and no longer maintain the 
semblance of external forces, but rather become the raw material from which the subject 
crafts itself. Nietzsche's Zarathustra extolls the joy and sense of liberty made possible by 
the embrace of fate: 
"Indeed, through a hundred souls I went my way and through a hundred cradles 
and pangs of birth. Many a farewell have I taken already; I know the 
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heartbreaking final hours. 
But thus my creating will wills it, my destiny. Or, to tell it more honestly to you: 
just such a destiny – my will wills. 
Everything that feels, suffers in me and is in prison; but my will always comes to 
me as my liberator and bringer of joy. 
Willing liberates: that is the true teaching of will and liberty – thus Zarathustra 
teaches it" (TSZ 66). 
The prominent metaphor of continuous rebirth, as though anticipating Zarathustras 
Wiederkehr, alludes to the recurring need to reinterpret one's fate, to be reborn again and 
again in life as the shape of fate changes within the view of the subject. And here fate is 
again transfigured from a force outside the subject into the ardent desire of the will, the 
goal and result of willing itself. This active, creative desire to reshape oneself and the 
narrative provided by fate Nishitani describes when he says that the self "affirms the 
world and its chance nature as necessity from out of creative will to power" (SN 50). 
 But it is on this point that Hesse's and Nietzsche's Zarathustras shall diverge: for 
Nietzsche the creative will displaces God and removes him from the realm of possibility, 
while for Hesse the creative will is precisely what makes God a possibility, but as an 
intrinsic aspect of the human being. 
"Away from God and gods this will lured me; what would there be to create, after 
all, if there were gods? 
But I am always driven anew to human beings by my ardent will to create; thus 
the hammer is driven toward the stone. 
Oh you human beings, in the stone sleeps an image, the image of my images! A 
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shame it must sleep in the hardest, ugliest stone! 
Now my hammer rages cruelly against its prison. Shards shower from the stone: 
what do I care? 
I want to perfect it, for a shadow came to me – the stillest and lightest of all things 
once came to me! 
The overman's beauty came to me as a shadow. Oh, my brothers! Of what concern 
to me anymore – are gods! –" (TSZ 67). 
The gods of which Zarathustra speaks may be quite literal, metaphysical beings whose 
existence he denies by virtue of his own creative power. To overcome nihilism requires a 
thorough rejection of all that offends becoming, existence, and life, which included the 
various promises of religion and otherworldly conjectures. Gods are relegated to the 
realm of fantasy, but lacking the empowering force of the beautiful lies provided by art, 
and the human being itself becomes the object of the creative will and transformation. 
Nietzsche evokes the suffering likewise required for a meaningful confrontation with and 
interpretation of fate in his alliterative language: "vom Steine stäuben Stücke: was schiert 
mich das?" As "shards shower from the stone," an old ugliness is slowly carved away to 
reveal an ever more beautiful image sleeping within; the sedimented past, formless and 
full of distortions, is shaped into a coherent narrative. And what is the self, that "ball of 
wild snakes," but a momentarily articulable narrative? 
 Yet there is an important irony in these lines that speaks to Nietzsche's tragic 
religiosity and its seemingly uncharacteristic relevance for Hesse's religious thinking. 
While chiseling away at the stone and sending shards flying off, Zarathustra shrugs, "Was 
schiert mich das?" The indeterminate referent of this "das" doubles the ambivalence 
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already implicit in the expression's more immediate rhetorical gesture. "Was schiert micht 
das?" "What do I care?" But more literally: "How does that cut me?" The nonchalance 
with which Zarathustra carves away at the stone suggests a degree of comfort with a 
practice of affirmation, but the rhetorical denial of the possible dangers of the process 
reveals a lurking, nameless uncertainty that threatens the subject in such a tightly wound, 
circular relation. That one might carve oneself out of oneself – one cuts and is cut, chisels 
and is chiseled – admits that a certain amount of suffering is produced by the affirmation 
of fate itself and not only in the historical material confronted in the fateful moment. 
 Likewise, there is an ambivalence opened up by this creative power, which 
nullifies the influence or existence of the gods. "The overman's beauty came to me as a 
shadow," Zarathustra says, recalling the image of God's lingering shadow in the wake of 
his death, then scoffing ironically once again, "Of what concern to me anymore – are 
gods!–" For here a rhetorically trivialized uncertainty asserts itself in the problematic 
similarity of the Übermensch to God: each looms, abstract, a conjecture tainted by 
impossibility. But this is precisely where the faith and appeal to grace implicit in 
Nietzsche's various formulations come to the fore in Hesse's interpretation. While 
Nietzsche draws a distinction between the metaphysical absurdity of God and the 
material possibility of a future humanity or superhumanity, Hesse insists from the outset 
on the metaphoricity of God, which is also the mark of his reality. The line of thought 
passed down from Nietzsche that acknowledges the illusory nature of all knowledge 
provides even linguistic perception with the possibility of truth, should even its absolute 
intention be toward untruth. God as metaphor – as linguistic and ideal expression, an 
extension of subjectivity, a product of the only means of discerning impossible truth – 
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thereby enters into truth. It is in the creative power, the possibility of imagining such a 
God or gods, where the divine dwells, as both the imagination which dreams up divinity 
and the thought of divinity itself. In this way, God is also delivered into insanity: 
recalling Benjamin's comment that "to see man's existence as the eternal subject of its 
own creations instead of recognizing him as its own creator, then all sane reflection is at 
an end," one finds God in this same paradox. 
 Hesse's Zarathustra formulates the ultimate task for the young Germans thus: 
"Eure Zukunft ist nicht dies oder das, ist nicht Geld oder Macht, ist nicht Weisheit oder 
Gewerbeglück – eure Zukunft und euer schwerer, gefährlicher Weg ist dieser: reif zu 
werden und Gott in euch selbst zu finden" (Hesse ZW 40).20 The maturity and ripeness to 
which the young, sorrowful Germans should aspire echoes Zarathustra's "On the Blessed 
Isles" when he says, "The figs fall from the trees, they are good and sweet; and as they 
fall, their red skin ruptures. I am a north wind to ripe figs" (Nietzsche TSZ 65). The wind 
has returned to Germany, but the figs are not ready to fall. First a narrative reformulation 
is required, which must issue from a confrontation with and affirmation of fate. To this 
end Hesse's Zarathustra encourages the Germans to disregard the inflammatory and 
unproductive rhetoric of political extremism, and especially the calls for revenge against 
the foes of the fatherland. Rather than listen to these resentful and misguided voices, he 
implores the Germans: "Höret auf die Stimme, die aus euch selber kommt! Wenn sie 
schweigt, diese Stimme, so wisset, daß etwas schief steht, daß etwas nicht in Ordnung ist, 
daß ihr auf dem falschen Wege seid. Singt und spricht er aber, euer Vogel – oh, dann 
folget ihm, folget ihm in jede Lockung und noch in die fernste und kälteste Einsamkeit 
                                                        
20 "Your future is not this or that, not money or power, not wisdom or business success – your future and 
your difficult, dangerous path is this: to become ripe in to find God in yourselves." My translation.  
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und in das dunkelste Schicksal hinein" (ZW 41)!21 
 The tragic pathos of affirmative fatalism pulses through Hesse's text through to 
the final call to follow the voice within "into the farthest, coldest solitude and the darkest 
fate." It is the orientation that is "bereit, ins Chaos, in die Unterwelt einzutreten und dort 
bei Fausts 'Müttern' die ersehnte Geheimlehre vom neuen Menschentum zu erlauschen," 
which Hesse explicitly ascribed to Nietzsche (Hesse MG 29). Yet it is also Faust's descent 
into that "underworld," aided by Mephistopheles, that separates him so thoroughly from 
God, which for Nietzsche was the sign of Faust's strength in the face of a nihilistic 
religious sensibility that effectively worshipped death, but which for Hesse – and here the 
true core of his religious thought emerges – reveals in dialectical fashion the manifold 
possible paths to God and the overcoming of nihilism. 
 
Unity and Devotion 
"Denn einzig darin besteht für mich das Leben, im Fluktuieren zwischen zwei Polen, im 
Hin und Her zwischen den beiden Grundpfeilern der Welt."22 
–Hermann Hesse, "Über die Einheit" 
 
 Hesse's characterizations of God and divinity appear across his corpus in 
variegated form, but the unifying quality among them is precisely unity. In Zarathustras 
Wiederkehr the idea of God is at one with an affirmed fate as a potentiality within the 
                                                        
21 "Heed the voice that comes from within you! When it is silent, this voice, know then that something is 
not right, that something it out of place, that you are on the wrong path. But if your bird sings and speaks – 
oh, then follow him, follow his every call and into the farthest and deepest solitude and into the darkest 
fate!" My translation. 
22 "For me life consists only of this: the fluctuating between two poles, the to and fro between the basic 
pillars of the world." My translation. 
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subject: it is to be found where necessity is recast as beauty, where conflicting narratives 
of the self are aligned through an articulation that owns the past and chisels from it a 
fresh image. Thus the subject might draw the exterior forces that make up certain aspects 
of its fate into itself, as they are spatially and temporally, sociologically and 
psychologically, inseparable from its development. The affirmation signifies a unity of 
subject and world, paving the way to a recognition of creative power as the divine in the 
human being. 
 Hesse begins his notes "Über die Einheit" (1923-6) with a profession of faith that 
recalls the schema put forward years prior in Zarathustras Wiederkehr: “Ich glaube an 
nichts in der Welt so tief, keine andere Vorstellung ist mir so heilig wie die der Einheit, 
die Vorstellung, daß das Ganze der Welt eine göttliche Einheit ist und daß alles Leiden, 
alles Böse nur darin besteht, daß wir einzelne uns nicht mehr als unlösbare Teile des 
Ganzen empfinden, daß das Ich sich zu wichtig nimmt" (MG 20).23 Unity is itself divine, 
and suffering issues forth when individuals place undue emphasis on themselves. The 
formulation is not unlike Benjamin's characterization of original sin as knowledge itself, 
in that this introduced negativity and differentiation into the world, the prerequisites for 
the individuation of the subject.24 
 But Hesse's formulation differs from Benjamin's in that it does not assume a fall: 
instead, the original sin of knowledge and individuation is inseparable from humanity's 
innermost nature, at one with a dialectical view of the world. Indeed, the divine unity of 
                                                        
23 "I believe in nothing in the world so deeply, no other idea is as holy to me as that of unity, the idea that 
the entire world is a divine unity, and that all suffering, all evil exists only because we individuals no longer 
feel ourselves to be insoluble parts of the whole, because the I (ego) takes itself too seriously." My 
translation. 
24 See chapter two, "Nietzsche's Tragic Religiosity," and Benjamin's discussion of the devil and original sin 
in Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels. 
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which Hesse sings the praises is a synthesis of individuation and its total erasure. It is that 
"the I takes itself too seriously," not that it exists at all, to which he attributes suffering 
and wickedness. 
"Denn einzig darin besteht für mich das Leben, im Fluktuieren zwischen zwei 
Polen, im Hin und Her zwischen den beiden Grundpfeilern der Welt. Beständig 
möchte ich mit Entzücken auf die selige Buntheit der Welt hinweisen und ebenso 
beständig daran erinnern, daß dieser Buntheit eine Einheit zugrunde liegt; 
beständig möchte ich zeigen, daß Schön und Häßlich, Hell und Dunkel, Sünde 
und Heiligkeit immer nur für einen Moment Gegensätze sind, daß sie immerzu 
ineinander übergehen" (Hesse MG 21).25 
It is Mephistopheles who calls himself "ein Teil von jener Kraft, / Die stets das Böse will 
und stets das Gute schafft" (Goethe 47), and although the intention of the utterance may 
have more direct or literal Christian implications – that whatever evil the Devil seeks to 
do must always work out as part of God's plan – the sentiment, especially in light of the 
appeal to grace which lingers in Nieztsche's thought,26 may extend to Hesse's 
understanding of divine unity here: that whatever one might suffer, it is part and parcel of 
a fate that, sincerely affirmed, can become meaningful and productive, even if only 
within the subject's imagination. It is not that ugliness or obstacles impede life's 
happiness, but that they are indispensable elements of its greater scheme, necessary to the 
development of the subject and its sense of integrity. Like a tree that grows weak without 
                                                        
25 "For me life consists only of this: the fluctuating between two poles, the to and fro between the basic 
pillars of the world. With pleasure I like constantly to point to the colorfulness of the world and recall that a 
unity underlies this colorfulness; constantly I would like to show that beautiful and ugly, light an dark, sin 
and holiness are only opposites for a moment, that they always flow into one another." My translation. 
26 See chapter two, "Nietzsche's Tragic Religiosity." 
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the rustling wind to teach it strength, the subject gains sight of its potentialities and limits 
through pain and joy, thus coming to terms with itself as fate. 
 Awareness of this process, it seemed to Hesse, was lacking in his time, and he 
struggled himself with the exploration or further public discussion of religious questions. 
He continues to explain later in the notes "Über die Einheit" that he maintains a great 
respect for the teachings of Jesus as detailed in the Bible, but that this text full of wisdom 
is prostituted ("daß diese höchste Weisheit auf allen Gassen feilgeboten wird") beside 
national vanity and a militaristic obsession with authority, even in churches (MG 21). On 
the one hand, he ponders whether such holy texts should be so readily available for all to 
read and (mis)interpret, whether one ought to devote years of study and contemplation to 
them before one can speak to their wisdom (22). "Wenn dem so ist (und ich glaube an 
manchen Tagen, daß es so ist), dann tut der letzte Unterhaltungsschriftsteller Besseres 
und Richtigeres als der, der sich um den Ausdruck für das Ewige bemüht" (22).27 Despite 
this essentially anti-Lutheran, anti-democratic sentiment, he maintains on the other hand 
that his task remains to provide a reading public with narratives and observations that 
inspire such contemplation: 
"Dies ist mein Dilemma und Problem. Es läßt sich viel darüber sagen, lösen aber 
läßt es sich nicht. Die beiden Pole des Lebens zueinander zu biegen, die 
Zweistimmigkeit der Lebensmelodie niederzuschreiben, wird mir nie gelingen. 
Dennoch werde ich dem dunklen Befehl in meinem Innern folgen und werde 
wieder und wieder den Versuch unternehmen müssen. Dies ist die Feder, die mein 
                                                        
27 "If this is the case (and some days I believe that it is), then the last entertainment writer accomplishes 
something better and more just than one who strives to find an expression for the eternal." My translation. 
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Ührlein treibt" (22).28 
Hesse's words are indicative of his own affirmative fatalism, and one that orients itself 
toward the expression of affirmative fatalism itself at that. They express on the one hand 
a quiet hopelessness in the face of the seeming futility of writing about spirituality, but 
they illustrate on the other hand an affirmative orientation toward his fate as one who will 
keep trying despite all apparent futility, as one for whom fate is neither fixed nor far off, 
but rather the active process of living in which he is engaged. It is out of the continued 
confrontation and reckoning with one's fate, after all, that a reinvigorated sense of self 
and creative possibilities emerge, and thereby one comes into contact with the divinity 
that dwells in the human being. For Hesse, the most apt engagement with this creative, 
redemptive force is in writing itself. 
 "Die Einheit, die ich hier hinter der Vielheit verehre, ist keine langweilige, keine 
graue, gedankliche, theoretische Einheit. Sie ist ja das Leben selbst, voll Spiel, voll 
Scherz, voll Gelächter" (Hesse MG 21).29 The image of "fluctuating between two poles" 
with which Hesse characterizes life is indicative of the dynamism discussed above, and 
that dynamism implies for Hesse as well as Nishitani a sense of play that recalls 
Nietzsche's repeated emphasis on the symbolic image of the child. The innocence of the 
child, the earnestness with which it plays, is an ideal, final stage of psychological 
development in Nietzsche's Zarathustra, as one overcomes both the mindless affirmation 
and mindless negation of exterior forces and comes to a place of free, creative 
                                                        
28 "This is then my dilemma and problem. There is plenty more to say about it, but no way to solve it. I will 
never succeed at bending the two poles of life toward one another, writing down both voices of the melody 
of life. Even so, I will follow the dark command from within me and will have to take up the attempt again 
and again. This is the mainspring that drives my little clock." My translation. 
29 "The unity behind multiplicity that I honor is not a boring, ray, conceptual, theoretical unity. It is indeed 
life itself, full of play, full of jest, full of laughter." My translation. 
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affirmation, where the will and the necessity of the world are unified in a dynamic sense 
of fate. Nishitani interprets Nietzsche similarly: 
"The world of flux, of impermanence, comes to be seen as the activity of 
bottomless will, an activity without any transcendent meaning or purpose; it 
becomes the play (Spiel) of bottomless will in the joy (Lust) of life which is 
absolute affirmation. That all things are ceaselessly changing and passing away is 
a source of suffering and grief; yet this suffering and its source can, just as they 
are, be transformed into joy" (Nishitani SN 54). 
Bearing in mind that Lust means both joy and desire, the absolute affirmation of life takes 
place where a subject is able to declare, as though to the demon that poses the 
Gedankenexperiment of the Eternal Return, that the necessity of the world is at one with 
its most fervent desire. These formulations are also of a kind with the ultimate scenes in 
Hesse's Steppenwolf, published just a few years after these notes on religion, wherein 
Harry Haller is sentenced to be laughed at by the immortal spirits that he reveres. 
Humiliated but alive, Harry is forced to consider the possibility that perhaps he takes 
himself far too seriously, that much of his suffering might be sublimated if only he could 
learn to laugh at himself: "Einmal würde ich das Figurenspiel besser spielen. Einmal 
würde ich das Lachen lernen" (Hesse Steppenwolf 237).30 In Harry's final assessment 
reverberate those words from Hesse's earlier notes, "that the I takes itself too seriously." 
 And yet the I is something quite serious indeed, else it would not merit so much 
discussion. But that the discussion centers itself on the repeated conviction that it is not 
so serious points to an irony which is not only performative, but inextricably wrapped up 
                                                        
30 "One day I would learn to play the figure game better. One day I would learn to laugh." My translation. 
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in the fundamental questions of religion. Nishitani poses as religion's first question: "For 
what purpose do I exist?" The goal of religious inquiry thus presents itself simultaneously 
as the creation of meaning for this despairing I while also teaching it not to take itself too 
seriously; that where the world and the subject can unify their narratives in an affirmed 
fate, the I will at once be the source of all meaning, as this is determined only 
perspectivally, and recognize its relative (in)significance in the Schuldzusammenhang in 
which it tarries. The seriousness then dwells in the I itself, in the subject for whom the 
question of meaning dictates and directs action: to determine what is meaningful and 
fulfilling in life is to chart a path toward the further creation of meaning and discovery of 
fulfillment in activity. 
 Two essays penned by Hesse about a decade later, "Mein Glaube" (1931) and "Ein 
Stückchen Theologie" (1932), reflect well on the earlier notes and narratives work, also 
providing insight into his final novel, Das Glasperlenspiel. In the first Hesse outlines his 
"mystical Christianity" as the confluence of different philosophical and religious ideas 
that remain rooted in his Christian upbringing and idea of God but which seem to reject 
the broader tendency toward literalism. The dominant idea remains that of unity: 
"In meinem religiösen Leben spielt also das Christentum zwar nicht die einzige, 
aber doch eine beherrschende Rolle, mehr ein mystisches Christentum als ein 
kirchliches, und es lebt nicht ohne Konflikte, aber doch ohne Krieg neben einer 
mehr indisch-asiatisch gefärbten Gläubigkeit, deren einziges Dogma der Gedanke 
der Einheit ist. Ich habe nie ohne Religion gelebt, und könnte keinen Tag ohne sie 
leben, aber ich bin mein Leben lang ohne Kirche ausgekommen" (MG 61-2).31 
                                                        
31 "And so in my religious life Christianity plays by no means the only role, but nevertheless a commanding 
one, more a mystic Christianity than an ecclesiastical one, and it lives not without conflict but nevertheless 
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That Hesse "could not live a day without [religion]" gestures back to Nishitani's 
fundamental question, namely, that Hesse, especially as a thoughtful writer and cultural 
commentator, could not imagine going a day without asking himself, "For what purpose 
do I exist?" The answer to this question directs action, and for Hesse it is not directed 
toward or by a singular religion or religious dogma aside from the principle of unity. In 
"Ein Stückchen Theologie" Hesse describes in greater detail his vision of spiritual 
development and action, admitting that his view is "europäisch und beinahe christlich 
ausgedrückt," though this is to a great extent unavoidable and also not a deficiency (MG 
63). Being that Hesse's readership was largely German and Christian, his formulations are 
thus ripe for digestion by that public and also for an interpretation alongside the other 
spiritual colossus of his time: fascist authoritarianism. 
 The spiritual development laid out "Ein Stückchen Theologie" is organized as a 
movement through "Stufen der Menschwerdung," and here the language of Hesse's essay 
must be taken very carefully in the context of its production. There is a wry irony to the 
use of certain vocabulary which is not without its own danger. 
“Der Weg der Menschwerdung beginnt mit der Unschuld (Paradies, Kindheit, 
verantwortungsloses Vorstadium). Von da führt er in die Schuld, in das Wissen um 
Gut und Böse, in die Forderungen der Kultur, der Moral, der Religionen, der 
Menschheitsideale. Bei jedem, der diese Stufe ernstlich und als differenziertes 
Individuum durchlebt, endet sie unweigerlich mit der Verzweiflung … Diese 
Verzweiflung führt nun entweder zum Untergang oder aber zu einem dritten Reich 
                                                        
without warfare beside a more Hindu-Asiatic-colored faith whose single dogma is the concept of unity. I 
have never lived without religion and could not live for a single day without it, but all my life long I have 
don without a church." Trans. Denver Lindley. 
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des Geistes, zum Erleben eines Zustandes jenseits von Moral und Gesetz, ein 
Vordringen zu Gnade und Erlöstsein, zu einer neuen, höheren Art von 
Verantwortungslosigkeit, oder kurz gesagt: zum Glauben. Einerlei welche Formen 
und Ausdrücke der Glaube annehme, sein Inhalt ist jedesmal derselbe: daß wir 
wohl nach dem Guten streben sollen, soweit wir vermögen, daß wir aber für die 
Unvollkommenheit der Welt und für unsere eigene nicht verantwortlich sind, daß 
wir uns selbst nicht regieren, sondern regiert werden, daß es über unsrem 
Erkennen einen Gott oder sonst ein 'Es' gibt, dessen Diener wir sind, dem wir uns 
überlassen dürfen” (MG 63).32 
The "European and nearly Christian" mode of expression admitted to by Hesse is 
apparent in the movement from innocence into guilt and then to belief, and certainly in 
the struggle against despair, but in the "higher kind of irresponsibility" smacks of a 
Buddhist worldview in which karma, "the imperfection of the world" that the living 
inherit, need not be interpreted as an innate, individual, moral shortcoming for which one 
must atone (or against which one must be baptized and blessed), but rather accepted as a 
condition of existence. Nishitani devotes much space to this discussion in Religion and 
Nothingness, comparing the European idea of fate to the concept of karma: 
"The karma of 'time past without beginning' is the true form of our life. It implies 
                                                        
32 "The path of human development begins with innocence (paradise, childhood, the irresponsible first 
stage). From there it leads to guilt, to the knowledge of good and evil, to the demand for culture, for 
morality, for religions, for human ideals. For everyone who passes through this stage seriously and as a 
differentiated individual it ends unfailingly in disillusionment [despair] ... Now this despair leads either to 
defeat or to a third realm of the spirit, to the experience of a condition beyond morality and law, an advance 
into grace and release to a new, higher kind of irresponsibility, or to put it briefly: to faith. No matter which 
forms and expressions the faith assumes, its content is always the same: that we should certainly strive for 
the good insofar as we are able, but that we are not responsible for the imperfections of the world or for our 
own, that we do not govern ourselves but are governed, that, above our understanding, is God or 'It' whose 
servants we are and to which we may surrender ourselves." Trans. Denver Lindley. 
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a sesne of essential 'despair.' Karma is what Kierkegaard calls the 'sickness unto 
death.' ... Karma here comes to bear the marks of guilt and sin. In a certain sense, 
it takes on the character of original sin, namely, sin that is as equally elemental as 
the free work and existence of man. Karma is freedom determined by causal 
necessity within the whole infinite nexus, a freedom of spontaneity in 'attachment' 
and, therefore, a freedom totally bound by fate" (248-9). 
While there are distinctions to be made, the focus here is on the similarities of these 
transcultural conceptions of guilt and freedom in human existence. Hesse eventually 
arrives at the conclusion that the subject must acknowledge its relative powerlessness in 
order to gain a sense of its humanity, but the language used here is indeed troublesome. In 
order not to succumb to despair and destroy oneself, one must move into a "third realm of 
the spirit" ("zu einem dritten Reich des Geistes"), a phrase so obviously loaded with 
political connotations that it forces one to reread very carefully what exactly he means. 
However this belief presents itself, it shares in the idea that "we should strive for the 
good" and "that we do not rule ourselves," but rather that "beyond our recognition there is 
a God or some kind of 'It'" that we serve, "to which we may entrust ourselves." It does 
not sound much like the freedom of the will in the playful creation of values that 
Nishitani describes, but rather bears hints of the worship of authority for which Hesse a 
decade earlier criticized the church. But Hesse's conception of God as a unity is not 
necessarily a metaphysical or spiritual unity of many subjects, as explored above, but 
rather an awakening to a sense of unity between subject and world in which the fate (or 
karma) to which the subject is subjected may be understood as the elemental material 
from which it arises, to which it owes its existence, and which its activity then serves. In 
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this way, the "God or some kind of 'It'" becomes the union of self and fate in its life as a 
dynamic and constitutive participant in a greater world process. And the characterization 
of this process is markedly Nieztschean, albeit somewhat utopian: "the experience of a 
state beyond morality and law." 
 Even so, this devotion should be differentiated from the dictatorial 
authoritarianism so rampant in Germany during this period, for which purposes Erich 
Fromm's Escape from Freedom may provide better insight. Fromm takes a materialist and 
psychoanalytic approach to the question of authoritarianism, describing its mechanisms 
in terms of sado-masochism – as "an inability to stand alone and to fully express [one's] 
own individual potentialities" (174) – and that, like all neurotic phenomena, "it assuages 
an unbearable anxiety and makes life possible by avoiding panic: yet it does not solve the 
underlying problem and is paid for by a kind of life that often consists only of automatic 
or compulsive activities" (140). It is also characteristic of German society in its 
fascination with Luther and Calvin, the growth of Protestantism alongside capitalism, and 
a peculiar fixation on fate. "The authoritarian character loves those conditions that limit 
human freedom, he loves being submitted to fate. ... [He] worships the past. What has 
been, will eternally be. To wish or work for something that has not yet been before is 
crime or madness. The miracle of creation – and creation is always a miracle – is outside 
his range of emotional experience" (169). 
 There appears to be a sharp distinction in the definition of "fate" between Fromm 
and Hesse (and Nietzsche and Nishitani). The fatalism that Fromm recognizes is one that 
does not interpret or love fate, but worships it, loves submitting to it, and does not grasp it 
as a standpoint from which to create, but rather recognizes in it the only creative force: 
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one is born into a world, the order of which is assumed to be rational and right, and one 
works not as part of a creative, expressive world process, but enslaved to a preestablished 
order. "Not to change fate, but to submit to it, is the heroism of the authoritarian 
character" (Fromm 171). In short, the fatalism of authoritarianism is not affirmative, but 
passive. It is an attitude taken, in Fromm's analysis, out of fear of the responsibilities 
entailed in freedom, as the recognition thereof produces a sense of existential loneliness. 
"In our effort to escape from aloneness and powerlessness, we are ready to get rid of our 
individual self either by submission to new forms of authority or by a compulsive 
conforming to accepted patterns" (134). 
 Fromm puts forward two types of freedom, the first of which – negative freedom, 
the freedom from – can produce a sense of isolation and fear of possibility, and the 
second of which – positive freedom, the freedom to – can lead to a more enlightened, 
meaningful, and mutually beneficial society by providing the individual with a unique 
sense of purpose and fulfillment in activity (34). The formulation shares with Hesse the 
responsibility of the individual in this process: both to recognize freedom and to embrace 
it rather than flee into authoritarianism or conformism. While Fromm focuses rather 
idealistically on freedom as such, however, and rejects all fatalism, Hesse still writes in 
the tradition of an affirmative fatalism, albeit oriented toward an ideal freedom. Thus 
while Fromm more or less rejects all religious thinking as a manifestation of passive 
fatalism and submission to authority, Hesse shares with thinkers like Nietzsche and 
Nishitani the view that the material limits upon one's pure freedom are not merely 
shackles – as though one was supposed to be born into other conditions – but rather the 
precondition of freedom, the antithesis against which one might strive toward freedom 
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and dialectically reach a point of thought and action that synthesizes limitation and 
freedom in possibility and actuality. 
 Returning to Hesse's Ein Stückchen Theologie with the question of devotion in 
mind – for it was a longing for devotion that he saw in the Germans, and it is devotion to 
the "God" or "It" that characterizes the step into faith from despair – one passage stands 
out which takes these remarks into consideration when reading his greater corpus. It 
comes rather ironically placed in the middle of the essay: "Meine eigentliche, im 
Christentum beginnende Seelensgeschichte zu erzählen, aus ihr meine persönliche Art 
von Glauben systematisch zu entwickeln, wäre ein unmögliches Unternehmen; Ansätze 
dazu sind alle meine Bücher" (MG 67).33 Bearing the strict implication that he could 
never sketch out a system of faith of from his own religious experiences, Hesse, (who is 
about to fill the rest of the essay with remarks on "pious" and "rational" personality types 
and their particular means of seeking truth), freely admits that his entire writing career is 
more or less a prolonged attempt to give narrative form to his existential-religious search 
for meaning. 
 The very reflexive nature of this task is also made apparent a few sentences later, 
where he writes: 
"Es mag tausend Arten geben, auf welche sich Individuation und 
Seelengeschichte des Meschen vollziehen kann. Der Weg dieser Geschichte aber 
und seine Stufenfolge ist stets derselbe. – Zu beobachten, wie dieser unweigerlich 
starre Weg auf so verschiedene Arten, von so verchiedenen Menschenarten erlebt, 
                                                        
33 "To describe my own, originally Christian, spiritual history and systematically to derive from it my 
personal form of faith would be an impossible task; all my books are an attempt to do that." Trans. Denver 
Lindley. 
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erkämpft, erlitten wird, ist wohl die beglückendste Leidenschaft des Historikers, 
des Psychologen, und des Dichters" (67).34 
This sentiment is expressed before Hesse launches into his own cursory and perhaps 
amateurish attempt to sketch out two types of personality that both by different 
orientations attempt to reach the point of faith, which might unite self and world in an 
affirmative fatalism. Hesse's own bias and preference for the "pious" type over the 
"rational" is obvious and not very interesting. What fascinates here is the comparison 
between the historian, psychologist, and poet in their shared task of observing and 
illustrating the thousand types of people and thousand ways that lead along the same 
general path toward faith and recognition of "God." It identifies three roles which each 
represent a specialization that provides insight into the elements of tragedy as Nietzsche 
identified its modern form: the historian, who recalls the past to form an image of fate as 
the nexus of guilt and responsibility in which the subject tarries; the psychologist, who 
takes seriously the eternal return of the past in memory and the ambivalent nature of time 
in the subject's interior; and the poet, who can take the exterior and interior material 
together with a sense of time's fluidity and craft a narrative that attempts to provide the 
subject with a stable sense of self. Taken together, these constitute the modern form of 
tragedy as an existential-psychological phenomenon whereby the self, as individuation, 
faces its destruction in the moment of its emergence as the exploration of certain 
possibilities also closes off other possibilities. "Vom Stein stäuben Stücke," but another 
                                                        
34 "There may be a thousand fashions in which individuation and the spiritual history of a human being can 
be achieved. The path of this history, however, and the sequence of its steps are always the same. – To 
observe how this invariably rigid path is encountered in so many different way by different types of men, 
struggled and suffered over, is probably the more rewarding passion of the historian, the psychologist, and 
the poet." Trans. Denver Lindley. 
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image sleeps within the stone. And as poet, Hesse sees it as his task not only to write 
narratives that give voice to these human experiences, but to use this platform to explore 
the phenomenon of affirmative fatalism. 
 Put another way: Hesse's writing, as an expression of his affirmative fatalism – his 
desire to create meaning(fully) within acknowledged conditions and limitations – focuses 
throughout his career ever more on representing this very process itself. From Peter 
Camenzind to Das Glasperlenspiel Hesse crafts narratives around figures who are not 
only reflections of himself or his own life (if, sometimes, at all), but whose searches for 
meaning more reflect the affirmative fatalist tendency in German literature and Hesse's 
anti-authoritarian approach. In this way Hesse's own service and devotion to the divine 
manifests as a devotion to writing itself, to the power of writing as a creative and didactic 
force capable of nonviolently combatting the belligerent movements of his day. 
 
Conclusion 
 Although Hesse's religious ideas have long been considered indispensable to any 
reading of his novels, they are often treated as idiosyncratic or as an intuitive contribution 
to a movement of "magical thinking" – as discussed, for example, by Theodore 
Ziolkowski35 – rather than as part of the logical development of nineteenth-century 
thought and the modern continuation of a tragic tradition fixated on fate. Affirmative 
fatalism as identified here is not a matter of magical thinking, but rather an existential 
standpoint rooted in the tragic sacrifice, and whether the object of said sacrifice be one's 
corporeal self or some portion of it (as in Nietzsche's modern reformulation), the 
                                                        
35 See: Ziolkowski, Theodore. The Novels of Hermann Hesse. Princeton: University Press, 1965. 
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operative gesture is one that orients itself toward the future as the locus of possible 
redemption. In this way Hesse's writing and his devotion to it as a practice functions 
similarly as a gesture to future generations that they may learn about and contribute to the 
development of their society through the products of his labors. But the sacrifice is not 
only for others; as past and future meet eternally in the present moment, the creation of a 
stabilizing narrative for the self grasps them together and recognizes subjectivity as an 
ongoing project in which sacrifices – the cutting-off of certain narrative elements in the 
de-cision to craft the narrative this way and not that – also gestures toward the subject's 
redemption by itself. 
 This is the form of Hesse's mystical Christianity: God and all gods are but 
representative figures, metaphors bound up in the endless process of metaphoricization 
which constitutes language and symbolic communication in general, and the faith to 
which one consigns oneself is the good faith of Nietzsche's amor fati, the hope that a 
sense of spiritual relief, comfort, or strength may be gained from the affirmation of fate 
and play with the possibilities that avail themselves despite perceived and material 
limitations. And that his books function as Ansätze for an explicit or systematic 
explanation of his Seelengeschichte provides the most fruitful insight into his narrative 
work, particularly his final novel. In Das Glasperlenspiel the task of writing itself 
becomes the central figure: its function, its unfolding, and its interpretation. Through the 
story of Josef Knecht's life and the appended stories attributed to him Hesse crafts 
narratives that not only exemplify his particular affirmative fatalism – that "mystical 
Christianity" – but also perform, individually as texts and collectively as a single volume, 
the tasks of the historian, psychologist, and poet that explore the tragedy of subjectivity. 
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CHAPTER V 
DAS GLASPERLENSPIEL AND THE POETICS OF AFFIRMATIVE FATALISM 
 
Introduction 
 In Hermann Hesse's bizarre and wildly popular Steppenwolf, Harry Haller's 
journey of self-discovery culminates in the surreal experience of the Magic Theater, a sort 
of thought experiment and opium dream in which he imagines his self as the object of a 
game in which he can recombine qualities, experiences, and conditions as game pieces on 
a board in order to explore alternate possible lives. Such a formulation of subjectivity 
proposes that the individual possesses certain traits that exist in relation to a material 
context in which the subject's identity develops through the dynamic negotiation between 
its interiority – as perception of the exterior world – and the exterior world itself – as a 
collection of social and material conditions – thrust forward in time toward death. In 
short, the imagery depicts the subject as Walter Benjamin's definition of fate: "der 
Schuldzusammenhang des Lebendigen" (Benjamin Illuminationen 46). The Magic 
Theater draws on the long tradition of affirmative fatalism – the notion of a dialectically 
determined freedom that often confronts its limitations with a sacrificial gesture for the 
sake of a future expansion of its horizon – but also insists in Nietzschean fashion upon a 
kind of playfulness with regard to the subject's relationship to itself. But this playfulness 
is not lacking in seriousness; laughter here performs the didactic function of allowing 
knowledge to grow out of failure. Reflecting on the Magic Theater, Harry Haller says: 
"Einmal würde ich das Figurenspiel besser spielen. Einmal würde ich das Lachen lernen" 
(Hesse Steppenwolf 237). 
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 The need for a knowledge gleaned from failure becomes a pressing concern in 
Hesse's last novel and indeed, this chapter shall contend, is the core idea of Das 
Glasperlenspiel in its organization and execution as an extension of the Magic Theater. It 
is carried over in large part even from the entreaties of Zarathustras Wiederkehr, where 
Hesse's iteration of Nietzsche's teacher encourages the Germans to think critically about 
their loss in the war and not to resort to resentment, but rather to turn away from 
belligerence and to strive for self-improvement. The goal for Hesse in that case was to 
avoid the descent into further (or civil) war after the Revolution of 1918; by the time of 
his composing Das Glasperlenspiel, when war appeared and proved once again to be 
inevitable, his fight was for the spiritual and intellectual integrity of educational and 
religious institutions. 
 To this end Hesse set his last novel in a future Europe and created Castalia, an 
educational province separate from the national-political world, where war has not reared 
its head for some time and scholars live completely immersed in their studies. While an 
apolitical and seemingly utopian state (easily interpreted as a futuristic and sovereign 
ivory tower), Castalia may also be understood as a representation of Germany's poetic 
soul, so to speak: the Innerlichkeit to which Thomas Mann attributed both Germany's 
invaluable contributions to culture and its descent into barbarism. Both Hesse and Mann, 
lifelong friends, completed novels near the end of the Second World War in which they 
reflected extensively on Germany's terrible fate, which already in 1933, around when 
work on the books began, appeared grim and confronted the authors with a crisis. In her 
comparative study of Das Glasperlenspiel and Doktor Faustus, Eva Knöferl writes: 
"Wenn Hermann Hesse also bereits Anfang 1933 im Gespräch mit Thomas Mann 
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bemerkt, dass die aktuellen Ereignisse nicht nur eine endgültige Abkehr vom 
politischen Deutschland notwendig machen, sondern auch eine 'Revision [s]einer 
Auffassung von der Funktion des Geistes und der Dichtung überhaupt,' so ist 
diese Aussage als ein gemeinsamer Ausgangspunkt für die in den nachfolgenden 
Jahren entstehenden Alterswerke zu verstehen" (11). 
As a "revision of [his] conception of the function of the spirit and poetry," Das 
Glasperlenspiel thematizes the erosion of Germany's intellectual integrity, namely in its 
warning against the dangers of allowing educational institutions to serve the interests of 
political and military powers rather than the pure pursuit of knowledge. But this pure 
pursuit is, like Castalia, a utopian fantasy based upon the idea that withdrawal into 
oneself – spiritual, political, and intellectual isolation – is not representative of a spiritual, 
political, or intellectual position; that Innerlichkeit is not or does not produce a skewed 
relationship to the "outside" world. 
 In his speech Deutschland und die Deutschen Thomas Mann described German 
Innerlichkeit as "Zartheit, der Tiefsinn des Herzens, unweltliche Versponnenheit, 
Naturfrömmigkeit, reinster Ernst des Gedankens und des Gewissens" (275). This dreamy 
description Mann also applies to Romanticism as an expression of Innerlichkeit, but with 
the consequence of becoming dangerously disconnected from reality: "Romantik ist 
wesentlich Versenkung, besonders Versenkung in die Vergangenheit; sie ist die Sehnsucht 
nach dieser, und zugleich der realistisch anerkennende Sinn für alles wirklich Gewesene 
in seinem Eigenrecht – mit seiner Lokalfarbe und Atmosphäre" (277). These 
characterizations Mann links to Germany's spiritual tradition, the anti-revolutionary spirit 
of Luther's politics, and the eventual development of political realism culminating in the 
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world wars. And although Castalia is painted as a classical institution by Hesse's narrator, 
who extols the virtues of Baroque music over the "cult of dynamics" represented by 
Romantic music, it certainly smacks of this Romantic sensibility in its focus on 
introspection, contemplation, and an obsession with the past. Indeed, the instances of 
meditation throughout the novel are too numerous to cite, but their prevalence speaks to a 
reading of Castalia as an embodiment of Innerlichkeit that is both alluring and dangerous, 
a way toward peace and contemplation as well as a separation from larger political 
contexts. 
 While Das Glasperlenspiel is the story of Josef Knecht's life, it is also the story of 
his imagination, his Innerlichkeit, and the influence that this has upon his decisions and 
ultimate fate. The three appended stories that close the novel (die drei Lebensläufe) are 
attributed to Knecht, supposedly written during his late adolescence, but they are offered 
as the clearest insight that the reader has into his psychology. If the Magic Theater of Der 
Steppenwolf represents an exploration of Harry Haller's speculative thinking about 
possibility and the spiritual-social context in which his fate arises, the appended lives 
represent Josef Knecht's own play with the same ideas, effectively providing the act of 
storytelling itself as a thought experiment that wrestles with the different approaches to 
and trajectories of affirmative fatalism. In order thus to understand Josef Knecht's 
confrontation with fate and death, this reading of Das Glasperlenspiel will first address 
the three Lebensläufe and employ the conclusions drawn from their interpretation to a 
reading of Knecht's "actual" death. 
 In each of the three appended stories Knecht imagines himself in a different time 
and culture bearing the same name – Knecht, Famulus, Dasa – each of which signifies in 
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German, Latin, and Sanskrit, respectively, that he is a servant to a different tradition or 
institution. Knecht likewise grapples in each story with the responsibility of his position 
and the nature of his fate, reconciling his personal will with the various obligations, 
constraints, and compulsions placed upon him, as well as the greater cultural context in 
which he lives and in which his death may have a special significance. This investigation 
will meditate on these iterations of affirmative fatalism, specifically detailing how within 
these different contexts Hesse crafts the psychological and temporal space in which fate 
is confronted and the relationship between aesthetics and how the affirmative orientation 
is ethically determined. 
 
Der Regenmacher 
 Knecht's first imagined incarnation is the most similar to the Magister Ludi, 
bearing his exact name and sharing much of his personality – quiet, clever, curious, 
attentive. He is an orphan in a stone-age village where all power is held by matriarchs 
save for one position, that to which the gifted Knecht hopes someday to strive: Turu the 
Rainmaker. This man, whose duty it is to study the seasons and phases of the moon, to 
serve as a conduit between the tribe and the natural world, Knecht follows and watches, 
eventually taken under his wing as his apprentice to marry his daughter and succeed him. 
As he grows into an adept Rainmaker, Knecht comes to earn the respect of the tribe and 
finds a comforting sense of belonging in his role, fully socially integrated and at one with 
the natural world. 
 The prose of Der Regenmacher is highly reminiscent of Siddhartha, with long 
series of parallel and paratactical clauses that mimic the Rainmaker's repetitive 
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observations and slow, contemplative life. This technique is pointed out by Gerhart 
Mayer in his article on Hesse's "Mystische Religiosität und dichterische Form" (1960), 
specifically in reference to moments of enlightenment in Siddhartha, where he observes: 
"Die objektiv-physikalische Zeitvorstellung wird durch das subjektive Zeiterlebnis 
durchbrochen, das selbst wiederum im Stadium der Einheitsschau in dem Gefühl einer 
Allgegenwart aufgehoben ist" (446). The vision of unity (Einheitsschau) that Mayer 
references is the narrative representation of the psychological phenomenon that Hesse 
draws from Nietzsche's amor fati: the affirmation of necessity as beauty, reconciliation 
with the past, determination of the self in its union with the world. The apparent 
suspension of time that so often occurs in Hesse's prose speaks to the vastness of such 
moments in their psychological depth. The Rainmaker, with his knowledge of the natural 
world, appears to Knecht as a personification of this thought: 
"Es mußte nun, so schien es Knecht in jenem Augenblick, im riesigen Netz der 
Zusammenhänge einen Mittelpunkt geben, von dem aus alles gewußt, alles 
Vergangene und alles Kommende gesehen und abgelesen werden konnte. Dem, 
der an diesem Mittelpunkt stünde, müßte das Wissen zulaufen wie dem Tal das 
Wasser und dem Kohl der Hase, sein Wort müßte scharf und unfehlbar treffen wie 
der Stein aus der Hand des Scharfschützen, er müßte kraft des Geistes alle diese 
einzelnen wunderbaren Gaben und Fähigkeiten in sich vereinen und spielen 
lassen: dies wäre der vollkommene, weise, unübertreffliche Mensch! So wie er zu 
werden, sich ihm anzuhähern, zu ihm unterwegs zu sein: das war der Weg der 
Wege, das war das Ziel, das gab einem Leben Weihe und Sinn" (498-9). 
This middle point embodied by the Rainmaker is the moment of fate, the standpoint of a 
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subject that finds itself at once the center of the world and dissolved into it, where the 
past and future meet in the eternal present of action. Open to the world in such a way, 
knowledge flows into the Rainmaker "like water into the valley," and thus is Knecht's 
experience as Rainmaker described after he assumes the role later on. In affirmative 
fatalist fashion he comes more and more to recognize the world around him as a part of 
his own subjectivity; he and his world are at one with his fate. This he sees first through 
his relationship to the natural world, as in his ability to feel and foretell weather patterns, 
but later also through the recognition that his role as Rainmaker places strict demands on 
him for things beyond his control and for which he must eventually be held responsible. 
 The parallel syntactical patterns appear in many descriptions throughout the text 
and their orientation is often the same: their rambling, repetitive formulations detail the 
links between Knecht's interior and the external world, painting an image of his life that 
performs the unity of self, world, and fate that imbues the subject with a sense of its 
divinity. 
"Es gab Lagen des Wetters, Spannungen der Luft und der Wärme, es gab 
Bewölkungen und Winde, gab Arten von Wasser- und von Erd- und Staubgeruch, 
gab Drohungen oder Versprechungen, gab Stimmungen und Launen der 
Wetterdämonen, welche Knecht in seiner Haut, seinem Haar, seinen sämtlichen 
Sinnen voraus- und mitempfand, so daß er von nichts überrascht, von nichts 
enttäuscht werden konnte, daß er mitschwingend das Wetter in sich konzentrierte 
und es in einer Weise in sich trug, die ihn befähigte, Wolken und Winden zu 
gebieten: nicht freilich aus einer Willkür und nach freiem Belieben, sondern eben 
aus dieser Verbundenheit und Gebundenheit heraus, welche den Unterschied 
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zwischen ihm und der Welt, zwischen Innen und Außen vollkommen aufhob. 
Dann konnte er verzückt stehen und lauschen, verzückt kauern und alle Poren 
offen haben und das Leben der Lüfte und Wolken in seinem Innern nicht mehr nur 
mitfühlen, sondern dirigieren und erzeugen, etwa so, wie wir einen Satz Musik, 
den wir genau kennen, in uns innen wecken und reproduzieren können" (509-10). 
Knecht anticipates and co-experiences various natural phenomena and the "moods of the 
weather demons" to the point that their whims seem at one with his own, "eliminating the 
distinction between interior and exterior." The description bears the mark of suspended 
time like so many instances of enlightenment among Hesse's characters, but here is 
idealized in the utmost as the constant state of mind of the Rainmaker. But there is a 
warning embedded in the tale, for as much as Knecht comes to feel himself so united 
with the weather patterns that he can conduct them like a piece of music, he is confronted 
eventually with the harsh reality that his knowledge of the natural world is not in fact 
tantamount to control over it. 
 Knecht's gradual awareness of his fate, bound to the indifference of nature and the 
social responsibilities entailed in his role as Rainmaker, comes first as he realizes that his 
embrace of his position means the embrace of a specific path that cuts him off from other 
possibilities. Reminiscent of Zarathustra's declaration about carving the self out from the 
stone –"Vom Steine stäuben Stücke –was schiert mich das?" – a sacrifice is demanded 
with every choice made as one continually becomes oneself. Something must be cut off, 
and this Knecht recognizes with clarity when he sees that his fate is tied to the education 
of his son and successor: 
"Mehr und mehr mußte er Abschied nehmen vom Traum, von dem Gefühl und 
123 
 
Genuß der unendlichen Möglichkeiten, der tausendfältigen Zukunft. Statt des 
Traumes vom unendlichen Fortschritt, von der Summe aller Weisheit, stand nun 
der Schüler da, eine kleine, nahe, fordernde Wirklichkeit, ein Eindringling und 
Störenfried, aber unabweisbar und unabwendbar, der einzige Weg in die wirkliche 
Zukunft, die einzige, wichtigste Pflicht, der einzige schmale Weg, auf welchem 
des Regenmachers Leben und Taten, Gesinnungen, Gedanken und Ahnungen vor 
dem Tode bewahrt bleiben und in einer kleinen neuen Knospe fortleben konnten. 
Seufzend, knirschend und lächelnd nahm er es auf sich" (513-4). 
The rhythm of the prose mimics the "dream" of "endless possibilities" and the 
"thousandfold future" that Knecht imagines from his position in the center of the "net of 
contexts," which here appears with all of its contingencies like the Schuldzusammenhang 
des Lebendigen that Walter Benjamin calls fate. "The only way into the real future" is 
differentiated from "the dream of endless progress" by its materiality and linearity: as 
opposed to the abstract idea of the future in thought experiments that allow for infinite 
possibility, the young Turu represents a clearly cut and defined trajectory rife with 
responsibilities. Not only this, but it is in care for him and his education that the 
Rainmaker – not just Knecht, but his sacred position – will live on into the future, such 
that in recognition of his fate he performs the sacrificial gesture which defines the tragedy 
of subjectivity. His fate he "[takes] upon himself" with an admixture of conflicting but 
not unrelated feelings, "sighing, grinding [his teeth], and smiling." 
 Knecht is likewise reminded of the necessity of sacrifice and its terrible power 
when confronted by the other realities of his responsibility, namely in the case of famine, 
when it may be demanded of him as Rainmaker to give his life in order to appease the 
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demons. This aspect of his fate begins to become clear one night when a "catastrophe" 
strikes: a meteor shower fills the sky with falling stars, inspiring terror and madness 
throughout the tribe. The rambling description of the event does not build tension as 
much as it encapsulates it, suspending time as in those moments of enlightenment 
described previously by Mayer, painting the external world with the brush of immense 
and timeless interiority.  
"Es fielen, wie Steine geworfen, aufglühend und rasch wieder erlöschend, 
einzelne Sterne schräg durch den Raum, hier einer, dort zwei, hier ein paar, und 
noch hatte das Auge den ersten entschwundenen Fallstern nicht losgelassen, noch 
hatte das Herz, vom Anblick versteinert, nicht wieder zu schlagen begonnen, da 
jagten sich die schräg und in leicht gekrümmter Linie durch den Himmel 
fallenden oder geschleuderten Lichter schon in Schwärmen von Dutzenden, von 
Hunderten, in unzählbaren Scharen trieben sie wie von einem stummen 
Riesensturm getragen quer durch die schweigende Nacht als habe ein 
Weltenherbst alle Sterne wie welke Blätter vom Himmelsbaum gerissen und jage 
sie lautlos dahin, ins Nichts. Wie welke Blätter, wie wehende Schneeflocken 
flohen sie, Tausende und Tausende, in schauerliche Stille dahin und hinab, hinter 
den südöstlichen Waldbergen verschwinden, wo noch niemals seit 
Menschengedenken ein Stern untergegangen war, irgendwohin ins Bodenlose 
hinab" (519-20). 
The cataclysmic vision is possessed of the vastness and mystery of fate, a sudden storm 
of streaking lights that disrupts all sense of order but the horrifying reality of which 
cannot be denied. This culminates in the image of the "tree of heaven," the metaphorical 
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fusion of the vegetal and celestial realms which are the Rainmaker's purview and over 
which he feels to exert some control. But as the stars appear cast off from the tree of 
heaven "like withered leaves," the very illusory nature of his power confronts him, 
precisely in that they vanish "into the nothingness" and "abysmal." The disintegration of 
Knecht's understanding is the revelation of nihilism, and its overcoming, he quickly 
recognizes, lies in recasting the narrative, incorporating this terrible knowledge into the 
necessary fiction that may restore both his and the tribe's sense of self and order. 
 Affirming his fate once more, Knecht "takes it upon himself with a heavy sigh" 
that his failure to predict or understand the immediate significance of the meteor shower 
will make him most conveniently responsible for whatever consequences that should 
follow. "Tief aufseufzend nahm es Knecht auf sich. Ihn vor allen andern traf es, dies 
Unglück, ihn, den Regenmacher; ihn, der gewissermaßen verantwortlich war für die 
Ordnung am Himmel und in den Lüften" (520-1). He is likewise empowered by the 
resolve and fearlessness of the his chieftess: "Die uralte Ahnmutter war ruhig; sie glaubte 
das Ende aller Dinge gekommen, wehrte sich aber nicht dagegen und zeigte dem 
Schicksal ein festes, hartes, in seiner herben Gekniffenheit beinah spöttisch aussehendes 
Gesicht" (522). With her help, Knecht draws the attention of the gathered and horrified 
tribe into a great ritual of ecstatic prayer, which slowly, then overwhelmingly distracts 
them from their fear, channeling their energy into a single action which, by some miracle, 
coincides temporally with the gradual end of the meteor shower. 
 The same tragic insight that his power may indeed be illusory also makes Knecht 
keenly aware of the conciliatory power of the communal ritual and its strong 
psychological component. It is an awareness that his responsibility as Rainmaker has 
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perhaps never been mystical, but rather as a keeper of knowledge whose true duty it is to 
maintain and shape the myths that endow the other villagers' lives with meaning. Uniting 
the tribe in a half-improvised ceremony under the celestial calamity above, Knecht 
protects the throng from the possible insight that nature is indifferent to the point of 
apparent cruelty. 
"Statt einer verzweifelten Horde von Verrückten stand da ein Volk von opfer- und 
bußgewillten Andächtigen, deren jedem es wohltat und das Herz stärkte, seine 
Todesfurcht und sein Entsetzen nicht in sich zu verschließen oder für sich allein 
hinauszubrüllen, sondern im geordneten Chor der vielen, taktmäßig, sich einer 
beschwörenden Zeremonie einzuordnen. Viele geheime Mächte sind in einer 
solchen Übung wirksam, ihr stärkster Trost ist die Gleichförmigkeit, das 
Gemeinschaftsgefühl verdoppelnd, und ihre unfehlbare Arznei ist Maß und 
Ordnung, ist Rhythmus und Musik" (524). 
The Rainmaker's power lies not in his control of the elements – that is an illusion – but 
rather in the illusion of meaning itself and his ability to create and proliferate the 
necessary fictions that render the otherwise indifferent violence of nature significant and 
bearable. The ritual does not in itself mean anything, but it provides consolation, comfort 
in "uniformity, doubling the feeling of community." Here the narrator speaks personally 
for the first time, though not explicitly. For it is the Castalian Knecht to whom the reader 
is supposed to attribute the narrative, and little is more transparently Castalian than these 
last phrases: "its fail-safe remedy is measure and order, rhythm and music." 
 Just as it cannot be said of music what it means, there is nevertheless the sense 
that it means, that it speaks, though not in words. Indeed, music gains its significance in 
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its movement and organization, but unlike language, its individual sounds do not bear any 
meaning in their isolation. "The language of music is quite different from the language of 
intentionality," writes Adorno in his essay "Music and Language," continuing: "It 
contains a theological dimension. What it has to say is simultaneously revealed and 
concealed. Its Idea is the divine Name which has been given shape. It is demythologized 
prayer, rid of efficacious magic. It is the human attempt, doomed as ever, to name the 
Name, not to communicate meanings" (Adorno QUF 2). This "theological dimension" of 
music is the "meaning" of aesthetic organization: it dissolves the atomic elements of 
sound – singular tones – into a greater whole, where they gain significance in relation to 
one another and their totality. Each note, like each human subject, affirms its place within 
a larger context through its participation in and alignment with the encompassing 
composition. Thus Knecht approaches the mad situation: "Es war hier, wie so oft, mit der 
Vernunft und den klugen Worten gar nichts zu erreichen" (Hesse GPS 523). The villagers, 
in their panic and terror, are scattered and meaningless tones, reverberating off into the 
abyss like the falling stars above, and Knecht is the musician, the great 
improvisationalist, who brings them into order, any kind of order, just so that their cries 
of anguish might be directed and imbued with fleeting, incidental, and indeterminate 
meaning. 
 Despite having quelled their fears, Knecht's are confirmed as the seasons roll in: 
the weather is mild and extreme in unpredictable turns, and the ritual of planting is 
disrupted by the death of the chieftess, whose sister, having assumed her role, distrusts 
Knecht and, at the behest of his former student-turned-charlatan, begins to insinuate that 
the time may be nigh for the Rainmaker to offer himself as a sacrifice. He attempts to 
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delay: "Einen halben Mond lang bemühte er sich auf seine Weise, eine Witterung zu 
schaffen, welche die Aussaat erlaubt hätte. Aber das Wetter, oft so gleichgerichtet mit den 
Strömungen seines Innern, verhielt sich hartknäckig höhnisch und feindselig, nicht 
Zauber noch Opfer schlug an" (529). But in spite of his prayers, sacrifices, and a 
seemingly promising sowing and planting season, a winter frost returns without warning 
and famine strikes the tribe. 
 It becomes clear to Knecht that the true purpose of his role lies in its ritual aspect. 
He can find no explanation for the sudden disconnect between his interior and exterior, 
but nature's violent indifference must be made meaningful for the sake of the tribe's sense 
of self and world. That the catastrophe of the falling stars and the famine be justified – at 
least aesthetically –, he resolves to offer himself as a sacrifice. 
"'Turu', sagte Knecht eines Tages zu seinem Sohn, 'diese Sache wird nicht gut 
ausgehen, wir haben alle Dämonen gegen uns. Mit dem Sternenfall hat es 
angefangen. Es wird mir, so denke ich, das Leben kosten. Merke dir: wenn ich 
geopfert werden muß, dann trittst du in der gleichen Stunde mein Amt an, und als 
erstes verlangst du, daß mein Leib verbrannt und die Asche auf die Felder gestreut 
wird. Ihr werdet einen Winter mit großem Hunger haben. Aber das Unheil wird 
dann gebrochen sein. Du mußt sorgen, daß niemand das Saatgut der Gemeinde 
angreift, er muß Todesstrafe darauf stehen. Das kommende Jahr wird besser 
werden, und man wird sagen: gut, daß wir den neuen, jungen Wettermacher 
haben'" (530-1). 
Knecht promises a better year to come, but since the meteor shower he has become 
acutely aware of the limits of his power. And while there is no guarantee that the sacrifice 
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of his life will actually bring a more bountiful harvest, this is not the primary concern. 
The power of ceremony, Knecht has already learned, is in its ability to unify and make 
suffering palatable. Turu's first task as Rainmaker will be to satisfy the demands of 
tradition, to carry out the ritual burning and scattering of his father's remains, to learn the 
palliative power of practice. Knecht cannot prepare him for the possibility that he, too, 
might face the abyss in a moment of tragic insight, but can instill in him that appreciation 
of necessity so that, should a catastrophe befall him, he may fend off the bottomless terror 
of nihilism by veiling the incomprehensible in rhythm and music, endowing it with the 
semblance of signification by virtue of its part in the greater whole. 
 When the time comes for his sacrifice, Knecht nominates Maro, his former 
apprentice who has become his most vicious critic and agitator, to bear the ax. In their 
final exchange Knecht stares stonily and mockingly at Maro just as the late chieftess did 
on the night of the meteor shower, and Maro cannot bring himself to smite the old 
Rainmaker. 
"Maro, die Axt in Händen, stellte sich vor seinem einstigen Lehrmeister auf, er 
haßte ihn noch mehr als sonst, der Zug von Spott auf diesem schwiegsamen alten 
Mund tat ihm bitter weh. Er hob die Axt und schwang sie über sich, zielend hielt 
er sie oben schwebend, starrte dem Opfer ins Gesicht und wartete, daß es die 
Augen schlösse. Allein dies tat Knecht nicht, er hielt die Augen unentwegt offen 
und blickte den Mann mit der Axt an, beinah ohne Ausdruck, aber was an 
Ausdruck zu sehen war, schwebte zwischen Mitleid und Spott" (532). 
Maro's overwerought performance betrays what Knecht has always known of him: his 
posture is mere posture, his talent is squandered on pretension. His hatred for Knecht 
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sprouts from an envy which will only be intensified by the Rainmaker's fearless death as 
a sacrificial animal. Knecht's devotion to the spirit as well as the tribe manifests in his 
fixed expression toward Maro's disingenuousness, somewhere "between compassion and 
mockery." Maro's resentment is something akin to the despair (Verzweiflung) of which 
Hesse writes in "Ein Stückchen Theologie," when an individual cannot accept the 
necessary burden of guilt as a condition of finding peace and meaning in life through 
faith in "the God or 'It'" that represents the unity of subject and world. But Knecht, having 
affirmed necessity and incorporated it into the narrative of his self – having made 
beautiful for himself the inevitability of sacrifice – may in part pity Maro, but his 
mockery also comes from the satisfaction of knowing that, by virtue of this one's 
cowardice, his death will not be a mere device in a revenge story. 
 Knecht's sacrificial death is possessed of the spirit of affirmative fatalism and its 
moral and political ambiguity, but in the spirit of tragic sacrifice it is not for glory that he 
confronts his fate head-on, but rather for the sake of coming generations. While his 
actions do not subvert the prevailing order – far rather, they reinforce its logic and power 
– they serve as a gesture that rings out into the future. In Knecht's case, this gesture is his 
devotion to his sacred position, and while his own terrible knowledge of his actual 
powerlessness before the indifference of nature may not be share by the rest of the tribe, 
he recognizes that the rituals themselves, including his own death, serve a preservative 
force for the community. 
 After Maro throws the ax aside in despair, an elder moves quickly and silently to 
take his place, and Knecht easily closes his eyes and bows his head, ready to die. Having 
made an example of Maro's insincere pretensions, he makes an example of himself for his 
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son, whose first acts as Rainmaker close the story: "Der Alte schlug ihn mit der Axt, er 
sank zusammen. Turu, der neue Regenmacher, konnte kein Wort sprechen, nur mit 
Gebärden ordnete er das Notwendige an, und bald war ein Holzstoß geschichtet und der 
Tote darauf niedergelegt. Das feierliche Ritual des Feuerbohrens mit den beiden 
geweihten Hölzern war Turus erste Amtshandlung" (533). That Turu cannot bring himself 
to speak, but merely acts "in gestures," already reveals the secret of his duty as 
Rainmaker: to maintain the cohesion and sanity of the tribe, to give the semblance of 
order to blind chance, to justify existence as an aesthetic phenomenon and thereby make 
it not only bearable, but meaningful. 
 The tragedy of subjectivity, as it were, consists not only of the subject's internal 
and personal narrative – in decisions (cutting away) and an orientation that entail an 
affirmation which necessitates a sacrifice – but also, because the subject does not exist in 
a vacuum, of the subject's integration into its context. In this way the narrative that 
provides the subject with a sense of stability plays a significant social role, and it is in this 
respect that the rainmaker Knecht is most legible as a modern subject, for although a 
figure in an imagined stone-age society, his insight confronts and also cannot escape 
nihilism. The recognition that his knowledge is not actually a power, that blind chance 
and nature's indifference cannot be swayed, rips away the metaphysical foundation of his 
and the tribe's thinking. Yet in gathering the village for prayers and offering himself as a 
sacrifice – in propagating what seem to be mere falsehoods – he recognizes the necessity 
of fictions, just as much as his own subjectivity is one such fiction that must be edited 
from time to time. While the rites and practices of the tribe may appear empty gestures 
devoid of efficacy, they provide nevertheless a sense of order and meaning which in turn 
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may stave off the more terrifying insight for the community: that its fundamental 
understanding of the world in which it precariously exists is untrue, or at least 
dangerously insufficient. 
 Truth is not a matter of facts, but rather of longevity and popular credibility. The 
insight that knowledge is illusory is as terrifying as it is liberating, and Knecht, not only a 
spiritual figure in his tribe, but as the man responsible for the village's access to food and 
hence its survival, sees fit, taking account of his social and ceremonial role, to sacrifice 
himself. In the good faith that his sacrifice will at least carry symbolic meaning and that 
nature perhaps will appear less cruel in the coming year, he affirms this particular fate. 
The tribe's potential longevity is here paradoxically correlated to the longevity of the lie. 
It is the necessary fiction that maintains order and sustains the religious-existential life of 
the community. 
 The moment of Knecht's terrible insight paints an image of the confrontation with 
fate, the narrativization of the self. As he watches the meteor shower in horror, Knecht 
notices that "the familiar stars" are not the same as the falling stars: 
"Nacht einer Weile freilich erkannte er, was andere zu erkennen nicht fähig waren, 
daß die wohlbekannten Sterne hier und dort und überall noch vorhanden waren, 
daß das Sterngestiebe nicht unter den alten, vertrauten Sternen ein schreckliches 
Wesen trieb, sondern im Zwischenraum zwischen Erdboden und Himmel, und daß 
diese fallenden oder geworfenen, neuen, so schnell erscheinenden und so schnell 
schwindenden Lichter in einem etwas anders gefärbten Feuer glühten als die 
alten, die richtigen Sterne. Dies war ihm tröstlich und half ihm sich wiederfinden, 
aber mochten das nun auch neue, vergängliche, andre Sterne sein, deren Gestöber 
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die Luft erfüllte: grausig und böse, Unheil und Unordnung war es doch, tiefe 
Seufzer aus Knechts vertrockneter Kehle" (520). 
The old order remains in place, but there is a calamity between heaven and earth that 
distorts their relationship. Fate appears in a flash as a disruption of the view – the vision, 
das Gesicht – of the world as previously understood. The converging forces of fate 
appear "in a somewhat differently colored fire," but fate still appears "ghastly and 
wicked," like "misery and disorder." This is the blunt realization of transience, the 
privation of eternity, but also the revelation of the power of aesthetic interpretation – the 
gay science. These lights, "appearing so quickly and fading so quickly" like human life, 
traverse a seemingly eternal and organized space, they flare up and vanish, but their brief 
existence does not appear to leave any lasting mark upon "the proper stars." Any 
connection between the meteor shower and the ensuing drought are as coincidental as the 
shower is to the night sky; each phenomenon lends itself to interpretation and 
interpretation is all that remains in the wake. 
 If knowledge reveals itself as an interpretation subject to random and incidental 
annihilation, then its purpose might be rediscovered not in any access to absolute truth, 
but to the production of truths. The moment of terror must be incorporated, brought into 
the subject's body through its inclusion in a narrative that sustains and stabilizes. An 
identity, individual as well as communal, is thereby stabilized and provided with a sense 
of direction and autonomy, illusory as it may be, that fends off despair and, as becomes 
clear in Der Beichtvater, suicide. 
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Der Beichtvater 
 The second of the three Lebensläufe is not nearly as dramatic as the first, but it 
deals more specifically with existential and religious despair, less explicitly concerned 
with the subject's integration and role in society. The father confessor Josephus Famulus 
lives in relative isolation in the wilderness near other ascetics, "Adepten einer 
sehnsüchtigen Ars moriendi, einer Kunst des Sterbens, des Absterbens von der Welt und 
vom eigenen Ich und des Hinübersterbens zu ihm, dem Erlöser, ins Lichte und 
Unverwelkliche" (534). He awaits traveling pilgrims seeking to rid themselves of the 
burden of their sin, and Joesphus soon finds that he possesses a particular propensity for 
listening to these confessions: "Auch in Josephus schlummerte eine Gabe, und mit den 
Jahren, als sein Haar fahl zu werden begann, kam sie langsam zu ihrer Blüte. Es war die 
Gabe des Zuhörens" (535). 
 He is gentle with his penitents, letting them speak and air their sins until they have 
no more to say, comforting them such that through their confession alone they feel relief 
from their guilt. Indeed, in his listening he acknowledges the Schuldzusammenhang, as 
Benjamin put it, in which the living find themselves, and the solace that comes with the 
shared recognition of guilt, individual as well as universal. "Bußen und Strafen zu 
verhängen, war nicht seines Amtes, auch zum Aussprechen einer priesterlichen 
Absolution fühlte er sich nicht ermächtigt, es war weder das Richten noch das Vergeben 
der Schuld seine Sache. Indem er zuhörte und verstand, schien er Mitschuld auf sich zu 
nehmen, schien tragen zu helfen" (537). Josephus is not compelled to admonish or 
absolve his penitents, but rather to share in their burden, which, the reader learns 
throughout the story, he believes is neither their own nor escapable, but rather a general 
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condition of life. 
 There is however a sort of curse that comes along with his position, in that 
Josephus struggles continually against his own sin, becoming increasingly and 
overwhelmingly critical of his own thoughts and feelings. Among these at first is a sense 
of pride and vanity when wanderers seek him out, not so much in his duty as in himself, 
that strikes fear in him, and he begs God not to send any more penitents to him. This is 
followed after some time by a sense of resentment, "Kälte und Lieblosigkeit," even 
"Verachtung gegen den Beichtenden," but this he combats with his own confessions to 
God, "Demütigungs- und Bußübungen" (539). 
 Thus he lives for quite some time, but slowly a feeling of existential boredom 
creeps over him, which is expressed through language and images that suspend him 
between all other affects. And although it seems to be the goal of his asceticism – like 
most monks, arguably – to remove himself from the cycle of joy and suffering, this 
boredom becomes something unbearable; indeed, his self-imposed distance from the 
cycle of pleasure and pain paradoxically brings with it its own kind of terrible suffering.  
"So wie es Tage gibt, an welchen weder die Sonne strahlt noch der Regen strömt, 
sondern der Himmel still in sich selber versinkt und sich einspinnt, grau, doch 
nicht schwarz, schwül, doch nicht bis zur Gewitterspannung, so wurden 
allmählich die Tage des alternden Josef; es waren die Morgen von den Abenden, 
die Festtage von den gewöhnlichen, die Stunden des Aufschwungs von denen des 
Darniederliegens immer weniger zu unterscheiden, es lief alles träg in einer 
lahmen Müdigkeit und Unlust dahin" (540). 
The comparison of his "flauer, lauer, langweiliger Seelenzustand" with gray, stagnant 
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weather does not have the ring of a blessed state beyond desire and suffering, but rather 
smacks of an arrest in movement or development (540). Parallel to this, times and days 
and events all lose their particularity, they become "ever less distinguishable" from one 
another, and the world seems not to flow beautifully around Josephus as, say, for 
Siddhartha by the river, but there is rather a sense of sinking, like the gray sky that "sinks 
silently into itself." 
"Es sei das Alter, dachte er traurig. Traurig war er, weil er vom Altwerden und 
vom allmählichen Erlöschen der Triebe und Leidenschaften sich eine Aufhellung 
und Erleichterung seines Lebens, einen Schritt weiter zur ersehnten Harmonie und 
reifen Seelenruhe versprochen hatte, und weil nun das Alter ihn zu enttäuschen 
und betrügen schien, indem es nichts brachte als diese müde, graue, freudlose 
Öde, dies Gefühl unheilbarer Übersättigung" (540). 
Age and experience have not brightened and brought relief to his life as "he had promised 
himself," but rather seem to have delivered him into a "tired, gray, joyless wasteland." 
His expectations of harmony and peace are instead tempered into an uninspired boredom; 
there is no blue sky or shining sun to signify "a brightening," but rather continuous 
mentions of "tired" and "gray" images that reflect his dissatisfaction. 
 And yet, although dissatisfied, there is a "feeling of irremediable oversaturation," 
an indictment against the quantitative measures of age and experience. What lacks is a 
quality which, despite his efforts to extinguish desire, Josephus longs for beyond or apart 
from his duties. 
"Es schien ihm zuweilen: wie in der Oase die kleine Wasserquelle sich im 
Steinbecken sammelte, durch Gras floß und einen kleinen Bach bildete, dann in 
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die Öde des Sandes hinausfloß und dort nach kurzem Lauf versiegte und starb, 
ebenso kämen diese Beichten, diese Sündenregister, diese Lebensläufe, diese 
Gewissensplagen, große wie kleine, ersten wie eitle, ebenso kämen sie in sein Ohr 
geflossen, Dutzende, Hunderte, immderdar neue. Aber das Ohr war nicht tot wie 
der Wüstensand, das Ohr war lebendig und vermochte nicht ewig zu trinken und 
zu schlucken und einzusaugen, er fühlte sich ermüdet, mißbraucht, überfüllt" 
(541). 
"Weary, abused," and "overfilled," Josephus is contrasted against the dead desert sand 
and its endless thirst. Indeed, his living ear is not the bottomless earth; with every 
confession comes that sense of Mitschuld which alleviates the spiritual suffering of the 
penitent but slowly saturates the soul of the father confessor. He, far more than the 
travelers with their "lists of sins" and "plagues of conscience," feels the 
Schuldzusammenhang that is fate – and its weight becomes too much to bear: 
"[Er] sehnte sich danach, daß das Fließen und Geplätscher der Worte, der 
Gegenständnisse, der Sorgen, der Anklagen, der Selbstbezichtigung einmal 
aufhöre, daß einmal Ruhe Tod und Stille an die Stelle dieses endlosen Fließens 
trete. Ja, er wünschte ein Ende, er war müde, er hatte genug und übergenug, schal 
und wertlos war sein Leben geworden, und es kam so weit mit ihm, daß er 
zuweilen sich versucht fühlte, seinem Dasein ein Ende zu machen, sich zu 
bestrafen und auszulöschen, so wie es Judas der Verräter getan hatte, als er sich 
erhängte" (541). 
Josephus does not feel himself to "flow" with the words and lamentations of his 
penitents, but rather to swallow them and become further burdened by them. Like the 
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Rainmaker he finds himself at a central point where the web of universal, reciprocal, and 
shared guilt collapses, but this drives him to despair. The despair in turn seems to produce 
its own guilt; "like Judas the traitor" "he feels at times tempted" to take his own life, as 
though in this act of self-punishment he might atone for the sin of despairing. 
 He resists the temptation to end his life, "aber er lebte Tag und Nach in einem 
Brand von Selbsthaß und Todesgier, das Leben war unerträglich und hassenswert 
geworden" (541). But he can neither bear to accept this as the determined course and 
condition of his becoming. He asserts his desire against the passive fatalism that would 
otherwise languish in this state. It appears his fate to be painfully aware of universal guilt, 
but this need not entail a lifelong battle against the will to die; rather, he flees his 
hermitage and begins to contemplate for the first time his own particular fate, his life as 
fate. 
 Josephus begins to conceive of his fate as something dynamic as he walks, a most 
suitable image. Like Zarathustra standing at the gateway called Augenblick where the 
past and future eternally converge, Josephus evaluates his actions in light of the past and 
in consideration of future possibility. He now moves with the present, the only locus of 
thought and action, and evaluates his experiences and decisions not only in accordance 
with his religious devotion, but also as aesthetic phenomena. Not repressing this drive to 
flee, he allows himself to reflect honestly on his feelings. 
"Scham und Bekümmerung wuchsen in ihm an, je deutlicher er die Hölle 
erkannte, der er entlaufen war, und am Ende drängte das Elend sich wie ein 
würgender Bissen in seiner Kehle, wuchs zu unerträglichem Drang und fand 
plötzlich Abschluß und Erlösung in einem Ausbruch von Tränen, der ihm 
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wunderbar wohltat. O wie lange hatte er nicht mehr weinen können! Die Tränen 
flossen, die Augen vermochten nichts mehr zu sehen, aber das tödliche Würgen 
war gelöst, und als er zu sich kam und den Salzgeschmack auf seinen Lippen 
fühlte und wahrnamm, daß er weine, war ihm einen Augenblick, als sei er wieder 
ein Kind geworden und wisse nichts von Argem" (544). 
The shame that Josephus feels springs not from his flight, but rather from the realization 
that he had been subjecting himself to so much needless suffering. His misery seems 
indigestible, but its regurgitation is necessary for rumination.36 The flow of his tears 
blinds him momentarily, but his inner vision is clear, and when he tastes the salt of his 
tears this moment of insight – this Augenblick – reminds him of the innocence of 
childhood, of a time before knowledge of good and evil. The image is not unfamiliar to a 
reader of Nietzsche: the child signifies earnest play, the freedom of creation, neither 
bound to moral obligations nor reacting too fervently against them, but rather 
acknowledging the past with an openness toward the future.37 
"Er lächelte, er schämte sich ein wenig seines Weinens, stand endlich auf und 
stezte seine Wanderung fort. Er fühlte sich unsicher, wußte niht, wohin seine 
Flucht führen und was mit ihm werden solle, wie ein Kind kam er sich vor, aber 
es war kein Kampf und Wollen in ihm, er fühlte sich leichter und wie geführt, wie 
von einer fernen, guten Stimme gerufen und gelockt, als wäre seine Reise nicht 
eine Flucht, sondern eine Heimkehr. Er wurde müde, und die Vernunft auch, sie 
schwieg oder ruhte sich aus oder kam sich entbehrlich vor" (544). 
                                                        
36 See Genealogy of Morals, second essay:  
37 See Thus spoke Zarathustra, "On the Three Metamorphoses": "The child is innocence and forgetting, a 
new beginning, a game, a wheel rolling out of itself, a first movement, a sacred yes-saying" (Nietzsche TSZ 
17). 
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Just as in Hesse's essays on religion, this affirmative fatalist orientation senses or 
acknowledges something beyond or greater than the subject, "a God or an 'It,'" and feels 
as though called by it. Yet, despite there being "no struggle or wanting in him," it was 
indeed wanting that brought him here. For a moment now the inner life of Josephus and 
the forces at work around him appear aligned. He is no longer fleeing, but traveling 
homeward, though he knows not where. Even reason ceases to dictate his actions; the 
guiding force on his journey is suddenly the feeling of unity between his own sense of 
self and the world around him. The conditional, hypothetical mood of this thought and 
action – that he moves "like being called and coaxed by a distant, good voice, as if his 
journey were not a flight" – speaks to the indeterminacy of his compulsion. His fate is at 
once a matter of active desire and passive contingency, the ever evolving point of their 
confluence through time, and "reason appear[s] dispensable": as an aesthetic phenomenon 
existence is suddenly bearable by virtue of the beautiful accord between his inner life and 
the outer world. 
 Reason is, however, of rather central importance to Josephus's well-being and 
sanity, but primarily as regards the internal narrative of his self, the narrativization of his 
life and the integration of his experiences into a coherent image and story of his self. This 
process is thematized through its piecemeal performance within the text. When Josephus 
comes to a watering hole to rest for the night, he overhears two travelers, an older man 
and a younger man, discussing their respective journeys and destinations. They speak of 
their travels and their mutual desire to find a father confessor, the younger man explicitly 
naming Josephus Famulus and describing his gentle way with penitents. The older man 
scoffs at his description of this "dreadfully pious" man and goes on to describe the father 
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confessor whom he seeks, Dion Pugil, whose reputation aptly suits his moniker. 
"[M]an nennt ihn Dion Pugil, das heißt den Faustkämpfer, weil er sich mit allen 
Teufeln rauft, und wenn einer ihm seine Schandtaten beichtet, dann, mein Guter, 
seufzt der Pugil nicht und behält das Maul, sondern legt los und tut dem Mann 
den Rost herunter, daß es eine Art hat. Manche soll er verprügelt haben, einen hat 
er eine ganze Nacht auf nacktne Knien in den Steinen knien lassen und ihm dann 
erst noch auferlegt, vierzig Groschen den Armen zu geben. Das ist ein Mann, 
Brüderchen, du wirst sehen und staunen; wenn er dich so richtig anschaut, dann 
schlottert dir schon das Gebein, durch und durch blickt dich der" (547). 
Josephus is intrigued by this man who handles his penitents with such force and violence, 
pondering as well his own reputation as a gentle and kind father confessor. As he hears 
his own person described in such stark contrast to Dion Pugil, his vision of himself as 
well as of his journey takes further shape, and after listening a while longer decides that it 
is to this Dion Pugil that his journey will take him. "Dieser berühmte Beichtvater, 
Seelenrichter und Ratgeber würde auch für ihn einen Rat, ein Urteil, eine Strafe, einen 
Weg wissen; ihm wollte er sich stellen wie einem Vertreter Gottes und willig annehmen, 
was er ihm verordnen würde" (549). Still plagued by the guilt of having abandoned his 
post, Josephus longs to confess his own sins and see himself properly punished. This 
seems the most reasonable path for him, a fitting conclusion to this episode, his crisis of 
faith and self. 
 Traveling and finding Dion, the deep intertwinement between these crises – that 
of faith and of the self – reveals itself as Josephus must negotiate between his 
expectations and reality and come to understand the tragic nature of his subjectivity. His 
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path crosses serendipitously with the aged and quiet Dion, who, it seems, is also on a 
journey of his own, and the two walk together for days until finally the elder invites 
Josephus to confess. The younger father confessor bares his soul: in his confession, he 
narrativizes his experience into a logical sequence, he leaves no detail out of his account, 
from the years spent in isolation to his impressions and prejudices of Dion himself, and, 
after talking for hours, prepares himself for his punishment. 
"Die Sonne stand schon tief, als er zu Ende gesprochen hatte. Der alte Dion hatte 
mit unermüdlicher Aufmerksamkeit zugehört und sich jeder Unterbrechung und 
Frage enthalten. Und auch jetzt, wo die Beichte zu Ende war, kam kein Wort von 
seinen Lippen. Er erhob sich schwerfällig, blickte Josef mit großer Freundlichkeit 
an, neigte sich zu ihm, küßte ihn auf die Stirn und machte das Kreuz über ihm. 
Erst später fiel es Josef ein, daß dies ja dieselbe stumme, brüderliche und auf 
Urteilsspruch verzichtende Gebärde war, mit welcher er selbst so viele Beichtende 
entlassen hatte" (556). 
Dion's "tireless attention" and refraining from "interruption and question," his silence in 
the wake of the confession, his slow movement, and finally his kind gaze and gentle kiss 
– it is all familiar and comfortable, but it surprises Josephus and almost disappoints him. 
After some brooding contemplation, however, he accepts it: "der Blick und Bruderkuß 
Dions hatte ihm genügt, es war still in ihm, und bald sank er in wohltätigen Schlaf" (557). 
 With the confession, Josephus's journey has indeed proven itself to be a 
homecoming (eine Heimkehr) rather than a flight, though it is as if home returns to him 
through Dion's kindness and charity. The gateway of the moment brings the past and 
future together in the present, disrupting his expectations for change while affirming the 
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past in its repetition. Fate takes shape here not as the moment of death and physical 
sacrifice, but as a psychological phenomenon, a reckoning with the past that determines 
the orientation toward the future and death. Anticipating punishment, Josephus wants and 
expects to regret his past and resent himself, but Dion brings him home to himself and 
employs his own methods to calm his heart and help him affirm his fate. His future need 
not be filled with rueful thoughts, nor need it be unduly proud, but rather at peace, 
acknowledging the past and the present situation in order to make life meaningful into the 
future. 
 The morning after his long confession, Josephus follows Dion back to his 
hermitage and begins living with him, watching and learning from him, led to a new 
home, but having undergone a kind of spiritual transformation. While this new life 
reminds him of the one he left, there is one fundamental difference: "Nur war er jetzt 
nicht mehr allein, er lebte im Schatten und Schutz eines andern, und so war es denn doch 
ein vollkommen anderes Leben" (557). Indeed, Josephus Famulus now fulfills his 
namesake as a sort of servant to Dion Pugil and feels himself no longer languishing in 
isolation, but rather living as part of a small community which itself seems to mirror the 
greater context of God's creation. 
 During their time together Josephus becomes increasingly aware that his sense of 
self is bound up within his religiosity, not only in that he identifies as a believer and an 
ascetic, but in the continuous confrontation with fate required by his chosen practice of 
his faith. Confession comes in this context to function as a conceit for the existential-
psychological reckoning with fate discussed in the previous chapter as Hesse's 
recognition of the divine within the human being. In the assessment and affirmation of 
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fate, the subject negotiates its position in the Schuldzusammenhang des Lebendigen, but a 
father confessor, whose days are consumed by considerations of guilt, must reckon 
endlessly with fate. This Dion explains after Josephus asks him one days why he did not 
prescribe a terrible punishment for his confession when first they met, but rather met him 
with gentle kindness. The old man answers: 
"Nun, so laß es gut sein. Auch habe ich dir ja damals eine strenge und lange Buße 
auferlegt, wenn schon ohne Worte. Ich habe dich mitgenommen und als meinen 
Diener behandelt und dich zu dem Amt zurückgeführt und gezwungen, dem du 
dich hättest entziehen wollen. ... Die Weltleute sind Kinder, mein Sohn. Und die 
Heiligen – nun, die kommen nicht zu uns beichten. Wir aber, du und ich und 
unseresgleichen, wir Büßer und Sucher und Weltflüchtige, wir sind keine Kinder 
und sind nicht unschuldig und sind nicht durch Strafpredigten in Ordnung zu 
bringen. Wir, wir sind die eigentlichen Sünder, wir Wissenden und Denkenden, 
die wir vom Baum der Erkenntnis gegessen haben, und wir sollten einander also 
nicht wie Kinder behandeln, die man mit der Rute streicht und wieder laufen läßt. 
Wir entlaufen ja nach einer Beichte und Buße nicht wieder in die Kinderwelt, wo 
man Feste feiert und Geschäfte macht und gelegentlich einander totschlägt, wir 
erleben die Sünde nicht wie einen kurzen, bösen Traum, den man durch Beichte 
und Opfer wieder von sich abtut; wir weilen in ihr, wir sind niemals unschuldig, 
wir sind immerzu Sünder, wir weilen in der Sünde und im Brand unseres 
Gewissens, und wir wissen, daß wir unsere große Schuld niemals werden 
bezahlen können, es sei denn, daß Gott uns nach unserem Hinscheiden gnädig 
ansieht und in seine Gnade aufnimmt. ...  Wir haben es nicht mit dieser oder jener 
145 
 
Entgleisung oder Übeltat zu tun, sondern immerdar mit der Urschuld selbst; 
darum kann einer von uns den andern nur des Mitwissens und der Bruderliebe 
versichern, nicht aber ihn durch eine Strafe heilen" (564-5). 
Josephus, in his eager wish to learn from Dion, administered his own punishment without 
realizing that it was his punishment. This image is the core of Dion's explanation: a 
punishment must correspond to the belief of the penitent, else it is ineffective to teach 
him anything. That is to say: even in confession one seeks to justify existence 
aesthetically, which requires an accord between subject and world that here corresponds 
to the affirmation of fate (in the act of narrativizing oneself and one's past) and the good 
faith that sacrifice (in the form of the prescribed punishment) will endow the past with 
meaning for the future. "The people of the world are children," they conceive of their sins 
as singular transgressions that can be atoned for through acts of prayer or punishment, 
thus Dion helps them to overcome their guilt by prescribing punishments that accord with 
their psychological and aesthetic sense of justice. But Josephus, as a fellow father 
confessor, has been the desert sand into which the confessions of other flow, has felt 
Mitschuld and recognized the vast and complicated web of interdependence and shared 
responsibility in the guilt nexus (Schuldzusammenhang) that is fate. 
 What unites the two men is their shared awareness of "original sin itself" in the 
"fire of [their] conscience," the knowledge that all of their knowledge and piety can only 
ever be appeals to grace. Whether this be understood as divine forgiveness for their sins 
or, as Dion suggests, a reassuring hope that "God will regard [their] departure from life 
mercifully," it represents, as Kenneth Calhoon puts it, an antidote against the weight of 
history, especially as this takes shape with every confession insofar as the past gains its 
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character and becomes meaningful through narration. And not only narration, but the 
narrativization of events, thoughts, and actions from the perspective of a subject likewise 
implicated in the web of guilt and who stakes with every pronunciation a meaningful 
sense of self and world. Thus Josephus sees that the "joint knowledge and brotherly love" 
with which Dion received his confession performs its function in accordance with the 
faith motivating, detailed by, and seeking consolation in the act of the confession: it 
recognizes that every confession contains its own recipe for forgiveness and expiation, 
that the pronunciation and affirmation of fate that it contains is itself the appeal to grace. 
Led back to the life that he once sought to flee, Josephus rediscovers its meaning for him 
as the purpose and conciliatory power of confession, of narrativization, so as to make 
sense of the past and orient himself toward the future. 
 Josephus's intense and express inwardness (Innerlichkeit) directs itself toward the 
service to and reverence for Dion as a father confessor. The world accords most 
harmoniously with his inner life where he is able to maintain a comfortable degree of 
isolation and devote himself to the practice of inward reflection. In this way his 
Innerlichkeit is not solipsistically oriented and thus his affirmative fatalism is ethically 
directed toward others through the service that he provides as father confessor. His 
sacrifice, his sense of duty and denial of desire, his dedication to his penitents – it all 
issues from that profound recognition of the inescapable web of guilt in which he tarries 
and of which he is ever aware. 
 Since his entire life is more or less spent pondering the paradoxes of faith, sin, 
guilt, and grace, it comes as no surprise that Josephus is quite at peace with the 
inevitability of not only his own death, but of Dion's as well. As the elder, Dion draws 
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attention to this, to his own impending departure from life, and invites the younger to aid 
him in digging his grave as he feels death approaching. The daily task of digging in the 
hard earth seems to return a certain vivacity to Dion, "als bereite die Arbeit ihm 
Vergnügen" (566). One day Dion explains: 
"'Du wirst eine Palme auf mein Grab pflanzen', sagte er einmal bei dieser Arbeit. 
'Vielleicht wirst du noch von ihren Früchten essen. Wenn nicht, so wird ein 
anderer es tun. Ich habe je und je einen Baum gepflanzt, aber doch zu wenige, 
allzu wenige. Manche sagen, ein Mann sollte nicht sterben, ohne einen Baum 
gepflanzt zu haben und einen Sohn zu hinterlassen. Nun, ich hinterlasse einen 
Baum und hinterlasse dich, du bist mein Sohn'" (566). 
The promise of the spiritual sacrifice embodied by Dion and Josephus as father 
confessors is mirrored in the palm to be planted upon Dion's grave. Just as their 
asceticism and contemplative lives are to inspire others and help them along their way, so 
the palm, growing out of the earth nourished by Dion's body, shall bear fruit to feed and 
help others who pass by. That "one should not die without having planted a tree and 
leaving behind a son" speaks to the general notion in Hesse's writing as well as 
throughout the tradition of tragic narrative that no generation lives or dies for its own 
sake, but rather that death is by necessity – and by virtue of its necessity – not only "an 
expression of the subjugation of guilty life to the law of natural life," as Benjamin puts it, 
but also always a gesture, however traumatic, that remains with and influences the living. 
But all of this even reflects on the nature of the text itself: the value of a life and meaning 
of its end reside in its lingering afterlife, and the act of narrative composition is the 
gesture that preserves it for posterity. Its sacrificial component lies in the decision 
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(cutting-off) of what to write, how to compose, what to omit and what to enshrine in 
written language for the future. 
 To accompany the palm that shall bear fruit upon his grave, Dion provides a 
narrative that shall likewise remain with Josephus long after his death, and which perhaps 
even Josephus shall recount to inspire others. Dion finally tells Josephus the story of how 
he came to be traveling at the same time when the two met years ago: he was likewise 
fleeing his own post, having grown bored and overcome with despair, but had heard tell 
of a father confessor named Josephus Famulus whose odd yet gentle treatment of his 
penitents had intrigued him. So he sought to find this man and confess to him, to see what 
strange power he might have. After fortuitously finding Josephus and learning that he, 
too, was suffering terrible doubts, he felt as though God had brought them together to 
learn from one another, and so Dion took the younger man under his wing to help him 
rediscover and create new meaning in his life. Finally he says in reference to the thoughts 
of suicide that plagued them both: 
"Es ist nicht bloß eine Sünde und Torheit, sich einen solchen Tod zu bereiten, 
obwohl es unserm Erlöser ein kleines ist, auch diese Sünde zu vergeben. Aber es 
ist auch überdies jammerschade, wenn ein Mensch in Verzweiflung stirbt. Die 
Verzweiflung schickt uns Gott nicht, um uns zu töten, er schickt sie uns, um neues 
Leben in uns zu erwecken. Wenn er uns den aber den Tod schickt, Josef, wenn er 
uns von der Erde und vom Leibe losmacht und uns hinüberruft, so ist das eine 
große Freude. Einschlafen dürfen, wenn man müde ist, und eine Last fallen lassen 
dürfen, die man sehr lang getragen hat, das ist eine köstliche, eine wunderbare 
Sache" (569). 
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The sentiment lies at the core of affirmative fatalism: that "fate leads to death," as 
Benjamin puts it, but this death should come as a sweet release from the mortal coil, and 
whatever suffering that leads to it should not grip the human subject with despair and 
inspire suicide, but rather should motivate and inspire action that will echo into the 
future. Despair, issuing from tragic insight, as in the recognition of the inescapable web 
of guilt, should "awaken new life" in the subject and drive one to create meaning from 
that insight. 
 That night, Dion dies in his sleep. "[Josephus] begrub ihn, er pflanzte den Baum 
auf das Grab und erlebte noch das Jahr, in welchem der Baum die ersten Früchte trug" 
(570). These final sentences walk forward succinctly and logically, eschewing excessive 
sentimentality and closing the narrative with the fulfillment of the promise of the palm 
tree, which Josephus, in seeing its first fruits, likewise fulfills for Dion as his son and 
spiritual heir. 
 
Indischer Lebenslauf 
 The third and final Lebenslauf tells the story of a prince named Dasa who, after 
his father's death and in light of his stepmother's sinister ambition to put her own son on 
the throne, is stolen away by one of the high brahmins and sent to live with the shepherds 
who guard the king's holy cows. His fate unfolds through a series of twists and intrigue a 
bit denser than the previous two narratives, thus this analysis will remain isolated to a 
series of formidable moments in the text, but as Dasa's tale progresses, it becomes clear 
to any reader of Hesse already familiar with Siddhartha that a very similar story unfolds 
which echoes many of the themes from Der Regenmacher and Der Beichtvater while also 
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developing the ideas of Hesse's essay Ein Stückchen Theologie. Namely, Dasa is drawn 
out of innocence into guilt, must reckon with despair, and eventually chooses to seek 
comfort in faith. 
 Dasa lives a long time among the shepherds, encountering one day a yogi who so 
impresses him that he begins to daydream of going to live as his pupil, but he is soon 
entranced by a young woman, Pravati, and asks her father for her hand in marriage. He 
consents and Dasa is brought to live with the family, working their land with them and 
finding great joy in his union with Pravati. He is so overcome by her beauty and his 
feelings that he desires nothing more than to be bound together with her in an eternal 
present. 
"Von manchen Göttern und Heiligen erzählt man Geschichten, daß sie, von einer 
entzückenden Frau bezaubert, dieselbe tage-, monde- und jahrelang umarmt 
hielten und mit ihr verschmolzen blieben, ganz in Lust versunken, jeder anderen 
Richtung vergessend. So hätte auch Dasa sich sein Los und seine Liebe 
gewünscht. Indessen war ihm anderes beschieden, und sein Glück währte nicht 
lange" (579). 
To extend their embraces "for days, months, and years" is his deepest desire, to make 
eternal each moment that he basks in her presence, but "his fortune [does] not last long." 
The seeming innocence of his love is corrupted within a year by the experience of 
profound loss. 
 Soon enough his stepbrother, the king Nala, steals Pravati away while hunting in 
the area and hides her in his tent. Dasa is cut to the core; he feels all his joy and his life 
torn away from him. After days of stalking Nala and watching the tent, recognizing 
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Pravati inside, he is driven by anger to kill his stepbrother. He waits in a tree and leaps 
down upon the king, striking him with his slingshot and leaving him dead, for no sooner 
does he realize what he has done than he recognizes that the terrible deed has doomed 
him as well. Thrust into the world of guilt, Dasa flees into the wilderness, where he 
ponders for a long time what has become of him. 
"Während er vom Baum gesprungen war, während er im Rausch der Tat seine 
Schleuder gewirbelt und den Tod entsendet hatte, war ihm so gewesen, als lösche 
er auch sein eigenes Leben damit aus, als entließe er die letzte Kraft und werfe 
sich, mit dem tötenden Steine fliegend, selber in den Abgrund der Vernichtung, 
einverstanden mit dem Untergang, wenn nur der gehaßte Feind enen Augenblick 
vor ihm fiele" (581). 
Here Dasa's relationship to desire and time is inverted: whereas with Pravati he sought to 
make the beauty and innocence of their love last an eternity, here he seeks to exact 
revenge and inflict pain just to see "the hated foe fall before him for a moment," and, 
dooming himself to be haunted by this deed for the rest of his life, "throws himself, flying 
along with the deadly stone, into the abyss of annihilation." Indeed, the moments that he 
would like to make eternal do become so in memory, but so does his act of murder. The 
loss of his joy is avenged not with the intention of reclaiming it, but rather with the 
embrace of his own destruction. And its description, the stacked clauses that illustrate the 
attack, the repeated images of "the abyss" and "downfall" – the prose spirals, gewirbelt 
like the slingshot, through his mind. 
 For a long time he lives as an outlaw in the wilderness, his momentary deed living 
on as the sentence to isolation, until finally one day he comes upon a place that seems 
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very familiar to him: "[Ein] Gefühl von Wiederkehr und Heimat...führte ihn Wege, die 
seine Füße von selbst zu finden schienen, bis er...zu einer winzigen Hütte gelangte, und 
vor der Hütte an der Erde saß der regungslose Yogin" (584). Again in the presence of this 
holy man, Dasa feels a sense of relief and peace, and makes up his mind to stay and live 
alongside the old yogi. After some time, overcome with frustration at his failed attempts 
to meditate and find the stillness that the yogi seems to have achieved, he confesses his 
life to him and begs him to teach him his ways. Like Josephus, he bares his soul to the 
old man, but unlike Dion, this teacher does not receive him entirely sympathetically: 
"Der Yogin hatte dem Ausbruch ruhig mit niedergeschlagenen Augen zugehört. 
Jetzt schlug er sie auf und richtete seinen Blick auf Dasas Gesicht, einen hellen, 
durchdringenden, beinah unerträglich festen, gesammelten und lichten Blick, und 
während er Dasas Gesicht betrachtete und seiner hastigen Erzählung nachdachte, 
verzog sein Mund sich langsam zu einem Lächeln und zu einem Lachen, mit 
lautlosem Lachen schüttelte er den Kopf und sagte lachend: 'Maya! Maya!'" 
(588). 
The anticipation built by the description of the gaze, like the building tension and 
frustration in Dasa's heart, is undercut suddenly by the old man's laughter, which, 
although silent, is then intensified by its doubling: "zu einem Lachen, mit lautlosem 
Lachen." 
 "Ganz verwirrt und beschämt," Dasa gapes as the yogi goes back about his 
business, and then ponders the meaning of the laugh and exclamation (588). His 
questions, like so many of these inward trains of thought, run one after another until 
meeting stagnation: "Er konnte es nicht enträtseln" (589). After much time ruminating – 
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"seine Gedanken kauten an diesem Gelächter herum wie an einer harten Wurzel" – he 
begins to digest the experience: 
"'Maya! Maya!' Was das Wort ungefähr meine, wußte er halb, halb ahnte er es, 
und auch die Art, wie der Lachende es ausgerufen hatte, schien einen Sinn erraten 
zu lassen. Maya, das war Dasas Leben, Dasa Jugend, Dasa süßes Glück und 
bitteres Elend, Maya war die schöne Pravati, Maya war die Liebe und ihre Lust, 
Maya das ganze Leben. Dasas Leben und aller Menschen Leben, alles war in 
dieses alten Yogin Augen Maya, war etwas wie eine Kinderei, ein Schauspiel, ein 
Theater, eine Einbildung, ein Nichts in bunter Haut, eine Seifenblase, war etwas, 
worüber man mit einem gewissen Entzücken lachen und was man zugleich 
verachten, keinesfalls aber ernst nehmen konnte" (589). 
His meditation on the idea, whether he knows it or not, breaks through stagnation by 
means of repetition, as illustrated in the paratactical chain of predicates. Repetition 
describes, after all, the form of a practice, the devotion to a idea in praxis, even where 
that praxis is internal or abstract. As he equates Maya one by one with particularities – 
"Dasa's life, Dasa's youth, Dasa's sweet joy and bitter sorrow" – the word's meaning 
unfolds as a blanket concept for all of the phenomena and experiences of the ephemeral 
world. But it also prepares both Dasa and the reader for an eventual challenge to this 
understanding of Maya as "child's play, a play, a theater, a delusion, a nothingness." 
 Particularly this final equivalence with nothingness does not sit well with Dasa, 
and he decides that this yogi's ways will remain unobtainable for him. Before he departs, 
however, he asks the old man to tell him more about Maya, but the master does not say a 
word. Instead, he hands Dasa a bowl and directs him to fetch fresh water. Dasa does as he 
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is told, but as ever his thoughts swirl in his mind, and the narration moves back and forth 
between his actions and his inner monologue. 
"Dasa gehorchte und lief, und Abschiedsgefühle zuckten ihm im Herzen, da er 
zum letztenmal diesen kleinen Fußpfad zur Quelle ging, zum letztenmal die 
leichte Schale mit dem glatten, abgegriffenen Rande hinübertrug zu dem kleinen 
Wasserspiegel, in dem die Hirschzungen, die Wölbungen der Baumkronen und in 
versprengten lichten Punkten das süße Himmelsblau abgebildet standen, der nun 
beim Darüberbeugen zum letztenmal auch sein eigenes Gesicht in bräunlichem 
Dämmer abbildete. Er tauchte die Schale ins Wasser, gedankenvoll und langsam, 
er füllte Unsicherheit und konnte nicht ins klare darüber kommen, warum er so 
Wunderliches empfinde, und warum es ihm, da er noch zu wandern entschlossen 
war, weh getan habe, daß der Alte ihn nicht eingeladen hatte, noch zu bleiben, 
vielleicht für immer zu bleiben" (591). 
As he dips the bowl into the "Wasserspiegel," his conflicting feelings are reflected 
through the relationship of interior and exterior, as once again a repetitive series of 
formulations gives the reader access to Dasa's thoughts. 
 But the external world enters into the narrative here primarily through its relation 
to Dasa's thoughts, insofar as it is perceived as a reflection of his internal world and 
concerns. This tendency of Hesse's writing is noted in Gerhart Mayer's article "Hermann 
Hesse: Mystische Religiosität und dichterische Form": 
"Vor 1917 dominierte in Hesses Werken ein durschaus konventioneller, realistisch 
gehaltener Stilwille. Seit dem Demian aber wird die äußere Handlung in ihrer 
Eigenbedeutung weitgehend entwertet. Sinclairs Umwelt – Etlernhaus, Heimat- 
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und Universitätsstadt – bleibt weithin ungestaltet. Nur einige wenige plastisch 
geformte Charaktere tragen die Handlung. Diese besitzt lediglich die Aufgabe, 
einen gewissen zeitlichen Ablauf zu veranschaulichen, um einen äußeren Maßstab 
für die innere Entwicklung der Hauptgestalt zu gewinnen. An markanten Stellen, 
wo die Umwelt plötzlich in lebendiger Gegenständlichkeit aufleuchtet, wohnt der 
Handlung eine hinweisende, zeichenhafte Funktion inne: Sie spiegelt Sinclairs 
seelisch-geistige Entwicklung an deren entscheidenden Wendepunkten. Damit 
enthüllt sich ein Formprinzip, das im Wesentlichen bis zum Glasperlenspiel seine 
Gültigkeit behält: die raum-zeitliche Wirklichkeit wird nicht mehr ernst 
genommen. … Die Poesie sollte ihm nunmehr die Wesenstiefen der Seele erhellen 
und dadurch seinem sehnsüchtigen Erlösungs- und Vollendungsdrang Vorschub 
leisten" (444). 
Thus "the hart's-tongue ferns, the arches of the treetops," and the "sweet blue of the sky" 
provide at once a comfortable and enclosed space, a familiar realm that has also come to 
envelop and limit Dasa in his development. Feeling as though he cannot grasp the 
meaning of Maya, having given up his desire for tutelage but still driven to follow the 
yogi's commands, he finds himself torn between the desire to stay and to leave, and the 
repetitious meditation on "the last time" brings the external world to bear on his interior 
as a reminder of the dual nature of the world in its impermanence and the haunting power 
of memory.  
 This tension regarding the distinction between exterior and interior, between the 
material and abstract, which is also to say: between reality and illusion – this 
characterizes the essence of Dasa's personal conflict at the heart of Indischer Lebenslauf, 
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though it will also come to bear upon the Castalian Knecht as an ethical problem. For 
what proceeds from this moment at the spring is a series of events that rattle Dasa to the 
core: Pravati emerges from the woods and embraces him, tells him that he is to be named 
king, and leads him back to the capital city where he assumes the throne and becomes 
ruler of his late father's realm. He sires a son who becomes the center of his world, and 
for the boy's sake and the sake of his kingdom Dasa engages in a war with a neighboring 
land after acts of aggression at the border. He is deeply conflicted about his course of 
action, but finds that once he has begun, he cannot relent, and the war rages on until 
finally his city is invaded, his son is murdered, and he and Pravati are taken prisoner. As 
he lies beaten and bloody in a cell, he closes his eyes, anticipating death, but when he 
opens them again, he finds that he is still standing bent over the water, dipping the bowl 
in the spring, and that the entire life that he just lived was nothing but a dream. 
 Standing shaken, horrified, and relieved, Dasa replays the memories through his 
head again and again, on the one hand convinced of their reality and on the other hand 
amazed at how intensely a mere illusion could affect him. 
"Er hatte weder eine Schlacht noch einen Sohn verloren, er war weder Fürst noch 
Vater gewesen; wohl aber hatte der Yogin seinen Wunsch erfüllt und ihn über 
Maya belehrt: Palast und Garten, Bücherei und Vogelzucht, Fürstensorgen und 
Vaterliebe, Krieg und Eifersucht, Liebe zu Pravati und heftiges Mißtrauen gegen 
sie, alles war Nichts – nein, nicht Nichts, es war Maya gewesen (610)! 
Although none of what he experienced was real, it was also "not nothing": he is left 
deeply stirred by the dream, all of its details linger in memory as though it were real. 
Indeed, it is to some extent indistinguishable from reality, insofar as what is real and past 
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lays claim to its status through its material effects or the memory thereof, in perceptibility 
and observability. But an experience entirely internal to the subject, while imperceptible 
to other subjects, remains no less burned into memory and asserts its power over the 
subject's sense of self and world. This Dasa likewise recognizes about the experience: 
"O wie rasch, wie rasch und schauerlich, wie grausam, wie gründlich war er über 
Maya belehrt worden, wie viele Jahre voll von Erlebnissen schrumpften in 
Augenblicke zusammen, geträumt war alles, was eben noch drangvolle 
Wirklichkeit schien, geträumt war vielleicht alles jenes andre, was früher 
geschehen war, die Geschichten vom Fürstensohn Dasa, seinem Hirtenleben, 
seiner Heirat, seiner Rache an Nala, seiner Zuflucht beim Einsiedler; Bilder waren 
sie, wie man sie an einer geschnitzten Palastwand bewundern mag, wo Blumen, 
Sterne, Vögel, Affen und Götter zwischen Laubwerk zu sehen waren. Und war 
das, was er gerade jetzt erlebte und vor Augen hatte, dies Erwachen aus dem 
Fürsten- und Kriegs- und Kerkertum, dies Stehen bei der Quelle, diese 
Wasserschüssel, aus der er eben ein wenig verschüttet hatte, samt den Gedanken, 
die er sich da machte – war alles dies denn nicht am Ende aus demselben Stoff, 
war es nicht Traum, Blendwerk, Maya" (611)? 
The distinction between Dasa's actual experiences and the dream becomes blurred as he 
contemplates the psychological and emotional effects of his memories. "Everything was 
dreamed," but "perhaps everything else that happened before was dreamed" as well. The 
events, recalled in thought, fall into a sequence of images compared to a relief carving in 
which they flow into one another lacking any essential differentiation between true and 
false, lived or dreamed. Where doubt is cast upon the supposed reality of all experience, 
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the question shifts to one of value. What is to be learned? What is to be gained? And 
finally: what is to be done? 
 The dreadful memory of the vision, in which Dasa was saddled with the ultimate 
responsibility of sovereignty and in which, despite his best efforts, he could not manage 
but to fall prey to the consequent dangers and follies of that responsibility, taints the 
thought of venturing back out into the world. In Dasa grow fear and doubt – despair – 
regarding the myriad possibilities of his life beyond the woods. Pondering likewise the 
possibility of reincarnation, or even to understand it as a metaphor, there seems to be no 
escape from the cycle of desire and disappointment, of gain and loss, of joy and sorrow. 
Even to take up the life of the yogi, to seek peace and to extinguish desire, may only lead 
again to frustration or suffering. Finally Dasa, fulfilling his namesake (dasa: servant), 
decides that at least to return to the yogi and serve him, to learn from him but more 
importantly to devote himself to the service, will be easier and allow him to live with a 
cleaner conscience. 
"Es war ein Dienst, den man von ihm verlangt hatte, es war ein Auftrag, man 
konnte ihm gehorchen und ihn ausführen, es war besser als zu sitzen und sich 
Methoden der Selbsttötung auszudenken, es war ja überhaupt Gehorchen und 
Dienen weit leichter und besser, weit undschuldiger und bekömmlicher als 
Herrschen und Verantworten, so viel wußte er. Gut, Dasa, nimm also die Schale, 
fülle sie hübsch mit Wasser und trage sie zu deinem Herrn hinüber" (612-3)! 
The service to which he ultimate commends himself is once again reminiscent of Hesse's 
essay on theology, the movement from guilt into faith, the recognition of some greater 
power or force, be it natural, social, or spiritual, to which one can devote oneself and be 
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at ease in a world so full of risk and peril. It is the recognition that one is not individually 
responsible for the suffering in the world, that one can only do what seems fitting and 
right to improve one little corner of the world. 
 Dasa never leaves the forest again. Thus ends the long thought experiment, the 
Magic Theater of Josef Knecht's Lebensläufe. But although this is the end of the novel in 
its physical, published form, it is not the end of Knecht's contemplation of fate and the 
possibilities for his own life. For if the reader is to take the editor and narrator at his word 
that these stories are to be understood as the writing exercises of a young Josef Knecht, 
then their function is not merely to close the novel with a playful exploration of Knecht's 
possible reincarnations, but rather to shed light on the development of his relationship to 
his own fate in Castalia – one that does not so cleanly reflect the conclusions drawn in 
each of the stories. 
 
Castalian Knecht 
 The "real" Josef Knecht, the protagonist of the novel's central story arc and 
diegetic author of the Lebensläufe, is an orphan raised within the educational province of 
Castalia whose natural intelligence and industriousness help him rise through the ranks of 
the elite schools, eventually becoming a remarkably young but gifted 
Glasperlenspielmeister, one of the highest offices in Castalia. During his time studying, 
he explores scholarly realms relatively unconventional for the average Castalian, namely 
history and eastern philosophy, but as a skilled Glass Bead Game player, it behooves him 
to cast a wide net across disciplines, for the ostensible purpose of the game is to put ideas 
from various fields – most popularly music and mathematics – into dialectical play with 
160 
 
one another, for example: 
"...das Nebeneinanderstellen, Gegeneinanderführen und endliche harmonische 
Zusammenführen zweier feindlicher Themes oder Ideen, wie Gesetze und 
Freiheit, Individuum und Gemeinschaft, und man legte großen Wert darauf, in 
einem solchen Spiel beide Themata oder Thesen vollkommen gleichwertig under 
parteilos durchzuführen, aus These und Antithese möglichst rein die Synthese zu 
entwickeln" (40). 
This most developed of games is described by the narrator of Knecht's biography (and 
editor of his posthumous writings) as a sort of Hegelian play with concepts that obtains a 
religious significance for its most devoted practitioners and players. "Es bedeutete eine 
erlesene, symbolhafte Form des Suchens nach dem Vollkommenen, eine sublime 
Alchimie, ein Sichannähern an den über allen Bildern und Vielheiten in sich einigen 
Geist, also an Gott" (40). Knecht grows into one such devoted player and master of the 
game, and in the true spirit of the game seeks to broaden the horizon of his understanding 
to the greatest extent possible. 
 Castalia is, for the most part, however, a fundamentally uncreative realm. Students 
as well as practitioners of the game are not generally encouraged to articulate their "own" 
ideas, but rather always to play with pre-established concepts and motifs, their creative 
drive sublimated in dialectical extrapolation and synthesis. But during certain years of 
study students are asked to perform writing exercises in which they practice imagining 
their lives in different times and cultures, indulging in the study of the various languages 
and stylistic traditions associated with the imagined reincarnations. Three of these 
Lebensläufe by Knecht are retained and appended by the narrator, who reveals their 
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pedagogical purpose and thereby formal function in the composition of the novel: "Denn 
natürlich waren die meisten dieser imaginierten Vorexistenzen nicht nur Stilübungen und 
historische Studien, sondern auch Wunschbilder und gesteigerte Selbstbildnisse: die 
Verfasser der meisten Lebensläufe schilderten sich in demjenigen Kostüm und als 
denjenigen Charakter, als welcher zu erscheinen und sich zu verwirklichen ihr Wunsch 
und Ideal war" (119). There is scant further mention of the imagined biographies 
throughout the rest of this central biography of Castalian Knecht, but taking seriously the 
narrator's comments about their general nature provides invaluable insight into the 
development of this "real" Knecht. 
 The previous three sections walked through and explored the aspects of the 
biographies that vividly expressed meditations on the nature of Knecht as an introspective 
subject becoming increasingly aware of how his subjectivity, position in the world, and 
orientation toward death are conditioned and determined. Throughout them dominates the 
dialectical spirit of the Glass Bead Game, especially the play with those examples 
mentioned earlier in the narrator's introduction: "laws and freedom, individuality and 
community." The stories function as the young Knecht's meditations on the possible paths 
and orientations of his own spiritual devotion to the life of the mind, but, generally 
speaking, each concludes very similarly: the character takes a relatively conservative 
affirmative fatalist stance in relation to the purpose and meaning of his social role. The 
stories reveal that the young Knecht maintains a profound respect for tradition and the 
absolute integrity of the Castalian order; his imagined personalities are each willing, in 
spite perhaps of some terrible knowledge, to give themselves wholly to spiritual 
institutions or traditions for the sake of a community or the ideal of personal inner peace. 
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 But the older Castalian Knecht, whose death organizationally precedes the 
presentation of the appended biographies, takes a radically different path, though it is no 
less informed by his introspection and spiritual devotion. As the end of his story 
approaches, the reader finds that he is less motivated by an absolute allegiance to the 
educational institution as an organized body and instead finds his calling beyond 
Castalia's borders. This is not in spite of the institution, but rather is informed by its core 
principles, and represents one of the recurring motifs in the Lebensläufe which the 
younger Knecht could only partially appreciate: the dialectical fullness of the world as 
expressed in the generational relationship between teacher and pupil. 
 Just as in each biography there is a dominant operative metaphor that illustrates 
the subject's confrontation and identification of itself with fate, the Castalian Knecht finds 
order and meaning for his own position within the Schuldzusammenhang in music. It is 
music that first inspires and draws Knecht into the educational institution and an 
understanding of the Glass Bead Game after, as a young boy, his school is visited by the 
old Music Master and he is asked to improvise a fugue together with the esteemed 
teacher. The two play together, the layers of their musical voices building a beautiful 
contrapuntal composition that leaves a profound impression upon him. 
"Des Knaben Herz wallte von Verehrung, von Liebe für den Meister, und sein Ohr 
vernahm die Fuge, ihm schien, er höre heute zum erstenmal Musik, er ahnte hinter 
dem vor ihm entstehenden Tonwerk den Geist, die beglückende Harmonie von 
Gesetz und Freiheit, von Dienen und Herrschen, er ergab und gelobte sich diesem 
Geist und diesem Meister, er sah sich und sein Leben und sah die ganze Welt in 
diesen Minuten vom Geist der Musik geleitet, geordnet und gedeutet, und als das 
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Spiel sein Ende gefunden hatte, sah er den Verehrten, den Zauberer und König, 
noch eine kleine Weile leicht vorgeneigt über den Tasten, mit haldgeschlossenen 
Lidern, das Gesicht von innen her leise leuchtend, und wußte nicht, sollte er 
jubeln über die Seligkeit dieser Augenblicke oder weinen, daß sie vorüber waren" 
(54). 
The reader who has taken note of the interwoven and recurring themes of the Lebensläufe 
will see that this scene thoroughly prefigures the development of Knecht's thought 
throughout the entire novel. Here he is awakened in moments (Augenblicke), as future 
potentiality moves through the present and into the past, anticipating the movement of the 
music in the awareness of a "spirit behind the tone-work coming into being before him." 
There is an ordering force that gives the elements of music an aesthetic form which opens 
itself to interpretation, deftly navigating the tensions of possibility and actuality in "the 
delightful harmony of law and freedom." The Music Master's calm but ecstatic 
expression, "shining softly from within," speaks as well to an existential orientation that 
seeks an accord between the inner and outer world, between impression and expression. 
The spirit of music described here anticipates the Rainmaker's corporeal, ritual appeal to 
the villagers beneath the meteor shower, where the rhythm and tone of their prayers are 
able to quiet their fears. 
 Knecht's conception of music as a mediating and ordering force follows him in his 
tenure as student, teacher, and eventual Glass Bead Game Master. Reflecting on his 
ascendancy, he remembers that first encounter with the Music Master and distills from it 
the also the spirit of Castalia itself, a spirit of dialectical play: 
"Die Szene im Klavierzimmer, das Hereintreten des Alten zu dem Knaben, 
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wiederholte sich immerzu, unendliche Male, der Meister und der Knabe folgten 
einander, wie am Draht eines Mechanismus gezogen, so daß es bald nicht mehr zu 
erkennen war, wer komme und wer gehe, wer führe und wer folge, der Alte oder 
der Junge. ... Und aus diesem Stadium entwickelte sich eine neue Vorstellung, 
mehr schon Symbol als Traum, mehr schon Erkenntnis als Bild, nämlich die 
Vorstellung oder vielmehr Erkenntnis: dieser sinnvoll-sinnlose Rundlauf von 
Meister und Schüler, dieses Werben der Weisheit um die Jugend, der Jugend um 
die Weisheit, dieses endlose, beschwingte Spiel war das Symbol Kastaliens, ja 
war das Spiel des Lebens überhaupt, das in alt und jung, in Tag und Nacht, in 
Yang und Yin gespalten ohne Ende strömt" (238-9). 
The Rainmaker, Father Josephus, and Dasa each participate in this reciprocal relationship, 
here imagined by Knecht years after the composition of the imagined biographies. Both 
the teacher and pupil long to learn from one another while also aware of what they have 
to teach, such that they fulfill their roles where these are most fluidly performed. And 
even these relationships in their interplay are, to some extent, merely a manifestation of 
the more fundamental affirmative fatalist comportment, a negotiation of inner and outer 
worlds and the subject's orientation toward action in light of certain terrible knowledge, 
namely the indifference of nature and inevitability of death. 
 But Knecht's attitude toward this relationship must be contrasted with the naïveté 
of the idealized characters written by his younger self. While each of these is certainly a 
compelling narrative focused on an affirmatively fatalist subject, the social and historical 
milieux in which they are imagined are, for the most part, highly apolitical, save for the 
illusion seen by Dasa in which his sovereignty becomes embroiled in war. Indeed it is the 
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tension between the three Lebensläufe and the life of the "real" Castalian Knecht that 
provides the novel with significance as regards any materialist reading of affirmative 
fatalism. For Knecht does not, like the protagonists of the imagined biographies, choose 
in every case to devote himself entirely to an idealized institution for the sake of its 
integrity or merely because of his own desires, but rather chooses the trajectory of his life 
taking into account the broader arc of history. The Lebensläufe, on the other hand, while 
situated historically and meant to function as exercises in historical imagination, do not 
concretely thematize the social or political implications of their central figures' 
affirmative fatalism. They are primarily exercises in reconciling the desire for spiritual 
with the sentiment that Nietzsche articulated with brutal honesty: "only as an aesthetic 
phenomenon is existence still bearable to us." 
 The indischer Lebenslauf presents the reader (and author Knecht) with the 
question of whether or not an imagined experience – a dream or vision – might leave the 
kind of lasting impression which one typically finds in traumatic memories. More than 
this, the question probes into the relationship between memory, thought, and action as 
regards the imagined experience, and asks whether or not its impression or influence is as 
valid as that left by real experience. This is, however, a projection in the narrative space 
of a question that plagues the Castalian Knecht, namely: Can the experiences imagined in 
the Lebensläufe have a lasting impact on his budding worldview and can they come to 
bear in a meaningful way upon his actual thoughts and actions? The Lebensläufe then 
represent for Knecht what the vision at the spring represented for Dasa: the attempt to 
draw from creative narrative a productive or insightful lesson about one's actual fate as a 
living subject in a dynamically developing world that will itself become the narrative 
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history read by a future generation. 
 The legacy of tragedy is easily discernible in this formulation, where a subject 
may contemplate its fate and orientation toward death in consideration of what this 
action, as gesture, might mean for a future generation. It is this idea that increasingly 
permeates Knecht's attitude toward the Glass Bead Game and the Castalian educational 
institution, as he intimates in a speech about the role of the teacher and the game: 
"Nun, ihr wisset so gut wie ich, daß auch das Glasperlenspiel seinen Diabolus in 
sich stecken hat, daß es zur leeren Virtuosität, zum Selbstgenuß künstlerhafter 
Eitelkeit, zur Streberei, zum Erwerb von Macht über andere und damit zum 
Mißbrauch dieser Macht führen kann. Darum bedürfen wir noch einer andern 
Erziehung als der intellektuellen und haben uns der Moral des Ordens unterstellt, 
nicht um unser geistigaktives Leben in ein seelischvegetatives Traumleben 
umzubiegen, sondern im Gegenteil um geistiger Höchstleistungen fähig zu sein. 
Wir sollen nicht aus der Vita activa in die Vita contemplativa fliehen, noch 
umgekehrt, sondern zwischen beiden wechselnd unterwegs sein, in beiden zu 
Hause sein, an beiden teilhaben" (256-7). 
The invocation of a diabolus is immediately reminiscent of Benjamin's discussion of evil, 
noted in the earlier second chapter, and its relationship to knowledge, namely in that it 
tempts one into the depths of isolation and melancholy – a vita contemplativa divorced 
from action, a self-serving Innerlichkeit. The knowledge gained by practice of the Glass 
Bead Game, Knecht insists here, should be put toward purposes that eschew such a 
descent into nihilism. The "morality of the Order" is meant to guide Glass Bead Game 
players to find balance between the lofty world of ideas and the world of action, or put 
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differently: the sense of order provided by the literal Order of Castalia is its morality, a 
playful, simultaneously contemplative and active engagement with knowledge and its 
application. But as Knecht continues to climb the ranks of the Order, eventually 
becoming Glass Bead Game Master, the finer points of what exactly that morality is and 
what form its application should take, moving between contemplation and action, become 
an source of increasing concern. 
 Indeed, up to this point the concrete applications of the game are not made 
explicit; the novel, as Anni Carlson writes in "Hermann Hesses Glasperlenspiel in seinen 
Wesensgesetzen," is inspired more by an idea than a singular character or biography with 
its contingent implications (200). "Die Biographie Josef Knechts ist also gleichbedeutend 
mit der Biographie des persofizierten kastalischen Gewissens" (187). And yet it is the 
"Castalian conscience" – which is meant to remain, so the narrator insists, impersonal, 
unindividuated and apolitical – personified in Knecht that eventually turns toward 
questions of the personal and political, and begins to question its position, as the position 
of the institution itself, in relation to its historical context, particularly as regards the 
powers that allow for Castalia's existence. After some years in his role as Glass Bead 
Game Master, Knecht decides that it is in keeping with the institution’s ideals and the 
Castalian conscience that he must leave the province, explaining in a long letter to the 
other members of the high council that the knowledge and weight of history have 
provided him with an insight that is also a warning. The world around Castalia is 
changing again, political tensions are mounting, and the institution, in his view, is too 
complacent, too unconcerned with the development of history outside its borders, 
thoroughly taking its existence for granted. His earlier warning about the diabolus of the 
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game extends here to the whole educational province. 
"Wir sind im Niedergang, der sich vielleicht noch sehr lange hinziehen kann, aber 
in jedem Falle kann uns nichts Höheres, Schöneres und Wünschenswerteres mehr 
zufallen, als was wir schon besessen haben, der Weg führt abwärts; wir sind 
geschichtlich, glaube ich, reif zum Abbau, und er wird unzweifelhaft erfolgen, 
nicht heut un morgen, aber übermorgen. ... Es wird alsdann auch ohne Zweifel 
eine kriegerische Ideologie in Schwung kommen und namentlich die Jugend 
ergreifen, eine Schlagwort-Weltanschauung, nach welcher Gelehrte und 
Gelertentum, Latein und Mathematik, Bildung und Geistespflege nur soweit als 
lebensberechtigt gelten, als sie kriegerische Zwecken zu dienen vermögen" (391-
2). 
The continued existence of Castalia as an idealized realm has been undercut by the reality 
of the larger context beyond its borders. The language of a "downfall" and a "swing" back 
toward "a belligerent ideology," the likes of which have not been seen in centuries, 
echoes Hesse's personal essays on religion, the vacillations between good and evil, 
beautiful and ugly, that assert themselves with the undeniability of necessity and which 
must, in Nietzschean fashion, be confronted, accepted, and dealt with in such a way as to 
make them meaningful and beneficial to the growth of the individual and society. Knecht 
sees Castalia in danger of becoming a mere tool of the ruling powers, its knowledge 
exploited to violent and oppressive ends, and so decides that he must leave the province 
and take his teaching out into the world in hopes of educating and inspiring the younger 
generation to resist the siren's song of aggressive politics. 
 Knecht's warning and resignation are rejected by the high council. The other 
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magisters are consumed by an unwavering devotion to the institution, ever reluctant to 
acknowledge the social and historical contingencies that both brought it into being and 
sustain it. Likewise, Master Alexander, with whom Knecht disputes his request, embodies 
a certain spirit of bureaucracy as well as a general anxiety toward the uncertainty of a 
world ever in flux. Castalia seeks to remain timeless and ethereal, it wants to be the yogi's 
hermitage, cut off from the concerns of the outside world and secure in its position. But 
Knecht doubts the certainty of this position, and instead embraces the uncertainty that 
comes with his departure from the province, affirming the anxiety that necessarily comes 
with freedom. 
 Throughout the novel there dominates an insistence on the impersonality of the 
Castalian Order and a veneration for absolute devotion to it at the expense of individual 
recognition, an interesting conversion of the sacrificial gesture into the mundane practice 
of almost monastic scholars. Knecht represents this ideal and its opposite in beautifully 
dialectical fashion, as it is his dedication to the fundamental principle of education which 
leads him to leave the institution. As his biography unfolds, the narrator's foreword takes 
on greater significance, specifically in his paradoxical definition of personality and 
Knecht's exemplary status as Castalian. 
"Es ist ja allerdings das, was wir heute under Persönlichkeit verstehen, nun etwas 
erheblich anderes, als was die Biographen und Historiker früherer Zeiten damit 
gemeint haben. Für sie, und zwar namentlich für die Autoren jener Epochen, 
welche eine ausgesprochene biographische Neigung hatten, scheint, so möchte 
man sagen, das Wesentliche einer Persönlichkeit das Abweichende, das 
Normwidrige und Einmalige, ja oft geradezu das Pathologische gewesen zu sein, 
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während wir Heutigen von bedeutenden Persönlichkeiten überhaupt erst dann 
sprechen, wenn wir Menschen begegnen, denen jenseits von allen Originalitäten 
und Absonderlichkeiten ein möglichst vollkomenenes Sich-Einordenen ins 
Allgemeine, ein möglichst vollkommener Dienst am Überpersönlichen gelungen 
ist" (9). 
This strange new-speak of the future where Castalia exists, in which a personality has 
significance insofar as there is nothing personal in it, is not only inherently contradictory, 
but it also anticipates its dialectical undoing. For what could fulfill this notion of 
impersonal personality more perfectly than a figure whose devotion to the Order goes so 
deep as to declare the Order insufficient to contain the most potent realization of its ideal? 
This is certainly the overarching irony of the novel. And if the irony of the tragedy of 
subjectivity consists in the necessary sacrifice that redefines the subject's individuality 
and its meaning for the future – cutting away at the stone, as Zarathustra put it, to craft 
oneself – then the irony of the tragedy of Castalia and the Glass Bead Game consists in 
the necessary sacrifice of one of its great personalities – the disruption of Knecht's 
departure and death – that redefines their purpose and meaning for future generations. 
The narrator clues the reader into the ironic and ultimately tragic nature of his story at the 
beginning of Knecht's biography: 
"Knecht gehört zu den Glücklichen, welche recht eigentlich für Kastalien, für den 
Orden unf dür den Dienst in der Erziehungsbehörde geboren und vorbestimmt 
scheinen; und wenn ihm auch die Problematik des geistigen Lebens keineswegs 
unbekannt gelieben ist, so war es ihm doch gegeben, die jedem geistesgeweihten 
Leben eingeborene Tragik ohne persönliche Bitterkeit zu erleben. Es ist wohl 
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auch nicht so sehr diese Tragik selbst, welche uns verlockt hat, der Persönlichkeit 
Josef Knechts unsre eingehende Betrachtung zu widmen; es ist vielmehr die stille, 
heitere, ja strahlende Art, mit welcher er sein Schicksal, seine Begabung, sene 
Bestimmung verwirklichte. Wie jeder bedeutende Mensch hat er sein Daimonion 
und seinene Amor fati, aber sein Amor fati zeigt sich uns frei von Düsterkeit und 
Fanatismus" (45). 
The string of signifiers – fate, talent, purpose – which Knecht is to "realize" by the end of 
his story speaks to his being "predetermined" to become a sacrifice himself. The narrator 
is not, however, tempted to tell Knecht's story because it is merely tragic, but because he 
realizes his fate in such "a quiet, cheerful, even radiant way," positioning Knecht like a 
guiding star. He is not, after all, a simple rebel, which the narrator also makes clear (10). 
Instead his life and legacy are clearly possessed of an insight the narrativization of which 
shall benefit the generations following him. This is the true essence of his tragic nature 
and affirmative fatalism: the conflict that arises between him and the Order does not only 
lead to his seemingly untimely death, but also performs a gesture containing wisdom for 
the future. 
 The cheerfulness with which Knecht approaches his fate is in part due to a naïveté 
differentiated from that of the characters of his Lebensläufe, perhaps more akin to an 
innocence yet unmarred by fear, an emotional and existential comportment toward the 
uncertainty of the future which, affirming the inevitability of anxiety entailed in freedom, 
extinguishes the mundane fear of future uncertainty. It is the spirit of music that Knecht 
so revered as a boy and which thoroughly colors his worldview. Specifically, it is the 
veneration of specific tonal tendencies and organizations which, he feels and trusts, 
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mimic the patterns of nature and the forces or movements to which the human being is 
subject in life. This is the good humor of his amor fati, the good faith that the arc of his 
life will follow a meaningful development that may resound into the future. This is 
expressed in a poem, "Stufen," that he wrote as a younger student and which recurs to 
him one day prior to his departure from Castalia. 
"Wie jede Blüte welkt und jede Jugend 
Dem Alter weicht, blüht jede Lebensstufe, 
Blüht jede Weisheit auch und jede Tugend, 
Zu ihrer Zeit und darf nicht ewig dauern. 
Es muß das Herz bei jedem Lebensrufe 
Bereit zum Abschied sein und Neubeginne, 
Um sich in Tapferkeit und ohne Trauern 
In andre, neue Bindungen zu geben. 
Und jedem Anfang wohnt ein Zauber inne, 
Der uns beschützt und der uns hilft, zu leben. 
Wir sollen heiter Raum um Raum durchschreiten, 
An keinem wie an einer Heimat hängen, 
Der Weltgeist will nicht fesseln uns und engen, 
Er will uns Stuf' um Stufe heben, weiten. 
Kaum sind wir heimisch einem Lebenskreise 
Und traulich eingewohnt, so droht Erschlaffen, 
Nur wer bereit zu Aufbruch ist und Reise, 
Mag lähmender Gewöhnung sich entraffen. 
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Es wird vielleicht auch noch die Todesstunde 
Uns neuen Räumen jung entgegensenden, 
Des Lebens Ruf an uns wird niemals enden... 
Wohlan denn, Herz, nimm Abschied und gesunde" (483-4)! 
The poem is a paean to impermanence, echoing the insight of Dasa's vision, the lesson of 
Maya. The apparent world is not mere illusion, but neither is its reality eternally 
determinable. Instead, the experience of life moves through time without end, the future 
passes through the present, the only locus of experience, into the irretrievable past, which 
may haunt the present in memory, but which is inalterable and lost. To become too 
acquainted to one space – or one idea, one memory – poses the threat of limp 
complacency. The "world spirit" instead seeks to drive us through experiences as up steps 
in some development. Discussing the poem with his friend Tegularius, Knecht is 
admonished for making the poem too pedantic. But Tegularius certainly reads Knecht's 
affinity for music in the text: 
"Sein eigentlicher Inhalt ist mit dem Titel 'Stufen' nicht schlecht angedeutet; Ihr 
hättet aber ebensogut und noch besser 'Musik' darüber schreiben können. Denn 
nach Abzug jener moralisierenden oder predigenden Haltung ist es recht 
eigentlich eine Betrachtung über das Wesen der Musik, oder meinetwegen ein 
Lobgesang auf die Musik, auf ihre stete Gegenwärtigkeit, auf ihre Heiterkeit und 
Entschlossenheit, auf ihre Beweglichkeitund rastlose Entschlossenheit und 
Bereitschaft zum Weitereilen, zum Verlassen des eben erst betretenen Raumes 
oder Raumabschnittes" (412). 
Considering its tonal qualities and movement that provide momentary harmony amid 
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uncertain explorations of discord, this description of music, which once appeared to 
Knecht as the force ordering and making (at least aesthetic) sense of the world, reflects 
the journey of the human subject through time, becoming and confronting fate "as the 
entelechy of events in the field of guilt" (Benjamin OGTD PAGE NEEDED). That 
Knecht conceives of his life so similarly bespeaks the good faith of amor fati, an embrace 
of temporal transience in hope that the whole composition of his life will linger like a 
beautiful piece in the memories of others. This is the cheerful innocence with which he 
embraces his fate, whatever it may be, as his path leads him out of Castalia into a future 
rushing toward him unknown and unseen. 
 Knecht gaily brushes aside Tegularius's criticism of the poem's pedantry, pointing 
to the predominance of its essential function over its tone. In so doing he conjures up the 
language of Nieztsche's Zarathustra, the ambivalence of the Gesicht (face/vision) and the 
need to affirm and cut away aspects of the past and himself in order to craft his fate. 
"Also ich habe eine Einsicht, eine Erkenntis, ein ineeres Gesicht erlebt und 
möchte den Gehalt und die Moral dieser Einsicht mir selber zurufen und 
einhämmern. Darum ist das Gedicht mir auch, obwohl ich es nicht wußte, im 
Gedächtnis gelieben. Mögen diese Verse nun gut oder schlecht sein, ihren Zweck 
haben sie also erreicht, die Mahnung hat in mir fortgelebt und ist nicht vergessen 
worden" (413). 
The poem not only speaks to the nature of music, as Tegularius observes, but also 
functions similarly. It lingers like an unforgettable melody or harmony, it returns when 
the present and the past align to awaken a memory and a thought, and its actual 
impermanence vis-a-vis its apparent persistence stakes its claim to profundity and 
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significance. Fate – envisioned as the subject's confrontation with the past and inevitable 
future death, the moment in which the subject must order and make meaning from 
experience for the sake of making meaning in the future, the affirmation and 
incorporation of the Schuldzusammenhang as well as the acceptance of endless 
movement through time – is described by this poem which also strikes Knecht with an 
awareness of the very phenomenon that it seeks to illustrate. 
 After leaving Castalia, Knecht takes on a private pupil, Tito, the son of his old 
friend Plinio. Knecht travels out to the family's mountain villa to meet Tito and finds the 
boy especially clever and inspiring. Eager to begin teaching him but also sensitive to the 
young man's need for a degree of freedom and independence, Knecht decides to wait a 
day before beginning their work together. The next morning he awakes to find Tito 
outside on the lake shore, performing what appears to be a spontaneous, ecstatic dance to 
welcome the sunrise over the mountains. Noticing after a moment that he has been seen, 
Tito seems to shake off his embarrassment by challenging Knecht to swim across the lake 
with him to see if they can reach the other side before the mountains receding shadow. 
Knecht, overcome by a fresh zeal for life despite the weakness of age and fatigue from 
his travels, throws himself into the water and swims after the boy, but in Dionysian 
fashion, like a sailor answering the sirens' song, is lost to the waves and literally absorbed 
into this final experience. 
"Er war nach dem Absprung schnell wieder emporgetaucht, entdeckte mit großem 
Vorsprung vor sich den Schwimmer Tito wieder, fühlte sich von dem Eisigen, 
Wilden, Feindseligen bitter bedrängt und glaubte noch um die Verringerung des 
Abstandes, um das Ziel des Wettschwimmens, um die Achtung und 
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Kameradschaft, um die Seele des Knaben zu kämpfen, als er schon mit dem Tode 
kämpfte, der ihn gestellt und zum Ringen umarmt hatte. Mit allen Kräften hielt er 
ihm stand, solange das Herz noch schlug" (470). 
The final moments of Knecht's life exemplify his affirmative fatalism in the most 
bittersweet of terms. Having already performed one sacrifice for his own sense of self – 
leaving Castalia, losing the respect of his fellow magisters, but maintaining his integrity 
and devotion to the ideal of the Glass Bead Game – he performs this last sacrifice for his 
pupil. Wishing on the one hand to win over Tito's affection and on the other hand to 
plunge into a spontaneous and wild experience unlike anything that he had heretofore 
allowed himself, Knecht throws himself forward while simultaneously feeling thrown 
and embraced by death. Otherwise banished to obscurity, his fate lies in the impression 
that he can make upon this student, the wisdom that he can impart, and to these ends he 
will challenge even death with full knowledge of his age and weakness. 
 The Glass Bead Game Master embodies the ideal of the Game: the dialectical play 
with ideas, the tragic play with competing narratives necessitating a sacrifice for a 
synthesis. Living this ideal in himself, rejecting the sterile asceticism of Dasa and 
Josephus, taking a cue from the Rainmaker and redirecting his intentions, Knecht teaches 
his final lesson, which reaches Tito after he reaches the opposite shore. 
"Oh weh, dachte er entsetzt, nun bin ich an seinem Tode schuldig! Und erst jetzt, 
wo kein Stolz zu wehren und kein Widerstand mehr zu leisten war, spürte er im 
Weh seines erschockenen Herzens, wie lieb er diesen Mann schon gehabt hatte. 
Und indem er sich, trotz allen Einwänden, an des Meisters Tode mitschuldig 
fühlte, überkam ihn mit heiligem Schauer die Ahnung, daß diese Schuld ihn selbst 
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und sein Leben umgestalten und viel Größeres von ihm fordern werde, als er 
bisher je von sich verlangt hatte" (471). 
Of course Tito is not directly responsible for Knecht's death, but the thought pierces his 
heart and draws him from innocence into guilt – indeed, an awareness of the 
Schuldzusammenhang des Lebendigen is awakened in him. And this guilt will have 
transformative power, will forever change his sense of self and world, and "demand much 
greater things from him." If the Glass Bead Game is the spiritual heir to the Magic 
Theater, then its essence truly lies in the production of meaningful narratives which, 
taken together and in conversation with one another, must be continually reworked, 
reformed, and negotiated in order each time to yield with increasing clarity a view of 
oneself and the world which both aesthetically and ethically justifies existence. Tito's first 
task is to make meaning out of Knecht's seemingly senseless death. And while it is 
pointless to conjecture about the identity of the narrator, it is certainly a sign of the lasting 
significance of Knecht's life and death that the editor of the biography insists on his 
exemplary status as student, teacher, and master of the Glass Bead Game. 
 The closing lines of Hesse's (and, diegetically, Knecht's) poem "Stufen" describe 
the affirmative fatalist worldview which is also at the heart of the Glass Bead Game: "Es 
wird vielleicht auch noch die Todesstunde / Uns neuen Räumen jung entgegensenden." 
Obtusely read, the verses are an uninspired musing on the idea of reincarnation, but, 
given his thoughtful engagement with religious and philosophical traditions, the reader 
should not think so little of Hesse. Indeed, Knecht is sent at the hour of death into new 
realms: his story, "the legend" of his life and death, and his Lebensläufe survive him and 
take on a new life of their own. The Game, like the Magic Theater, is not merely a playful 
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thought experiment, but rather an earnest contemplation of fate as an existential and 
psychological phenomenon, the development and evolution of the subject, and how these 
processes are constituted through a tragedy that plays out both within the subject and 
between generations. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
 
 Throughout this dissertation a dictum of Nietzsche's has appeared time and again 
as part and parcel of an understanding and rationalization of amor fati, that clearest 
expression of affirmative fatalism: "Only as an aesthetic phenomenon is life still bearable 
to us." Walter Benjamin criticizes this formulation not only explicitly in Ursprung des 
deutschen Trauerspiels, but also implicitly in Das Kunstwerk im Zeitalter seiner 
technischen Reproduzierbarkeit, when he points out the specific fascist tendency to 
aestheticize a politic in order to appeal to and engage the rage of the masses without any 
express intention of liberating or improving the material conditions of their oppression 
(Illuminationen 167-8). The hindsight of history provides a clear view of how the 
aestheticization of the National Socialist politic and its thematization of the German 
people's fate (Schicksal) mobilized a sense of affirmative fatalism in the service of an 
authoritarian war machine and industrialized genocide. But it is precisely here that the 
sharp distinction must be drawn between affirmative fatalism in its authentic sense – a 
love of and dynamic engagement with fate as discussed throughout the last four chapters 
– and the passive fatalism of authoritarianism – a prostration before a prescribed fate, the 
obsequiousness of which is veiled in the language and pageantry of patriotic heroism.  
 Considering the material conditions surrounding its composition between 1933 
and 1941, Josef Knecht's ultimate fate in Das Glasperlenspiel – his letter of resignation 
and sudden death – takes on a broader significance beyond the expression of Hesse's 
affirmative fatalism, with all of its existential and religious inflections. In defiance of an 
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institution in danger of abandoning its integrity in the unctuous service of a nationalistic 
or belligerent politic, Knecht leaves his post like so many German artists and 
intellectuals, perhaps to vanish into obscurity, perhaps to meet an utterly sudden and 
embarrassing doom. He is the German conscience that cannot tolerate the supposedly 
apolitical Innerlichkeit which, in its privileged position, more or less unperturbed by anti-
Semitism, militarism, and Gleichschaltung, tolerates these. That fatalism, even more 
passive than the authoritarianism of the ardent fascist, is utterly poisonous to the spirit 
that Knecht represents, and should he die in obscurity, should he fall so far from his 
position as Glass Bead Game Master that his death arouse not even a sigh, it is a far 
better fate than devoting his life to an institution with no regard for its potential 
complicity in the expansion of militarism. This is a fatalism affirmatively defined not 
only by its aesthetic appeal – to expose oneself to new and beautiful things, to feel the 
rush of the risk – but by this appeal's accord with a view of human freedom and the 
divine creative potential of the individual. The aesthetic and ethical orientations of such 
an affirmative fatalism are united for Knecht as they were for so many writers and artists 
during the Third Reich: exile was a heartbreaking necessity, but as necessity it became an 
aspect of fate affirmed through their creative work. 
 The Glass Bead Game itself as a metaphor need not be limited to the processes of 
self-narrativization through which a subject, repeatedly but variedly, performs an 
existential-psychological (and thereby also religious) Gedankenexperiment as with the 
thought of the Eternal Return of Nietzsche's fröhliche Wissenschaft, but may also 
represent the very process playing out before the reader's eyes, in this sentence and the 
last and next since the beginning of the document at hand. Knecht's traumatic death 
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inspires guilt in Tito, his pupil, but only insofar as his death has inspired the very legend 
that the editor includes in the biography, and only insofar as his life and death were 
noteworthy enough for the editor, a Castalian who professes to adhere to the 
fundamentally uncreative principles of the educational province, to break with this 
tradition. And this he does by asserting the exemplarity of Knecht as one such Castalian, 
although this is achieved by including his creative works. In the final analysis, the 
dialectical play that characterizes the Glass Bead Game is embodied in the fictional 
editor's organization and execution of writing Knecht's biography. Similarly, it is in the 
practice of reading, comparing, and writing about the narrative works of authors that 
literary scholarship likewise engages in the Glass Bead Game, and in this dissertation it is 
specifically the thematization of affirmative fatalism as an existential-psychological 
negotiation of different narratives that exemplifies, on the level of the individual subject, 
the processes of self-evaluation and the affirmation of fate which authors like Hermann 
Hesse and Thomas Mann took upon themselves as representatives of the German literary 
tradition. Works of literature inspire their readers to take the words and ideas represented 
in them beyond the page, to give them new life in discourse and scholarship, and thereby 
allow for a dynamic engagement with the past that plays out in and informs the present 
for the sake of the future. Knecht's apotheosis through the biography is as much a 
narrative performance of the Glass Bead Game as both of these are metaphors for the 
process of writing history and coming to terms with it. 
 Coming to terms with history, of course, implies that it weighs heavily upon the 
present, like the demon's proposition in Die fröhliche Wissenschaft, and recalls the 
second chapter's discussion of amor fati as an affirmation made in the good faith that the 
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individual or collective formulation of present fate can grant the past a grace which 
makes it bearable. In affirming the past as the stuff of present fate, a sacrifice is made for 
the sake of the future: the commitment to a narrative, implicit in the acknowledgement of 
past necessity, chips away at the stone of perceived possibility, narrowing the field of 
what can be by what has been, but in this sacrifice makes its vision of the future clearer 
and mutely professes an inarticulate faith that it will justify the past, even if only 
aesthetically.  
 But the aesthetic justification of existence implies an ethic, insofar as the accord 
struck between a subject's interior and exterior orients itself toward future action in the 
hopeful search for further accord. And where this ethic is not explicitly articulated, it 
must be read out of that orientation and action. In both Hesse's essays on religion and 
throughout the incarnations of Knecht in Das Glasperlenspiel there is a marked tension 
between a tendency toward Innerlichkeit and a desire for belonging which attempts to 
resolve itself in the critical consideration of the individual's position and role in the larger 
context of the community. There is likewise however a tension between the belonging 
sought here and the integration of the individual into a larger authoritarian order, such as 
the church, political organization, or military, which then attempts to resolve itself in the 
question of its historical position. Josef Knecht is not merely interested in how his life 
will serve the Castalian institution, though he certainly values its fundamental ideals, but 
is rather more interested in the institution's relationship to political power structures and 
its role in developments that will determine its history. It is an echo from Zarathustras 
Wiederkehr that warns against the potential belligerence of political movements that 
ultimately exploit the individual's desire for belonging to destructive ends. Instead 
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Knecht's incarnations seek out peaceful paths in often idyllic environments, narrative and 
poetic images of the accord between interior and exterior which were most appealing to 
Hesse and which serve as a fecund, voluptuous alternative to the grime and grind of 
industry and war machines. 
 Similarly, the beautiful and ethereal atmospheres of music, with its complex 
harmonies, awesome structures, and vast possibilities, enchant Knecht and Hesse alike. 
Although Sinclair in Demian expresses that he loves music because it is not moral, there 
is indeed implied in its form an order and meaning which are not devoid of an ethic. But 
this ethic is bound to an aesthetic, and the implications of this relationship seem to have 
evaded Hesse's grasp to some extent, though there is evidence enough between Gertrud, 
Demian, Der Steppenwolf, and Das Glasperlenspiel that a future study of the tensions 
between Baroque and Romantic musical sensibilities in these novels could prove fruitful 
for a understanding of how these styles are reflected in their ethics. Such has remained 
for the time being beyond the bounds of this dissertation. 
 What this dissertation has sought to achieve is to draw a thread from the traditions 
of tragedy and Trauerspiel through the nineteenth century and into the twentieth, 
focusing on the legacy of the tragic as it lived on in Nietzsche's psychological philosophy 
and was taken up by Hermann Hesse in his literary explorations of spiritual development 
and the fate of the German soul. Affirmative fatalism, as the tendential orientation toward 
the contingencies of social life and the inevitability of death particularly observed here, 
achieves its most authentic expression not merely through texts and rhetoric that exploit 
the spectacle of sacrifice, but rather through those that engage with the tragic modality in 
its various manifestations, taking seriously its implications for the spiritual development 
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of the individual in relation to social and political movements that offer a sense of 
belonging or meaning. As eventually illustrated in Das Glasperlenspiel, where 
affirmative fatalism itself becomes thematized within the text itself, this existential-
psychological comportment is taken to its logical conclusion when a subject carries out 
its central process (the negotiation of narratives) on both an individual and communal 
level, for personal as well as social, national, or world history. 
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